Container Security Hardening Skill

A production-focused guide for building, scanning, and running containers securely — from Dockerfile authoring through runtime enforcement and supply chain integrity.

Detailed Guide

Read the detailed guide before executing this skill. It retains the complete procedure and reference material. Treat its safety, prerequisites, and validation requirements as mandatory. For focused work, load the relevant sections; for end-to-end work, read the guide completely.

When to Use This Skill

• User mentions Docker security, container hardening, or Dockerfile security review
• User asks about distroless images, non-root containers, or read-only filesystems
• User wants to scan images for CVEs with Trivy, Grype, or Snyk
• User mentions seccomp, AppArmor, Linux capabilities, or runtime security
• User asks "is my Dockerfile secure?" or "how do I reduce my image attack surface?"
• User wants to sign/verify images with Cosign or generate SBOMs
• User asks about Kubernetes pod security, NetworkPolicy, or RBAC hardening
• User says "fix container CVEs" or "harden my container for production"

When NOT to Use This Skill

• The user is primarily asking about GitHub Actions CI/CD → recommend github-actions-advanced
• The user needs general Docker usage help (not security) → recommend docker-expert
• The user is working with Kubernetes orchestration beyond security → recommend kubernetes-architect
• The user needs application-level security (SQL injection, XSS) → recommend api-security-best-practices

Security Checklist

Dockerfile

• ] Minimal base image (distroless, slim, or alpine — not full debian/ubuntu)
• ] Multi-stage build — no build tools, devDependencies, or compilers in runtime image
• ] Non-root USER declared before CMD/ENTRYPOINT
• ] Base image pinned to @sha256:... digest (not just tag)
• ] No secrets in ENV, ARG, or RUN commands
• ] HEALTHCHECK defined
• ] OCI labels present (org.opencontainers.image.*)
• ] .dockerignore excludes .git, .env, secrets, tests
• ] ENTRYPOINT uses exec form, not shell form

Image Scanning

• ] Trivy or Grype scan in CI (fails on HIGH/CRITICAL)
• ] Hadolint passes with no warnings
• ] Secret scan run on image (trivy --scanners secret)
• ] SBOM generated and stored
• ] .trivyignore has justified entries for accepted CVEs

Runtime

• ] --read-only filesystem
• ] --cap-drop ALL (add back only what's documented as required)
• ] --security-opt no-new-privileges:true
• ] --security-opt seccomp=<profile> applied
• ] Resource limits set (--memory, --cpus, --pids-limit)
• ] Image signed with Cosign; verified before deploy

Kubernetes

• ] readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
• ] allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
• ] runAsNonRoot: true with explicit UID
• ] capabilities.drop: ["ALL"]
• ] Resource requests and limits defined
• ] automountServiceAccountToken: false
• ] Namespace PSA enforced at restricted level
• ] NetworkPolicy default-deny applied
• ] RBAC uses specific resource names and minimal verbs

Limitations

• Use this skill only when the task clearly matches the scope described above.
• Do not treat the output as a substitute for environment-specific penetration testing or a formal security audit.
• Seccomp profiles and AppArmor are Linux-only; macOS/Windows Docker Desktop uses different mechanisms.
• Stop and ask for clarification if required inputs, permissions, safety boundaries, or success criteria are missing.