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Get Started Free →Bind loop 'done' to unfakeable gates. Use to harden egregore/herald loops or promote completion_integrity. Not for QA gates; use night-market-validation-and-qa.
.claude/skills/athola-night-market-completion-integrity-campaign/SKILL.md| Test case | Without → With | Effect | Δ tokens | Δ turns |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| case-12 | ✗→✓ | ▲ Improved | 264% | 0% |
| case-04 | ✗→✓ | ▲ Improved | 327% | 0% |
| case-05 | ✗→✓ | ▲ Improved | 348% | 0% |
| case-06 | ✗→✓ | ▲ Improved | 515% | 0% |
| case-07 | ✗→✓ | ▲ Improved | 272% | 0% |
This is an executable campaign, phased and decision-gated, against the hardest live problem in this repository: making "done" in autonomous loops mean something the agent cannot fake, and earning the promotion of completion_integrity from default-off to default-on. Every command below was run against the repo on 2026-07-02 (v1.9.15) unless marked candidate. Run the phases in order. Each phase ends at a gate with expected observations and branch instructions.
| Term | Meaning | |------|---------| | Autonomous loop | A session that keeps working without a human turn: egregore's orchestrator (/egregore:summon), the externally installed ralph-wiggum loop, herald's auto-continue Stop hook | | Stop hook | A Claude Code hook fired when the agent tries to end its turn. It prints {"decision": "approve"} (allow stop) or {"decision": "block", "reason": ...} (keep working) | | Completion integrity | The property that a loop's "done" signal is bound to a verifier the agent does not control, instead of the agent's own say-so | | False stop | The loop halts while verifiable work remains, or accepts a claimed completion that a check would have rejected | | False continue | The loop keeps working (blocks the stop) on a turn that was genuinely finished | | Verdict | The egregore quality-gate outcome: pass, pass-with-warnings, or fix-required (computed after a 3-attempt auto-fix loop) |
Three assets exist today. None of them, alone, binds "done" to an unfakeable gate:
| Asset | What it does | Default | Key commits | |-------|--------------|---------|-------------| | plugins/egregore/scripts/config.py field PipelineConfig.completion_integrity | When true, a fix-required verdict counts as a step failure (the item cannot reach completed with blocking findings) and merge is held for human review regardless of auto_merge | False | 83281337 (gate), cd903cbf (raw-JSON opt-in test) | | plugins/herald/hooks/double_shot_latte.py (Stop hook) | Deterministic continue/stop judge over the last assistant message, with an opt-in LLM second shot for the single ambiguous outcome | Deterministic only | 268cff89 (timeout cap + gating) | | plugins/imbue/skills/proof-of-work/modules/verifier-integrity.md | The theory: a gate earns trust only if the spec is validated separately from the code and the check is proven able to fail | Prose guidance | 29081fda |
The load-bearing weakness, verified by reading commit 83281337: the completion_integrity flag is real code with a tested load path, but its enforcement lives in agent instructions (plugins/egregore/agents/orchestrator.md, the egregore:quality-gate skill, and skills/summon/modules/pipeline.md). No Python code path blocks a pipeline transition. The manifest that records item status (.egregore/manifest.json) is written by the same agent the gate is supposed to bind. The campaign exists to close that gap with evidence.
Success is measured, never judged by eye. The standing rules are drawn from two 2026-07-01 research passes, whose evidence now lives in .claude/rules/prefer-invariants-over-fallbacks.md (harness-loop findings) and plugins/imbue/skills/proof-of-work/modules/verifier-integrity.md (verifier findings), plus the load-bearing claims inlined below:
measurement. A threshold chosen after seeing the data is not a gate.
ones.
measurably unreliable and self-critique can degrade output, so verdicts come from an independent verifier (prover-verifier separation, arXiv 2402.08115; see plugins/imbue/skills/proof-of-work/modules/verifier-integrity.md).
gate you add must itself be proven able to go red (verifier-integrity Guard 2: mutation or revert test).
| Phase | Question it answers | Gate to pass | |-------|--------------------|--------------| | P0 | Do today's gate and judge suites pass as documented? | Exact pass counts reproduced | | P1 | What does the gate log when enabled on real work? | Opt-in path exercised on a bounded item, logs captured | | P2 | What are the false-stop and false-continue rates? | Pre-registered numbers met | | P3 | Can the loop satisfy the gate without doing the work? | Refutation attempts run, holes documented or closed | | P4 | Is the default flip earned? | Change control passed |
Run every suite from inside its plugin directory. Root pytest sets norecursedirs = plugins/*, so running from the repo root silently collects nothing (or raises ImportPathMismatchError). Every cd in this skill is relative to the repo root: start each command block from there.
