Security Engineering

Approach every security task as an engineer who has read real incident post-mortems and knows that most breaches are not exotic zero-days — they are OWASP Top 10 vulnerabilities that were known, understood, and skipped. Security is not a phase at the end of development. It is a design constraint applied from the first line of code.

Step 0: Threat Model Before You Build

Before writing security controls, understand what you are protecting:

1. What are the assets? User data, credentials, financial records, proprietary algorithms — name them
2. Who are the threat actors? External attackers, malicious insiders, compromised dependencies, misconfigured services
3. What are the attack surfaces? API endpoints, authentication flows, file uploads, third-party integrations, admin interfaces
4. What are the trust boundaries? Where does data cross from untrusted to trusted? Every boundary needs validation
5. What is the impact of a breach? Data exposure, financial loss, regulatory penalty, reputational damage — prioritise controls by impact

Use STRIDE as a thinking tool: Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information disclosure, Denial of service, Elevation of privilege. For each component, ask which STRIDE categories apply.

OWASP Top 10 — Mandatory Defenses

A01 — Broken Access Control

• Deny by default — every resource is protected unless explicitly made public
• Verify ownership on every request — a user accessing /api/documents/123 must own document 123
• Implement RBAC at the middleware layer — roles and permissions enforced before business logic runs
• Never trust client-supplied IDs for access decisions without server-side verification
• Log all access control failures — they are reconnaissance signals

A02 — Cryptographic Failures

• Enforce HTTPS everywhere — redirect HTTP to HTTPS; HSTS header with long max-age
• Encrypt sensitive data at rest — AES-256 minimum
• Never store passwords in plaintext or with reversible encryption — bcrypt (cost ≥ 12) or argon2id
• Never store credit card numbers, SSNs, or equivalent PII unless absolutely required — tokenise instead
• Use strong, modern TLS — TLS 1.2 minimum, TLS 1.3 preferred; disable weak cipher suites

A03 — Injection

• Parameterized queries for all database access — never interpolate user input into SQL
• Use an ORM as the default — raw queries only when performance requires it, with parameterization enforced
• Validate and sanitize all input at the API boundary — reject malformed input before it reaches business logic
• HTML-encode output in templates — use a templating engine that auto-escapes by default
• Avoid eval(), exec(), os.system(), shell interpolation with user data

A04 — Insecure Design

• Security requirements belong in the design phase — add them to acceptance criteria, not as post-hoc patches
• Rate limit authentication endpoints — brute force is not sophisticated; stopping it is not optional
• Implement account lockout after repeated failed attempts with exponential backoff
• Multi-factor authentication for admin accounts and sensitive operations

A05 — Security Misconfiguration

• Security headers on every HTTP response:

Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains; preload Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self' X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff X-Frame-Options: DENY Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin Permissions-Policy: camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=()

• CORS: whitelist specific origins — never Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * for credentialed requests
• Disable debug endpoints, stack traces, and verbose error messages in production
• Remove default credentials and unused accounts before deploying
• Review cloud storage permissions — S3 buckets and blob containers are public by accident more often than by design

A06 — Vulnerable and Outdated Components

• Dependency scanning in CI — npm audit, pip audit, Snyk, Dependabot
• Pin dependency versions — floating versions pull in breaking or vulnerable updates silently
• Review dependency changelogs before updating — automated updates can introduce breaking changes
• Remove unused dependencies — every dependency is an attack surface

A07 — Identification and Authentication Failures

• JWT best practices (see JWT section below)
• Session tokens: cryptographically random, minimum 128 bits of entropy
• Invalidate sessions on logout — do not rely on token expiry alone
• Invalidate all sessions on password change
• Implement account lockout: 5 failed attempts → temporary lockout → exponential backoff
• Never log authentication tokens, passwords, or session identifiers

A08 — Software and Data Integrity Failures

• Verify integrity of downloaded artifacts in CI — checksums, signatures
• Do not deserialize untrusted data without schema validation — avoid pickle, eval, unsafe YAML loaders
• Use subresource integrity (SRI) for CDN-hosted scripts
• Sign build artifacts and container images; verify signatures at deploy time

A09 — Security Logging and Monitoring Failures

• Log all authentication events: success, failure, lockout, password reset
• Log all access control failures
• Log all admin actions
• Ship logs to a system the attacker cannot reach — a compromised server should not be able to erase its own audit trail
• Alert on: multiple failed logins, privilege escalation attempts, access to sensitive endpoints outside business hours

A10 — Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)

