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An adversary may forge SAML tokens with any permissions claims and lifetimes if they possess a valid SAML token-signing certificate.
Passed 19 of 22 test cases with the skill, and 11 of 22 without it.
and 8 more in the full report
8 fixed11 passed either way3 still failing0 broke
Tokens, turns and time describe resource use, not a dollar price.
One of 8 test cases the skill fixed. Same model, same prompt, with and without the skill.
Under which MITRE ATT&CK mitigation identifier (e.g. M1015, M1047, M1018, M1026) is token-signing AD FS certificate rotation categorized?
| Checked | Without skill | With skill |
|---|---|---|
| Identifies mitigation ID M1015 for Active Directory Configuration. | Missed | Passed |
The instructions your model reads when the skill loads.
Sub-technique of: T1606
An adversary may forge SAML tokens with any permissions claims and lifetimes if they possess a valid SAML token-signing certificate. The default lifetime of a SAML token is one hour, but the validity period can be specified in the NotOnOrAfter value of the conditions ... element in a token. This value can be changed using the AccessTokenLifetime in a LifetimeTokenPolicy. Forged SAML tokens enable adversaries to authenticate across services that use SAML 2.0 as an SSO (single sign-on) mechanism.
An adversary may utilize Private Keys to compromise an organization's token-signing certificate to create forged SAML tokens. If the adversary has sufficient permissions to establish a new federation trust with their own Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS) server, they may instead generate their own trusted token-signing certificate. This differs from Steal Application Access Token and other similar behaviors in that the tokens are new and forged by the adversary, rather than stolen or intercepted from legitimate users.
An adversary may gain administrative Entra ID privileges if a SAML token is forged which claims to represent a highly privileged account. This may lead to Use Alternate Authentication Material, which may bypass multi-factor and other authentication protection mechanisms.
Platforms: SaaS, Windows, IaaS, Office Suite, Identity Provider
Identify Attack Surface: Determine if the target environment is susceptible to SAML Tokens by examining the target platforms (SaaS, Windows, IaaS).
Assess Existing Defenses: Review whether mitigations for T1606.002 are in place. If defenses are absent or misconfigured, this technique may be exploitable.
Execute Test: Use tools and methods described in the MITRE ATT&CK page and external references below.
Note: No Atomic Red Team tests available for this technique. See Atomic Red Team GitHub for updates.
test cases passed, vs 11 / 22 without
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