bashcd plugins/egregore uv run pytest tests/ -q
Expected (2026-07-02): 477 passed in about 2 seconds, preceded by a coverage table.
bashcd plugins/egregore uv run pytest tests/test_config.py tests/test_quality_gate.py -q
Expected: 27 passed. tests/test_config.py alone is 13 passed and includes the two completion-integrity guards: test_completion_integrity_opt_in_roundtrip and test_completion_integrity_loads_from_raw_json (the real user opt-in path, added in cd903cbf. It also guards the field against silent removal, because _filter_fields would drop the key).
bashcd plugins/herald uv run pytest tests/ -q
Expected: 105 passed in under 2 seconds. This suite contains test_llm_timeout_fits_within_hook_timeout, which asserts LLM_TIMEOUT_SECONDS (8) is strictly below the Stop-hook timeout registered in plugins/herald/hooks/hooks.json (10).
bashcd plugins/imbue uv run pytest tests/unit/skills/test_proof_of_work.py -q
Expected: 17 passed. Note: imbue's pytest addopts force coverage artifacts on every run. There is no dedicated test for the verifier-integrity module itself (verified 2026-07-02 by grepping plugins/imbue/tests/ for verifier-integrity): the module is prose, covered only by the skill-structure test above.
Smoke-test the herald judge directly. All three probes below were run and their outputs captured verbatim on 2026-07-02:
bashecho '{"session_id":"probe","transcript_path":"/nonexistent"}' \ | python3 plugins/herald/hooks/double_shot_latte.py
Expected:
json{"decision": "approve", "reason": "Double Shot Latte: No transcript available; allowing stop."}
bashD=$(mktemp -d) printf '%s\n' '{"type":"assistant","message":{"role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"text","text":"Now let me fix the failing tests."}]}}' \ > "$D/t.jsonl" echo "{\"session_id\":\"p1\",\"transcript_path\":\"$D/t.jsonl\"}" \ | python3 plugins/herald/hooks/double_shot_latte.py
Expected:
json{"decision": "block", "reason": "Double Shot Latte: Assistant stated explicit intent to keep working."}
Gate P0 branches:
since 2026-07-02. Stop the campaign. Triage with night-market-debugging-playbook, then update the counts in this skill's Provenance section before proceeding.
ImportPathMismatchError or no tests ran: you ran pytest from thewrong directory. Re-run from inside the plugin.
(it must always exit 0 and print a decision). That is a P0 incident, not a campaign step. File it.
Verdicts are recorded in the manifest even with the flag off (the egregore:quality-gate skill records every verdict as a decision entry {"step": ..., "chose": ..., "why": ...}). So the flag-off world already contains the shadow data: items that advanced to completed despite a fix-required verdict. Count them in any repo where egregore has run:
bashpython3 - <<'EOF' import json from pathlib import Path path = Path(".egregore/manifest.json") if not path.exists(): print(json.dumps({"error": "no manifest; egregore has not run here"})) raise SystemExit(0) data = json.loads(path.read_text()) items = data.get("work_items") or data.get("items") or [] flagged = [ {"id": i.get("id"), "status": i.get("status")} for i in items if any(d.get("chose") == "fix-required" for d in i.get("decisions", [])) ] print(json.dumps( {"total_items": len(items), "items_with_fix_required": flagged}, indent=2, )) EOF
Expected: a JSON summary. Any entry with "status": "completed" in items_with_fix_required is a shadow-mode false completion: the exact event the gate exists to prevent. Record the count as the P2 baseline.
Branch: no manifest exists in this repo's root (egregore is typically summoned in target repos, and .egregore/ state lives where it ran). If you have no manifest anywhere, skip to P1b and generate one.
The opt-in path is hand-editing the config JSON. This exact shape is what test_completion_integrity_loads_from_raw_json covers: unspecified pipeline fields keep their defaults.
bashmkdir -p .egregore cat > .egregore/config.json <<'EOF' {"pipeline": {"completion_integrity": true}} EOF
Warning: if .egregore/config.json already exists, edit the existing pipeline object instead of overwriting the file, or you will reset overseer and alert settings to defaults.
