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Get Started Free →Security checklist for Solidity AMM contracts, liquidity pools, and swap flows. Covers reentrancy, CEI ordering, donation or inflation attacks, oracle manipulation, slippage, admin controls, and integer math.
.claude/skills/defi-amm-security/SKILL.md| Test case | Without → With | Effect | Δ tokens | Δ turns |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| case-04 | ✗→✓ | ▲ Improved | — | — |
| case-10 | ✗→✓ | ▲ Improved | — | — |
| case-01 | ✗→✓ | ▲ Improved | — | — |
| case-15 | ✗→✓ | ▲ Improved | — | — |
| case-13 | ✗→✓ | ▲ Improved | — | — |
Critical vulnerability patterns and hardened implementations for Solidity AMM contracts, LP vaults, and swap functions.
token.balanceOf(address(this)) in share or reserve mathUse this as a checklist-plus-pattern library. Review every user entrypoint against the categories below and prefer the hardened examples over hand-rolled variants.
The shell commands in this skill are local audit examples. Run them only in a trusted checkout or disposable sandbox, and do not splice untrusted contract names, paths, RPC URLs, private keys, or user-supplied flags into shell commands. Ask before installing tools or running long fuzzing/static-analysis jobs that may consume significant local or paid resources.
Never include secrets, private keys, seed phrases, API tokens, or mainnet signing credentials in command examples, logs, or reports.
Vulnerable:
solidityfunction withdraw(uint256 amount) external { require(balances[msg.sender] >= amount); token.transfer(msg.sender, amount); balances[msg.sender] -= amount; }
Safe:
solidityimport {ReentrancyGuard} from "@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/ReentrancyGuard.sol"; import {SafeERC20} from "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/utils/SafeERC20.sol"; using SafeERC20 for IERC20; function withdraw(uint256 amount) external nonReentrant { require(balances[msg.sender] >= amount, "Insufficient"); balances[msg.sender] -= amount; token.safeTransfer(msg.sender, amount); }
Do not write your own guard when a hardened library exists.
Using token.balanceOf(address(this)) directly for share math lets attackers manipulate the denominator by sending tokens to the contract outside the intended path.
solidity// Vulnerable function deposit(uint256 assets) external returns (uint256 shares) { shares = (assets * totalShares) / token.balanceOf(address(this)); }
solidity// Safe uint256 private _totalAssets; function deposit(uint256 assets) external nonReentrant returns (uint256 shares) { uint256 balBefore = token.balanceOf(address(this)); token.safeTransferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), assets); uint256 received = token.balanceOf(address(this)) - balBefore; shares = totalShares == 0 ? received : (received * totalShares) / _totalAssets; _totalAssets += received; totalShares += shares; }
Track internal accounting and measure actual tokens received.
Spot prices are flash-loan manipulable. Prefer TWAP.
solidityuint32[] memory secondsAgos = new uint32[](2); secondsAgos[0] = 1800; secondsAgos[1] = 0; (int56[] memory tickCumulatives,) = IUniswapV3Pool(pool).observe(secondsAgos); int24 twapTick = int24( (tickCumulatives[1] - tickCumulatives[0]) / int56(uint56(30 minutes)) ); uint160 sqrtPriceX96 = TickMath.getSqrtRatioAtTick(twapTick);
Every swap path needs caller-provided slippage and a deadline.
solidityfunction swap( uint256 amountIn, uint256 amountOutMin, uint256 deadline ) external returns (uint256 amountOut) { require(block.timestamp <= deadline, "Expired"); amountOut = _calculateOut(amountIn); require(amountOut >= amountOutMin, "Slippage exceeded"); _executeSwap(amountIn, amountOut); }
solidityimport {FullMath} from "@uniswap/v3-core/contracts/libraries/FullMath.sol"; uint256 result = FullMath.mulDiv(a, b, c);
For large reserve math, avoid naive a * b / c when overflow risk exists.
solidityimport {Ownable2Step} from "@openzeppelin/contracts/access/Ownable2Step.sol"; contract MyAMM is Ownable2Step { function setFee(uint256 fee) external onlyOwner { ... } function pause() external onlyOwner { ... } }
Prefer explicit acceptance for ownership transfer and gate every privileged path.
nonReentrantbalanceOf(address(this))SafeERC20amountOutMin and deadlinemulDivbashpip install slither-analyzer slither . --exclude-dependencies echidna-test . --contract YourAMM --config echidna.yaml forge test --fuzz-runs 10000
| Case | Status | Duration (ms) | Turns | Tokens | Tool calls | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Without | With | Δ | Without | With | Δ | Without | With | Δ | Without | With | Δ | ||
case-22 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-03 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-16 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-20 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-17 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-04 | fail→pass | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-10 | fail→pass | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-02 | pass→pass | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-18 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-01 | fail→pass | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-08 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-07 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-19 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-05 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-09 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-11 | pass→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-14 | pass→pass | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-15 | fail→pass | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-13 | fail→pass | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-06 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-12 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-21 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
DecimalAI ran this skill against gemini-3.6-flash twice over the same eval suite — once with the skill loaded and once without — and compared the two runs case by case. 22 cases were attempted. The headline lift of +18 percentage points is the difference between those two pass rates over the 22 comparable cases. 1 case got worse with the skill loaded, and it is included in that figure.
The per-case answers from this run were removed by the retention sweep, so the case table below shows the verdicts without the text either arm produced. The counts above were recorded at the time and are unaffected. Answers are now kept for 180 days.
Other measured skills in the registry, with their headline benchmark lift.