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Get Started Free →Adversaries may abuse a double extension in the filename as a means of masquerading the true file type.
| Test case | Without → With | Effect | Δ tokens | Δ turns |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| case-01 | ✗→✓ | ▲ Improved | 184% | 0% |
| case-02 | ✗→✓ | ▲ Improved | 22% | 0% |
| case-07 | ✗→✓ | ▲ Improved | -13% | 0% |
| case-18 | ✗→✓ | ▲ Improved | 32% | 0% |
| case-19 | ✗→✓ | ▲ Improved | -39% | 0% |
> Sub-technique of: T1036
Adversaries may abuse a double extension in the filename as a means of masquerading the true file type. A file name may include a secondary file type extension that may cause only the first extension to be displayed (ex: <code>File.txt.exe</code> may render in some views as just <code>File.txt</code>). However, the second extension is the true file type that determines how the file is opened and executed. The real file extension may be hidden by the operating system in the file browser (ex: explorer.exe), as well as in any software configured using or similar to the system’s policies.
Adversaries may abuse double extensions to attempt to conceal dangerous file types of payloads. A very common usage involves tricking a user into opening what they think is a benign file type but is actually executable code. Such files often pose as email attachments and allow an adversary to gain Initial Access into a user’s system via Spearphishing Attachment then User Execution. For example, an executable file attachment named <code>Evil.txt.exe</code> may display as <code>Evil.txt</code> to a user. The user may then view it as a benign text file and open it, inadvertently executing the hidden malware.
Common file types, such as text files (.txt, .doc, etc.) and image files (.jpg, .gif, etc.) are typically used as the first extension to appear benign. Executable extensions commonly regarded as dangerous, such as .exe, .lnk, .hta, and .scr, often appear as the second extension and true file type.
Platforms: Windows
The following tests are from Atomic Red Team and provide actionable ways to test this technique:
download and execute a file masquerading as images or Office files. Upon execution 3 calc instances and 3 vbs windows will be launched.
e.g SOME_LEGIT_NAME.doc,docx,xls,xlsx,pdf,rtf,png,jpg,etc.].exe,vbs,js,ps1,etc] (Quartelyreport.docx.exe)
Supported Platforms: windows
cmdcopy "#{exe_path}" %temp%\T1036.007_masquerading.docx.exe /Y copy "#{exe_path}" %temp%\T1036.007_masquerading.pdf.exe /Y copy "#{exe_path}" %temp%\T1036.007_masquerading.ps1.exe /Y copy "#{vbs_path}" %temp%\T1036.007_masquerading.xls.vbs /Y copy "#{vbs_path}" %temp%\T1036.007_masquerading.xlsx.vbs /Y copy "#{vbs_path}" %temp%\T1036.007_masquerading.png.vbs /Y copy "#{ps1_path}" %temp%\T1036.007_masquerading.doc.ps1 /Y copy "#{ps1_path}" %temp%\T1036.007_masquerading.pdf.ps1 /Y copy "#{ps1_path}" %temp%\T1036.007_masquerading.rtf.ps1 /Y %temp%\T1036.007_masquerading.docx.exe %temp%\T1036.007_masquerading.pdf.exe %temp%\T1036.007_masquerading.ps1.exe %temp%\T1036.007_masquerading.xls.vbs %temp%\T1036.007_masquerading.xlsx.vbs %temp%\T1036.007_masquerading.png.vbs C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe -File %temp%\T1036.007_masquerading.doc.ps1 C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe -File %temp%\T1036.007_masquerading.pdf.ps1 C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe -File %temp%\T1036.007_masquerading.rtf.ps1
Dependencies:
If Atomic Red Team tests are not applicable, manually verify the technique by:
Train users to look for double extensions in filenames, and in general use training as a way to bring awareness to common phishing and spearphishing techniques and how to raise suspicion for potentially malicious events.
Disable the default to “hide file extensions for known file types” in Windows OS.
| Finding | Severity | Impact | | ------------------------------------------ | -------- | --------------- | | Double File Extension technique applicable | High | Defense Evasion |
| CWE ID | Title | | ------- | ---------------------------- | | CWE-693 | Protection Mechanism Failure |
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