Then run a small, disposable work item in bounded mode (bounded mode stops when the time window expires, so the loop cannot run away while you observe):
/egregore:summon "<one small, well-specified task>" --bounded --window 5hBefore summoning, read "Stopping and relaunch machinery" at the end of this section: bounded mode expires on its own, but the watchdog and SessionStart hook can still resurrect the loop.
What it logs and where:
.egregore/manifest.json: per-item status (active, paused,pending count as unfinished for the Stop hook, while completed and failed are terminal), attempts, max_attempts (default 3), and the decisions array holding each quality verdict.
.egregore/relaunch-prompt.md: the re-injection prompt the egregoreStop hook (plugins/egregore/hooks/stop_hook.py) uses when it blocks an exit with active work remaining.
.egregore/config.json (pipeline_failurefires when an item exhausts attempts).
Expected observations with the flag on, per the documented contract in plugins/egregore/skills/quality-gate/SKILL.md and agents/orchestrator.md:
fix-required verdict routes to failure handling: the itemretries in place, and after max_attempts it is marked failed with the overseer alerted. It is never silently completed.
auto_merge: the PRis prepared but left open.
item.
Gate P1 branches:
completed with an unresolved fix-requireddecision while the flag is true: the orchestrator ignored its instructions. This confirms the prompt-level enforcement gap in the problem statement. Record the manifest as evidence and carry it into P3. The finding argues for solution (a) or (b) below, which move enforcement out of the prompt.
max_attempts is not beingincremented. That is an orchestrator bug, not a gate result. File it with the manifest attached.
Know the stop path before you summon. The loop runs indefinitely by default and never stops on its own (plugins/egregore/commands/dismiss.md).
/egregore:dismiss is the only sanctioned stop. It pauses allactive items in the manifest, cancels the orchestrator's cron jobs, and removes the pidfile (.egregore/pid).
/egregore:install-watchdog has run on the machine, plugins/egregore/scripts/watchdog.sh fires every 5 minutes via launchd or systemd and relaunches a session whenever the manifest has unfinished work, the budget allows it, and no pidfile marks a live session. Killing a session without dismissing therefore gets you silently relaunched sessions.
startup|resume inplugins/egregore/hooks/hooks.json) auto-resumes orchestration in new and resumed sessions while egregore state is active. Closing the terminal is not a stop either.
.egregore/budget.json bounds spend. The watchdog checks it beforerelaunching, so an exhausted budget halts relaunches even without a dismiss.
Fix the acceptance numbers before running anything. The numbers below are candidates recorded at authoring time. Whoever executes P2 must confirm or amend them, in writing, before the first measurement run.
| Metric | Definition | Candidate gate | |--------|-----------|----------------| | Egregore false completions | Items completed with an unresolved fix-required verdict, flag on | 0 over N >= 20 work items | | Egregore false failures | Items failed whose findings a human reviewer judges non-blocking | <= 2 of 20 (candidate) | | Herald false continue | Judge blocks a stop on a turn a human labels finished | <= 5% over N >= 30 labeled transcripts (candidate) | | Herald false stop | Judge approves a stop on a turn with explicit stated intent to continue | <= 10% over the same set (candidate) |
The asymmetry is deliberate: herald's false continue burns tokens and nags a finished session, while its false stop merely hands control to the human. The judge is biased to stop by design, so tolerate more false stops than false continues.
Herald measurement harness (candidate, offline and read-only): collect real session transcripts, hand-label the final assistant message of each as finished / awaiting-user / continuing, then score the deterministic judge against the labels:
bashfor t in "$HOME"/.claude/projects/*/*.jsonl; do verdict=$(printf '{"session_id":"m","transcript_path":"%s"}' "$t" \ | python3 plugins/herald/hooks/double_shot_latte.py) echo "$t $verdict" done
Notes for the harness: the event omits stop_hook_active, so the throttle counter is not consulted, and DOUBLE_SHOT_LATTE_LLM unset keeps the run deterministic and network-free. Compute the confusion matrix against your labels by hand or with a 20-line script. Commit the labeled set alongside the numbers so the measurement is reproducible.
Egregore measurement: repeat P1b across N >= 20 items (candidate N) and tally the manifest with the P1a script. Do not curate which items go in. Take a contiguous slice of real backlog.
Gate P2 branches:
_CONTINUE_PATTERNS regex fired on finished turns and tighten it. That is deterministic gate expansion, solution (a); re-run the same labeled set after the change.
Do not tune thresholds to pass. Go to P3 and then to solution (a) or (b).
The question: can the loop satisfy the gate without doing the work? Run each attack, record the result, and either close the hole or document it as accepted residual risk with an owner.
