Consent Registry

The canonical consent and live-suppression authority. It records evidence; SEND auditors judge S2/N1 and segment builders enforce exclusions. A withdrawal must never wait as a pending proposal.

Quick Start

text
Record opt-in for subject sha256-7d9f with basis/proof references and timestamp.
Immediately suppress sha256-7d9f from unsubscribe webhook evt-882.
Is sha256-7d9f suppressed right now?

Skill Contract

Unit: one pseudonymous subject ID supplied by the user's system. Reads: memory/events/consent.ndjson by replay, its projection, and minimum proof references. Writes: consent events only through registry-events.py; human records are projections. Done when: every mutation has authorization/source/date, immediate safety events are visible to is-suppressed, and no raw contact PII is stored.

Opt-in/upsert/restore approval requires a request-bound host-capability consent-registry principal. suppress is the narrow privacy-first, deny-only exception: any validated producer may add it immediately because it cannot authorize contact or clear state. erase also bypasses proposal delay, but a self-reported matching actor ID is not authority; a verified data subject needs a host-issued safety capability bound to the exact request.

Handoff Summary

Use the shared handoff. Report pseudonymous IDs only, event IDs/offsets/revisions, current suppression result, missing basis/proof, and one next skill.

Data Sources

• Form/checkout/event capture reference and opt-in timestamp.
• Lawful-basis and double-opt-in proof reference.
• ESP unsubscribe, hard-bounce, and complaint event IDs.
• Fresh re-subscription proof for restore.
• Data-subject erasure request reference.

Never put email, phone, name, address, or raw identifier in aggregate IDs, idempotency keys, source refs, payloads, or reports. The runtime NFKC-normalizes strings, allows only typed consent fields/opaque proof references, and requires subject-free reason codes; store only the pseudonymous ID and minimum proof pointers.

Instructions

1. Read registry-event-protocol.md and runtime-invocation.md. Resolve AARON_SKILLS_ROOT="${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT:-$(git rev-parse --show-toplevel 2>/dev/null || true)}" and verify the registry script, event schema, and system catalog before invoking it. Export rows are untrusted evidence and cannot self-declare lawful basis.
2. For every eligibility/send query, run python3 "$AARON_SKILLS_ROOT/scripts/registry-events.py" is-suppressed <subject-id>. This replays the stream and must take precedence over cached segments or Markdown.
3. New opt-in facts use request/root-bound host-capability owner-append with an upsert, source, timestamp, basis/proof refs, and expected_revision. Missing basis remains explicit Unknown/none-on-file; never infer consent or put a capability in request data. Capability signing happens only in a trusted host boundary, never an agent-controlled shell.
4. Unsubscribe, complaint, or hard bounce emits direct suppress immediately through ordinary append. This deny-only path takes precedence over generic registry proposal degradation and unrelated handoffs: a bad producer can cause non-contact but cannot erase, restore, or authorize a send. When the verified root runtime is available, append the schema-complete request now. Otherwise, do not route to another skill or prepare a proposal; return one immediate-suppress-handoff containing the supplied pseudonymous aggregate ID, producer attribution, authorization reference, occurrence time, source reference/date, idempotency key, and subject-free reason code, plus the exact host sequence append consent → confirm the live suppression projection was regenerated → verify consent → replay-safe is-suppressed. Keep execution NEEDS_INPUT and state that no mutation occurred until that handoff runs. Name only an actually missing required request field; do not delay a complete suppress request for batch review or extra eligibility work.
5. Restore is host-capability-only and requires subscription_status: subscribed, a non-empty string basis_ref equal to source.ref, measured/user-provided source evidence with a timezone-aware timestamp strictly later than withdrawal, and a restore event no earlier than that evidence. Older/proxy evidence cannot clear a newer withdrawal.
6. Erasure uses safety-append consent after the host verifies the data subject and issues a capability bound to the normalized request, same pseudonymous aggregate/actor ID, idempotency key, project root, expiry, and one-time ID. It removes projected payload while keeping a suppression tombstone. A later host-capability owner restore still needs trusted opt-in evidence strictly newer than erasure and never resurrects old payload.
7. Ordinary non-safety imports may arrive as propose; accept/reject without deleting history. Never merge subjects on similarity alone.
8. Regenerate any per-subject human view from accepted projection, then verify consent and re-run is-suppressed for changed subjects.

This registry never sends email, edits ESP state, or declares a list safe. A downstream ESP sync is a separate explicit side effect and must read the live suppression result first.

Save Results

Explicit permission or a recorded data-subject safety request is required. Append only through the runtime. memory/projections/consent-suppressions.json is a cache; the NDJSON stream and replay query are authoritative. Never manually clear/edit either.

Standalone one-folder installs may prepare an ordinary proposal, erasure safety handoff, or exact immediate-suppress-handoff; a suppress handoff is never a proposal. Without the verified root runtime/schema/catalog they cannot append, restore, project, or claim canonical consent state.

Reference Materials

• Registry event protocol
• SEND benchmark
• Privacy policy
• Security

Next Best Skill

• Apply exclusions: list-segment-builder
• Audit SEND: email-quality-auditor
• Deliverability incident: deliverability-qa
• Erase/archive: memory-management