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Adversaries may manipulate continuous integration / continuous development (CI/CD) processes by injecting malicious code into the build process.
Passed 19 of 22 test cases with the skill, and 13 of 22 without it.
and 6 more in the full report
7 fixed12 passed either way2 still failing1 broke
Tokens, turns and time describe resource use, not a dollar price.
One of 7 test cases the skill fixed. Same model, same prompt, with and without the skill.
Which specific MITRE ATT&CK mitigation entry corresponds to limiting repository write access and restricting CI workflow scope?
| Checked | Without skill | With skill |
|---|---|---|
| Maps user write permission limits and pipeline least privilege controls to MITRE mitigation M1018. | Missed | Passed |
The instructions your model reads when the skill loads.
Adversaries may manipulate continuous integration / continuous development (CI/CD) processes by injecting malicious code into the build process. There are several mechanisms for poisoning pipelines:
gitlab-ci.yml in GitLab). They may include a command to exfiltrate credentials leveraged in the build process to a remote server, or to export them as a workflow artifact.pull_request_target trigger allows workflows running from forked repositories to access secrets. If this trigger is combined with an explicit pull request checkout and a location for a threat actor to insert malicious code (e.g., an npm build command), a threat actor may be able to leak pipeline credentials. Similarly, threat actors may craft pull requests with malicious inputs (such as branch names) if the build pipeline treats those inputs as trusted. Finally, if a pipeline leverages a self-hosted runner, a threat actor may be able to execute arbitrary code on a host inside the organization’s network.By poisoning CI/CD pipelines, threat actors may be able to gain access to credentials, laterally move to additional hosts, or input malicious components to be shipped further down the pipeline (i.e., Supply Chain Compromise).
Platforms: SaaS
Identify Attack Surface: Determine if the target environment is susceptible to Poisoned Pipeline Execution by examining the target platforms (SaaS).
Assess Existing Defenses: Review whether mitigations for T1677 are in place. If defenses are absent or misconfigured, this technique may be exploitable.
Execute Test: Use tools and methods described in the MITRE ATT&CK page and external references below.
Note: No Atomic Red Team tests available for this technique. See Atomic Red Team GitHub for updates.
test cases passed, vs 13 / 22 without
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