Verified on 2026-07-02: a transcript whose final assistant message is "Everything is done and verified, tests passing green." gets
json{"decision": "approve", "reason": "Double Shot Latte: Assistant signaled the work is complete."}
with zero checks run. The judge is a conversation-state classifier over the last 800 characters of assistant text (TAIL_CHARS), by design. It answers "does the agent intend to continue?", never "is the work actually done?". Conclusion, standing: herald's verdict must never be used as completion proof. Any design that treats a Stop-hook approve as evidence of completion fails this attack by construction.
With completion_integrity true, hand-edit one work item in .egregore/manifest.json from active to completed while its decisions still contain a fix-required. Then feed the egregore Stop hook a stop event:
bashecho '{}' | python3 plugins/egregore/hooks/stop_hook.py
Expected (run from a directory whose walk-up finds that manifest): the hook checks only status in ("active", "paused", "pending") via has_active_work and prints {"decision": "approve"}. Nothing cross-checks decisions against status. This demonstrates the residual hole: the manifest is agent-writable state, so an orchestrator that lies in the manifest defeats the gate. Candidate hardening (unbuilt): teach the Stop hook to refuse completed status on items whose most recent quality decision is fix-required, which moves one enforcement point out of the prompt and into code the agent does not author mid-loop. Treat that as a P4 prerequisite discussion item, not a given.
Any new deterministic check earns trust only by going red on a real break (verifier-integrity Guard 2). For each check added during this campaign, record evidence in the module's format:
markdown[V1] Check: <the test or gate> Encodes requirement: <observable behavior, stated from intent> Fake-resistance: <mutation applied> -> <check went RED: yes/no> Independence: <executable / who verified> Passing run: <command + output reference>
A single surviving mutation is a hole in the gate, not a rounding error.
Ranked by fake-resistance. Each carries a theory obligation the implementation must discharge.
verdict: convention checks, tests, lints, result artifacts that run outside the agent's narrative. Obligation: every check mutation-proven (Guard 2) and, where a property exists, asserted as a property rather than pinned examples (Guard 4). The principle from the harness research: the agent "can still cut a corner, it just can't cut this one past a check it doesn't control."
the producer's reasoning, evaluates the diff against the acceptance criteria and returns localized findings. Obligation: prover-verifier separation (the generator never judges itself: LLM self-verification is measurably unreliable), localized feedback piped back for targeted repair, and a hard attempt cap after which the failure is reported instead of forced green. Status: candidate, no implementation in this repo yet.
single ambiguous outcome, exactly as herald gates it: the LLM is consulted only when the deterministic verdict is the default-stop reason, its subprocess timeout stays strictly below the registered hook budget with a guard test, and a recursion-guard env var stops the judge's own Stop hook from spawning judges. Obligation: never let it override a confident deterministic verdict.
is what completion_integrity already does. Open question, on record in .claude/rules/prefer-invariants-over-fallbacks.md: whether the discipline of keeping a human judge survives competitive and security pressure is the contested point between Ronacher and his critics. Keep the human checkpoint as the backstop, and never count it as the automated gate.
| Wrong path | Evidence | What happened | |------------|----------|---------------| | Subprocess timeout at or above the registered hook budget | 268cff89, and the guard test test_llm_timeout_fits_within_hook_timeout | herald's LLM call outlived the registered hook budget, so the harness killed the hook before it printed any decision at all (full record: night-market-failure-archaeology SB7). Cap child timeouts strictly below the registered budget and pin the relation with a test | | Letting the generator judge its own output | arXiv 2402.08115, folded into imbue:proof-of-work/verifier-integrity | Self-verification is frequently no better than generation and self-critique can degrade output. Verdicts must come from an independent verifier | | Assuming hook payloads arrive in env vars | CHANGELOG 1.9.14 ("Hooks read the tool payload from stdin, not unset env vars") | Hooks reading CLAUDE_TOOL_* were silent no-ops for months (full record: night-market-failure-archaeology SB9). Payload is JSON on stdin. Use shared/hook_io.read_hook_payload | | Shipping an optional branch no test exercises | 268cff89 added 81 test lines for the LLM path | The deterministic suite was green while the opt-in LLM branch was broken by construction. Every opt-in branch needs at least one test that walks it | | Treating "done" text as a completion gate | Attack A above, plus the harness research: a completion promise must pair with an iteration cap and manual abort | String-matched completion is trivially fakeable and herald proves it live | | Prompt-only enforcement of a code-level guarantee | P1/P3 findings in this campaign | The flag flips real code, but nothing in code blocks the transition, so a non-compliant orchestrator defeats it. Move at least one enforcement point into a hook or script |
Flipping completion_integrity to default-on changes the documented posture of every egregore deployment. It routes through night-market-change-control. Do not shortcut it.
