Install any skill in seconds. Free to start, no credit card required.
Get Started Free →cyberstrikeus/T1195.001_compromise-software-dependencies-and-development-tools
Adversaries may manipulate software dependencies and development tools prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise.
Passed 15 of 23 test cases with the skill, and 12 of 23 without it.
and 1 more in the full report
4 fixed12 passed either way8 still failing0 broke
Tokens, turns and time describe resource use, not a dollar price.
One of 3 test cases the skill fixed. Same model, same prompt, with and without the skill.
When reviewing our SOC monitoring dashboard for T1195.001 dependency and build tool compromise, how many distinct core detection strategies are documented for coverage assessment?
| Checked | Without skill | With skill |
|---|---|---|
| Specifies 1 detection strategy. | Missed | Passed |
The instructions your model reads when the skill loads.
Sub-technique of: T1195
Adversaries may manipulate software dependencies and development tools prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. Applications often depend on external software to function properly. Popular open source projects that are used as dependencies in many applications, such as pip and NPM packages, may be targeted as a means to add malicious code to users of the dependency. This may also include abandoned packages, which in some cases could be re-registered by threat actors after being removed by adversaries. Adversaries may also employ "typosquatting" or name-confusion by choosing names similar to existing popular libraries or packages in order to deceive a user.
Additionally, CI/CD pipeline components, such as GitHub Actions, may be targeted in order to gain access to the building, testing, and deployment cycles of an application. By adding malicious code into a GitHub action, a threat actor may be able to collect runtime credentials (e.g., via Proc Filesystem) or insert further malicious components into the build pipelines for a second-order supply chain compromise. As GitHub Actions are often dependent on other GitHub Actions, threat actors may be able to infect a large number of repositories via the compromise of a single Action.
Targeting may be specific to a desired victim set or may be distributed to a broad set of consumers but only move on to additional tactics on specific victims.
Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
Identify Attack Surface: Determine if the target environment is susceptible to Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools by examining the target platforms (Linux, macOS, Windows).
Assess Existing Defenses: Review whether mitigations for T1195.001 are in place. If defenses are absent or misconfigured, this technique may be exploitable.
Execute Test: Use tools and methods described in the MITRE ATT&CK page and external references below.
Note: No Atomic Red Team tests available for this technique. See Atomic Red Team GitHub for updates.
test cases passed, vs 12 / 23 without
Published skills whose descriptions closely match this one, with their headline benchmark lift.
More skills from the same source and nearby in the registry, with their headline benchmark lift.