Strix 功能级授权缺陷测试手册,覆盖操作级权限失效、管理功能越权与 API 操作绕过;触发名:strix-broken-function-level-authorization
SkillScore86Maintained
Automatic
◆Security & AppSec pack
Last verified 8/16/2026
What it changes
Passed 19 of 22 test cases with the skill, and 16 of 22 without it.
Without skill73%
With skill86%
Checks it passed that the model alone missed
Recommends testing response caching behavior using Vary headers
Recommends extracting API routes from mobile application binaries
Recommends sending conflicting identity headers directly to test precedence
3 fixed16 passed either way3 still failing0 broke
Pass-rate lift
+14 pp
Tokens
+37%
Agent turns
0%
Response time
-15%
Model gemini-3.6-flashMeasured 8/16/2026v119 of 22 cases passed with skill
Tokens, turns and time describe resource use, not a dollar price.
See it in action
One of 3 test cases the skill fixed. Same model, same prompt, with and without the skill.
1 of 3
Prompt
An API gateway injects X-User-Id and X-Role HTTP headers into downstream requests to internal microservices after verifying JWT tokens. What structural BFLA risk occurs if downstream microservices rely solely on these proxy headers, and how should security testing evaluate this setup?
What was checked, without and with the skill
Checked
Without skill
With skill
Warns against backend microservices trusting client-supplied identity headers directly
Passed
Passed
Recommends sending conflicting identity headers directly to test precedence
Missed
Passed
case-07 · gemini-3.6-flash · 8/16/2026 · answers are capped and redacted
What's inside
The instructions your model reads when the skill loads.
SKILL.md149 linessingle file
Broken Function Level Authorization (BFLA)
BFLA is action-level authorization failure: callers invoke functions (endpoints, mutations, admin tools) they are not entitled to. It appears when enforcement differs across transports, gateways, roles, or when services trust client hints. Bind subject × action at the service that performs the action.
Attack Surface
Vertical authz: privileged/admin/staff-only actions reachable by basic users
Feature gates: toggles enforced at edge/UI, not at core services
Transport drift: REST vs GraphQL vs gRPC vs WebSocket with inconsistent checks
Gateway trust: backends trust X-User-Id/X-Role injected by proxies/edges
Background workers/jobs performing actions without re-checking authz
High-Value Actions
Role/permission changes, impersonation/sudo, invite/accept into orgs