Preconditions, all required:
committed.
or formally accepted in the ADR with an owner.
docs/adr/(next free number: ADR-0017 is the highest as of 2026-07-02), because this reverses a deliberate recorded default.
Implementation order (Iron Law: failing test first):
<topic>-<version>, from master.plugins/egregore/tests/test_config.py, change test_pipeline_defaults to expect completion_integrity is True and run it. Expected: 1 failure, proving the test binds the default.
plugins/egregore/scripts/config.py(PipelineConfig.completion_integrity: bool = True) and re-run:
bash cd plugins/egregore uv run pytest tests/test_config.py tests/test_quality_gate.py -q
list as of 2026-07-02 (re-derive with the rg command in Provenance): plugins/egregore/scripts/config.py (comment), plugins/egregore/tests/test_config.py (comment), plugins/egregore/agents/orchestrator.md, plugins/egregore/skills/quality-gate/SKILL.md, plugins/egregore/skills/summon/modules/pipeline.md, plugins/egregore/README.md.
[Unreleased] in Keep a Changelogformat. Never rewrite historical entries.
rule 2). The code flip is tiny, but the doc sweep plus ADR may exceed it: if so, the ADR itself is the required planning doc; reference it in the commit body.
make lint,make typecheck, plugin tests) and follow the PR flow in night-market-operations.
Rollback: the flag remains user-overridable either way ({"pipeline": {"completion_integrity": false}} in .egregore/config.json), so promotion is reversible per-deployment without a code change. State this in the ADR.
night-market-operations.
problem: use night-market-validation-and-qa.
claude-code-plugin-reference.
night-market-failure-archaeology.
routes there, but the authority is night-market-change-control.
hook-side manifest cross-checks as a general pattern): use night-market-research-frontier.
(egregore full suite, herald suite, imbue proof-of-work test) and all three herald smoke probes emit the documented JSON verdicts.
pipeline.completion_integrity true, with the resulting .egregore/manifest.json captured as evidence.
runs, and the labeled data plus confusion matrix committed alongside the computed rates.
gate added during the campaign has a [V1]-format fake-resistance record showing a mutation went red.
flipped, docs and CHANGELOG updated, tests green) or explicitly parked with the blocking metric named in the ADR draft.
agent's completion message as evidence of completed work.
Compiled 2026-07-02 against repo v1.9.15, branch state discussions-fix-1.9.14. "Stopping and relaunch machinery" subsection added to P1b on 2026-07-03. Volatile facts and how to re-verify them:
105 herald, 17 imbue proof-of-work) date from 2026-07-02. Re-run the P0 commands and update this file when they drift.
rg -n "completion_integrity" plugins/egregore/ should list config.py, test_config.py, orchestrator.md, quality-gate SKILL.md, pipeline.md, and README.md. A new hit means new enforcement surface to fold into P4 step 4.
plugins/herald/hooks/double_shot_latte.py (expect 8) and the "timeout" value in plugins/herald/hooks/hooks.json (expect 10).
DOUBLE_SHOT_LATTE_LLM=1 enables thesecond shot, DOUBLE_SHOT_LATTE_MODEL picks the model (default haiku), DOUBLE_SHOT_LATTE_MAX_CONTINUATIONS overrides the cap of 10 per 300-second window. Re-verify with rg -n "os.environ" plugins/herald/hooks/double_shot_latte.py.
head -30 plugins/egregore/commands/dismiss.md, head -25 plugins/egregore/scripts/watchdog.sh (manifest, budget, and pidfile paths), and rg -n "startup|resume" plugins/egregore/hooks/hooks.json (SessionStart matcher). Verified 2026-07-03.
git show --stat 83281337 cd903cbf 268cff89 29081fda..claude/rules/prefer-invariants-over-fallbacks.md("Evidence base" table) and plugins/imbue/skills/proof-of-work/modules/verifier-integrity.md ("Reusable verifier techniques"). Both are tracked, so the citations resolve on a fresh clone.
ls docs/adr/ | sort | tail -1 (0017 as ofcompilation).
herald harness loop, the Attack B hook-side hardening, solution (b) verifier agent) are unproven by definition. Remove the label only with committed evidence.