• Validate and whitelist URLs before making server-side HTTP requests
• Reject requests to private IP ranges (10.x.x.x, 172.16.x.x, 192.168.x.x, 169.254.x.x, localhost)
• Use an allow-list of permitted external domains — not a block-list
• Never pass user-controlled data directly to HTTP clients, DNS resolvers, or file loaders

JWT Review Checklist

When reviewing or implementing JWTs:

• ] Algorithm explicitly specified and validated — reject alg: none; use RS256 or ES256 for multi-service; HS256 only when the secret is shared safely
• ] Signature verified on every request — never decode without verifying
• ] exp claim present and validated — short-lived access tokens (15 minutes); longer refresh tokens (7-30 days)
• ] iss (issuer) and aud (audience) claims validated — prevent token reuse across services
• ] Refresh tokens rotated on use — a refresh token used twice indicates theft; invalidate both
• ] Refresh tokens stored securely — httpOnly cookie, not localStorage
• ] Token revocation strategy defined — short expiry is the simplest; token blacklist for immediate revocation needs
• ] Sensitive data not in the payload — JWTs are base64-encoded, not encrypted; do not store PII in claims

OAuth 2.0 / OIDC

• Use the Authorization Code flow with PKCE for all user-facing applications — never the Implicit flow
• Use the Client Credentials flow for service-to-service authentication
• Validate the state parameter to prevent CSRF on the callback
• Validate id_token signature, iss, aud, exp, and nonce
• Store tokens in httpOnly cookies — not in JavaScript-accessible storage
• Request minimal scopes — principle of least privilege applies to OAuth scopes
• Validate redirect URIs strictly — registered URIs only, no open redirects

RBAC Design

Role-Based Access Control done correctly:

1. Define roles at the domain level — not "admin/user" but "billing-admin", "content-editor", "read-only-viewer"
2. Permissions are the unit of access control — roles are collections of permissions; check permissions, not roles in business logic
3. Deny by default — a missing permission entry means no access
4. Enforce at the middleware layer — permission checks happen before handlers run, not inside them
5. Resource ownership is a permission — order:read:own (can read own orders) vs order:read:any (admin can read all orders)
6. Audit permission assignments — who granted this role, when, and why

User → has Roles → Roles contain Permissions → Permissions gate Resources

Never check roles in business logic. Check permissions. Roles are a UI concern.

XSS Prevention

• React, Vue, Angular auto-escape by default — do not use dangerouslySetInnerHTML / v-html with untrusted content
• Sanitize HTML with DOMPurify before rendering any user-generated rich text
• Content Security Policy blocks inline scripts and untrusted sources — implement it
• HttpOnly flag on session cookies — JavaScript cannot read them
• SameSite=Strict or SameSite=Lax on all cookies

CSRF Prevention

• SameSite=Strict on session cookies prevents CSRF for modern browsers
• For APIs: require a custom request header (e.g., X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest) — cross-origin requests cannot set custom headers
• For traditional form submissions: double-submit cookie or synchronizer token pattern
• Verify Origin and Referer headers on state-changing requests as a secondary check

Secret Management

Never:

• Hardcode secrets in source code
• Commit .env files to version control
• Log secrets, tokens, or API keys
• Pass secrets as command-line arguments (visible in process list)
• Store secrets in environment variables on shared CI runners without scoping

Always:

• Use a secrets manager in production: AWS Secrets Manager, Azure Key Vault, HashiCorp Vault, Doppler
• Rotate secrets on a schedule and immediately after any suspected exposure
• Scope secrets to the minimum surface — a service that reads from one bucket does not need write access
• Audit secret access — who accessed what secret, when

In CI/CD:

• Use platform-native secret storage (GitHub Secrets, GitLab CI Variables)
• Mask secret values in logs — configure the CI platform to redact known secret patterns
• Use short-lived credentials where possible — OIDC-based cloud authentication instead of long-lived keys

Bundled Resources

Read threat-model.md when scoping a security review. Run python scripts/scan_secrets.py <path> only as a local, read-only first pass; confirm every finding manually and use dedicated secret-scanning tooling in CI.

Definition of Done — Security Work

• ] Threat model documented for the feature or service
• ] OWASP Top 10 defenses applied relevant to the surface area
• ] All inputs validated and sanitized at the boundary
• ] Authentication and authorization enforced on every protected endpoint
• ] Secrets in a secrets manager — not in source code or environment files committed to git
• ] Security headers configured on all HTTP responses
• ] Dependency scan passing in CI
• ] Security logging in place for auth events and access control failures
• ] JWT/OAuth implementation reviewed against the checklist