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Adversaries may modify property list files (plist files) to enable other malicious activity, while also potentially evading and bypassing system defenses.
Passed 20 of 22 test cases with the skill, and 15 of 22 without it.
and 2 more in the full report
5 fixed15 passed either way2 still failing0 broke
Tokens, turns and time describe resource use, not a dollar price.
One of 5 test cases the skill fixed. Same model, same prompt, with and without the skill.
Which historical macOS malware report is associated with early documented real-world exploitation of plist file modification for evasion and persistence?
| Checked | Without skill | With skill |
|---|---|---|
| References ESET OSX Flashback analysis. | Missed | Passed |
The instructions your model reads when the skill loads.
Adversaries may modify property list files (plist files) to enable other malicious activity, while also potentially evading and bypassing system defenses. macOS applications use plist files, such as the info.plist file, to store properties and configuration settings that inform the operating system how to handle the application at runtime. Plist files are structured metadata in key-value pairs formatted in XML based on Apple's Core Foundation DTD. Plist files can be saved in text or binary format.
Adversaries can modify key-value pairs in plist files to influence system behaviors, such as hiding the execution of an application (i.e. Hidden Window) or running additional commands for persistence (ex: Launch Agent/Launch Daemon or Re-opened Applications).
For example, adversaries can add a malicious application path to the ~/Library/Preferences/com.apple.dock.plist file, which controls apps that appear in the Dock. Adversaries can also modify the LSUIElement key in an application’s info.plist file to run the app in the background. Adversaries can also insert key-value pairs to insert environment variables, such as LSEnvironment, to enable persistence via Dynamic Linker Hijacking.
Platforms: macOS
The following tests are from Atomic Red Team and provide actionable ways to test this technique:
Modify MacOS plist file in one of two directories
Supported Platforms: macos
If Atomic Red Team tests are not applicable, manually verify the technique by:
test cases passed, vs 15 / 22 without
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