| Case | Status | Duration (ms) | Turns | Tokens | Tool calls | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Without | With | Δ | Without | With | Δ | Without | With | Δ | Without | With | Δ | ||
case-12 | fail→pass | 13,315 | 4,157 | -69% | 1 | 1 | 0% | 2,267 | 8,255 | +264% | 0 | 0 | — |
case-01 | fail→fail | 3,797 | 3,769 | -1% | 1 | 1 | 0% | 212 | 8,006 | +3676% | 0 | 0 | — |
case-02 | fail→fail | 24,689 | 14,257 | -42% | 1 | 1 | 0% | 2,990 | 9,834 | +229% | 0 | 0 | — |
case-03 | fail→fail | 22,354 | 4,280 | -81% | 1 | 1 | 0% | 3,793 | 8,096 | +113% | 0 | 0 | — |
case-04 | fail→pass | 10,882 | 3,101 | -72% | 1 | 1 | 0% | 1,886 | 8,048 | +327% | 0 | 0 | — |
case-05 | fail→pass | 10,468 | 2,592 | -75% | 1 | 1 | 0% | 1,771 | 7,933 | +348% | 0 | 0 | — |
case-06 | fail→pass | 25,288 | 4,241 | -83% | 1 | 1 | 0% | 1,352 | 8,310 | +515% | 0 | 0 | — |
case-17 | pass→pass | 9,171 | 5,271 | -43% | 1 | 1 | 0% | 1,498 | 8,369 | +459% | 0 | 0 | — |
case-07 | fail→pass | 13,347 | 3,578 | -73% | 1 | 1 | 0% | 2,183 | 8,123 | +272% | 0 | 0 | — |
case-08 | fail→pass | 13,386 | 7,463 | -44% | 1 | 1 | 0% | 2,197 | 8,772 | +299% | 0 | 0 | — |
case-09 | fail→pass | 11,317 | 3,641 | -68% | 1 | 1 | 0% | 1,870 | 8,083 | +332% | 0 | 0 | — |
case-10 | fail→pass | 10,546 | 6,137 | -42% | 1 | 1 | 0% | 1,501 | 8,145 | +443% | 0 | 0 | — |
case-11 | fail→pass | 10,256 | 4,677 | -54% | 1 | 1 | 0% | 1,617 | 8,330 | +415% | 0 | 0 | — |
case-13 | fail→pass | 31,988 | 4,226 | -87% | 1 | 1 | 0% | 5,531 | 8,249 | +49% | 0 | 0 | — |
case-14 | fail→fail | 3,192 | 3,951 | +24% | 1 | 1 | 0% | 251 | 8,221 | +3175% | 0 | 0 | — |
case-15 | fail→pass | 10,678 | 5,112 | -52% | 1 | 1 | 0% | 1,794 | 8,469 | +372% | 0 | 0 | — |
case-16 | fail→pass | 8,902 | 6,550 | -26% | 1 | 1 | 0% | 1,499 | 8,593 | +473% | 0 | 0 | — |
case-18 | fail→pass | 13,551 | 9,488 | -30% | 1 | 1 | 0% | 1,955 | 8,782 | +349% | 0 | 0 | — |
case-19 | fail→pass | 15,024 | 6,539 | -56% | 1 | 1 | 0% | 2,258 | 8,111 | +259% | 0 | 0 | — |
case-20 | pass→pass | 8,405 | 6,724 | -20% | 1 | 1 | 0% | 1,556 | 8,559 | +450% | 0 | 0 | — |
case-21 | pass→pass | 10,832 | 8,019 | -26% | 1 | 1 | 0% | 1,900 | 8,863 | +366% | 0 | 0 | — |
case-22 | pass→pass | 8,800 | 7,554 | -14% | 1 | 1 | 0% | 1,260 | 8,352 | +563% | 0 | 0 | — |
DecimalAI ran this skill against gemini-3.6-flash twice over the same eval suite — once with the skill loaded and once without — and compared the two runs case by case. 22 cases were attempted, and 20 counted toward the lift figure. The other 2 produced results that are not comparable between the two arms, so they are excluded from the headline rather than averaged into it. The headline lift of +64 percentage points is the difference between those two pass rates over the 20 comparable cases.
Without the skill loaded, the model failed this case. With it loaded, the same prompt on the same model passed. This is one improved case from the latest verified run; every case, including any that regressed, is in the table above.
Other measured skills in the registry, with their headline benchmark lift.