Install any skill in seconds. Free to start, no credit card required.
Get Started Free →Analyzes malicious Linux ELF (Executable and Linkable Format) binaries including botnets, cryptominers, ransomware, and rootkits targeting Linux servers, containers, and cloud infrastructure. Covers static analysis, dynamic tracing, and reverse engineering of x86_64 and ARM ELF samples. Activates for requests involving Linux malware analysis, ELF binary investigation, Linux server compromise assessment, or container malware analysis.
.claude/skills/analyzing-linux-elf-malware/SKILL.md| Test case | Without → With | Effect | Δ tokens | Δ turns |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| case-02 | ✗→✓ | ▲ Improved | — | — |
| case-09 | ✗→✗ | = Same ✗ | — | — |
| case-11 | ✗→✗ | = Same ✗ | — | — |
| case-04 | ✗→✗ | = Same ✗ | — | — |
| case-19 | ✗→✗ | = Same ✗ | — | — |
Do not use for Windows PE binary analysis; use PEStudio, Ghidra, or IDA for Windows malware.
Examine the ELF header and basic properties:
bash# File type identification file suspect_binary # Detailed ELF header analysis readelf -h suspect_binary # Section headers readelf -S suspect_binary # Program headers (segments) readelf -l suspect_binary # Symbol table (if not stripped) readelf -s suspect_binary nm suspect_binary 2>/dev/null # Dynamic linking information readelf -d suspect_binary ldd suspect_binary 2>/dev/null # Only on matching architecture! # Compute hashes md5sum suspect_binary sha256sum suspect_binary # Check for packing/UPX upx -t suspect_binary
python# Python-based ELF analysis from elftools.elf.elffile import ELFFile import hashlib with open("suspect_binary", "rb") as f: data = f.read() sha256 = hashlib.sha256(data).hexdigest() with open("suspect_binary", "rb") as f: elf = ELFFile(f) print(f"SHA-256: {sha256}") print(f"Class: {elf.elfclass}-bit") print(f"Endian: {elf.little_endian and 'Little' or 'Big'}") print(f"Machine: {elf.header.e_machine}") print(f"Type: {elf.header.e_type}") print(f"Entry Point: 0x{elf.header.e_entry:X}") # Check if stripped symtab = elf.get_section_by_name('.symtab') print(f"Stripped: {'Yes' if symtab is None else 'No'}") # Section entropy analysis import math from collections import Counter for section in elf.iter_sections(): data = section.data() if len(data) > 0: entropy = -sum((c/len(data)) * math.log2(c/len(data)) for c in Counter(data).values() if c > 0) if entropy > 7.0: print(f" [!] High entropy section: {section.name} ({entropy:.2f})")
Search for embedded IOCs and functionality clues:
bash# ASCII strings strings suspect_binary > strings_output.txt # Search for network indicators grep -iE "(http|https|ftp)://" strings_output.txt grep -iE "([0-9]{1,3}\.){3}[0-9]{1,3}" strings_output.txt grep -iE "[a-zA-Z0-9.-]+\.(com|net|org|io|ru|cn)" strings_output.txt # Search for shell commands grep -iE "(bash|sh|wget|curl|chmod|/tmp/|/dev/)" strings_output.txt # Search for crypto mining indicators grep -iE "(stratum|xmr|monero|pool\.|mining)" strings_output.txt # Search for SSH/credential theft grep -iE "(ssh|authorized_keys|id_rsa|shadow|passwd)" strings_output.txt # Search for persistence mechanisms grep -iE "(crontab|systemd|init\.d|rc\.local|ld\.so\.preload)" strings_output.txt # FLOSS for obfuscated strings (if available) floss suspect_binary
Identify what system calls and libraries the malware uses:
bash# List imported functions (dynamically linked) readelf -r suspect_binary | grep -E "socket|connect|exec|fork|open|write|bind|listen" # Trace system calls during execution (in isolated VM only) strace -f -e trace=network,process,file -o strace_output.txt ./suspect_binary # Trace library calls ltrace -f -o ltrace_output.txt ./suspect_binary # Key system calls to watch: # Network: socket, connect, bind, listen, accept, sendto, recvfrom # Process: fork, execve, clone, kill, ptrace # File: open, read, write, unlink, rename, chmod # Persistence: inotify_add_watch (file monitoring)
Debug the malware to observe runtime behavior:
bash# Start GDB with the binary gdb ./suspect_binary # Set breakpoints on key functions (gdb) break main (gdb) break socket (gdb) break connect (gdb) break execve (gdb) break fork # Run and analyze (gdb) run (gdb) info registers # View register state (gdb) x/20s $rdi # Examine string argument (gdb) bt # Backtrace (gdb) continue # For stripped binaries, break on entry point (gdb) break *0x400580 # Entry point from readelf (gdb) run # Monitor network connections during execution # In another terminal: ss -tlnp # List listening sockets ss -tnp # List established connections
Perform deep code analysis on the ELF binary:
Ghidra Analysis for Linux ELF:
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
1. Import: File -> Import -> Select ELF binary
- Ghidra auto-detects ELF format and architecture
- Accept default analysis options
2. Key analysis targets:
- main() function (or entry point if stripped)
- Socket creation and connection functions
- Command dispatch logic (switch/case on received data)
- Encryption/encoding routines
- Persistence installation code
- Self-propagation/scanning functions
3. For Mirai-like botnets, look for:
- Credential list for brute-forcing (telnet/SSH)
- Attack module selection (UDP flood, SYN flood, ACK flood)
- Scanner module (port scanning for vulnerable devices)
- Killer module (killing competing botnets)
4. For cryptominers, look for:
- Mining pool connection (stratum protocol)
- Wallet address strings
- CPU/GPU utilization functions
- Process hiding techniquesCheck for persistence mechanisms:
bash# Check for LD_PRELOAD rootkit strings suspect_binary | grep "ld.so.preload" # Malware writing to /etc/ld.so.preload can hook all dynamic library calls # Check for crontab persistence strings suspect_binary | grep -i "cron" # Check for systemd service creation strings suspect_binary | grep -iE "systemd|\.service|systemctl" # Check for init script creation strings suspect_binary | grep -iE "init\.d|rc\.local|update-rc" # Check for SSH key injection strings suspect_binary | grep -i "authorized_keys" # Check for kernel module (rootkit) loading strings suspect_binary | grep -iE "insmod|modprobe|init_module" # Check for process hiding strings suspect_binary | grep -iE "proc|readdir|getdents"
| Term | Definition | |------|------------| | ELF (Executable and Linkable Format) | Standard binary format for Linux executables, shared libraries, and core dumps containing headers, sections, and segments | | Stripped Binary | ELF binary with debug symbols removed, making reverse engineering more difficult as function names are lost | | LD_PRELOAD | Linux environment variable specifying shared libraries to load before all others; abused by rootkits to intercept system library calls | | strace | Linux system call tracer that logs all system calls and signals made by a process, revealing file, network, and process operations | | GOT/PLT | Global Offset Table and Procedure Linkage Table; ELF structures for dynamic linking that can be hijacked for function hooking | | Statically Linked | Binary compiled with all library code included; common in IoT malware to run on systems without matching shared libraries | | Mirai | Prolific Linux botnet targeting IoT devices via telnet brute-force; source code leaked, leading to many variants |
Context: A cloud server shows 100% CPU usage. Investigation reveals an unknown binary running from /tmp with a suspicious name. The binary needs analysis to confirm it is a cryptominer and identify the attacker's wallet and pool.
Approach:
file and readelf to identify architecture and linking typePitfalls:
ldd on malware outside a sandbox (ldd can execute code in the binary)LINUX ELF MALWARE ANALYSIS REPORT
====================================
File: /tmp/.X11-unix/.rsync
SHA-256: e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb924...
Type: ELF 64-bit LSB executable, x86-64
Linking: Statically linked (all libraries embedded)
Stripped: Yes
Size: 2,847,232 bytes
Packer: UPX 3.96 (unpacked for analysis)
CLASSIFICATION
Family: XMRig Cryptominer (modified)
Variant: Custom build with C2 update mechanism
FUNCTIONALITY
[*] XMR (Monero) mining via RandomX algorithm
[*] Stratum pool connection for work submission
[*] C2 check-in for configuration updates
[*] Process name masquerading (argv[0] = "[kworker/0:0]")
[*] Competitor process killing (kills other miners)
[*] SSH key injection for re-access
NETWORK INDICATORS
Mining Pool: stratum+tcp://pool.minexmr[.]com:4444
C2 Server: hxxp://update.malicious[.]com/config
Wallet: 49jZ5Q3b...Monero_Wallet_Address...
PERSISTENCE
[1] Crontab entry: */5 * * * * /tmp/.X11-unix/.rsync
[2] SSH key added to /root/.ssh/authorized_keys
[3] Systemd service: /etc/systemd/system/rsync-daemon.service
[4] Modified /etc/ld.so.preload for process hiding
PROCESS HIDING
LD_PRELOAD: /usr/lib/.libsystem.so
Hook: readdir() to hide /tmp/.X11-unix/.rsync from ls
Hook: fopen() to hide from /proc/*/maps reading| Case | Status | Duration (ms) | Turns | Tokens | Tool calls | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Without | With | Δ | Without | With | Δ | Without | With | Δ | Without | With | Δ | ||
case-09 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-11 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-04 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-19 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-20 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-08 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-21 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-10 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-18 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-06 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-16 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-13 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-22 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-05 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-12 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-03 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-14 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-02 | fail→pass | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-15 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-01 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-07 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-17 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
DecimalAI ran this skill against gemini-3.6-flash twice over the same eval suite — once with the skill loaded and once without — and compared the two runs case by case. 22 cases were attempted. The headline lift of +5 percentage points is the difference between those two pass rates over the 22 comparable cases.
The per-case answers from this run were removed by the retention sweep, so the case table below shows the verdicts without the text either arm produced. The counts above were recorded at the time and are unaffected. Answers are now kept for 180 days.
Other measured skills in the registry, with their headline benchmark lift.