Install any skill in seconds. Free to start, no credit card required.
Get Started Free →Systematically deobfuscate multi-layer PowerShell malware using AST analysis, dynamic tracing, and tools like PSDecode and PowerDecode to reveal hidden payloads and C2 infrastructure.
.claude/skills/deobfuscating-powershell-obfuscated-malware/SKILL.md| Test case | Without → With | Effect | Δ tokens | Δ turns |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| case-21 | ✗→✓ | ▲ Improved | — | — |
| case-04 | ✗→✓ | ▲ Improved | — | — |
| case-10 | ✗→✗ | = Same ✗ | — | — |
| case-18 | ✗→✗ | = Same ✗ | — | — |
| case-15 | ✗→✗ | = Same ✗ | — | — |
PowerShell is heavily abused by malware authors due to its deep Windows integration and powerful scripting capabilities. Obfuscation techniques include string concatenation, Base64 encoding, character substitution, Invoke-Expression layering, SecureString abuse, environment variable manipulation, and tick-mark insertion. Modern malware uses multiple obfuscation layers requiring iterative deobfuscation. Tools like PSDecode, PowerDecode, and PowerPeeler automate much of this process, while manual AST (Abstract Syntax Tree) analysis handles custom obfuscation. PowerPeeler achieves a 95% deobfuscation correctness rate using instruction-level dynamic analysis of expression-related AST nodes.
base64, re, subprocess modulesInstall-Module PSDecode)PowerShell malware employs layered obfuscation to evade static detection. String concatenation splits commands across variables ($a='In'+'voke'). Base64 encoding wraps entire scripts in -EncodedCommand parameters. Character code arrays use [char] casting ([char[]](73,69,88)|%{$r+=$_}). Environment variable abuse reads substrings from $env: paths. Tick-mark insertion adds backticks between characters that PowerShell ignores (Invoke-Expression). SecureString conversion encrypts strings using ConvertTo-SecureString with embedded keys.
PowerShell's Abstract Syntax Tree exposes the parsed structure of scripts regardless of surface-level obfuscation. By walking the AST and evaluating expression nodes, analysts can resolve concatenated strings, decode encoded values, and reconstruct the original commands. PowerPeeler uses this approach at the instruction level, monitoring the execution process to correlate AST nodes with their evaluated results.
By replacing Invoke-Expression (IEX) with Write-Output, analysts can safely capture the deobfuscated script content that would normally be executed. This technique works across multiple layers by iteratively replacing IEX calls until the final payload is revealed.
python#!/usr/bin/env python3 """Identify and classify PowerShell obfuscation techniques.""" import re import base64 import sys def analyze_obfuscation(script_content): """Identify obfuscation techniques used in PowerShell script.""" techniques = [] # Check for Base64 encoded command b64_pattern = re.compile( r'-[Ee](?:nc(?:odedcommand)?)\s+([A-Za-z0-9+/=]{20,})', re.IGNORECASE ) if b64_pattern.search(script_content): techniques.append("Base64 EncodedCommand") # Check for FromBase64String if re.search(r'\[Convert\]::FromBase64String', script_content, re.IGNORECASE): techniques.append("Base64 FromBase64String") # Check for string concatenation concat_count = script_content.count("'+'") + script_content.count('"+"') if concat_count > 3: techniques.append(f"String Concatenation ({concat_count} joins)") # Check for char array construction if re.search(r'\[char\]\s*\d+', script_content, re.IGNORECASE): techniques.append("Character Code Array") # Check for Invoke-Expression variants iex_patterns = [ r'Invoke-Expression', r'\bIEX\b', r'\.\s*\(\s*\$', r'&\s*\(\s*\$', r'\|\s*IEX', r'\|\s*Invoke-Expression', ] for pattern in iex_patterns: if re.search(pattern, script_content, re.IGNORECASE): techniques.append(f"Invoke-Expression variant: {pattern}") # Check for tick-mark obfuscation tick_count = script_content.count('`') if tick_count > 5: techniques.append(f"Tick-mark Insertion ({tick_count} backticks)") # Check for environment variable abuse if re.search(r'\$env:', script_content, re.IGNORECASE): env_refs = re.findall(r'\$env:\w+', script_content, re.IGNORECASE) if len(env_refs) > 2: techniques.append(f"Environment Variable Abuse ({len(env_refs)} refs)") # Check for SecureString if re.search(r'ConvertTo-SecureString', script_content, re.IGNORECASE): techniques.append("SecureString Encryption") # Check for compression if re.search(r'IO\.Compression|DeflateStream|GZipStream', script_content, re.IGNORECASE): techniques.append("Compression (Deflate/GZip)") # Check for XOR encoding if re.search(r'-bxor\s+\d+', script_content, re.IGNORECASE): techniques.append("XOR Encoding") # Check for Replace chain replace_count = len(re.findall(r'\.Replace\(', script_content)) if replace_count > 2: techniques.append(f"Replace Chain ({replace_count} replacements)") return techniques def decode_base64_command(script_content): """Extract and decode Base64 encoded commands.""" b64_match = re.search( r'-[Ee](?:nc(?:odedcommand)?)\s+([A-Za-z0-9+/=]{20,})', script_content, re.IGNORECASE ) if b64_match: encoded = b64_match.group(1) try: decoded = base64.b64decode(encoded).decode('utf-16-le') return decoded except Exception: return None return None def remove_tick_marks(script_content): """Remove PowerShell tick-mark obfuscation.""" # Remove backticks that are not escape sequences escape_chars = {'`n', '`r', '`t', '`a', '`b', '`f', '`v', '`0', '``'} result = [] i = 0 while i < len(script_content): if script_content[i] == '`' and i + 1 < len(script_content): pair = script_content[i:i+2] if pair in escape_chars: result.append(pair) i += 2 else: # Skip the backtick, keep the next char result.append(script_content[i+1]) i += 2 else: result.append(script_content[i]) i += 1 return ''.join(result) def resolve_string_concat(script_content): """Resolve simple string concatenation patterns.""" # Pattern: 'str1' + 'str2' pattern = re.compile(r"'([^']*)'\s*\+\s*'([^']*)'") while pattern.search(script_content): script_content = pattern.sub(lambda m: f"'{m.group(1)}{m.group(2)}'", script_content) # Pattern: "str1" + "str2" pattern = re.compile(r'"([^"]*)"\s*\+\s*"([^"]*)"') while pattern.search(script_content): script_content = pattern.sub(lambda m: f'"{m.group(1)}{m.group(2)}"', script_content) return script_content if __name__ == "__main__": if len(sys.argv) < 2: print(f"Usage: {sys.argv[0]} <powershell_script>") sys.exit(1) with open(sys.argv[1], 'r', errors='replace') as f: content = f.read() print("[+] Obfuscation Analysis") print("=" * 60) techniques = analyze_obfuscation(content) for t in techniques: print(f" - {t}") # Attempt automatic deobfuscation print("\n[+] Attempting Deobfuscation") print("=" * 60) # Layer 1: Remove tick marks deobfuscated = remove_tick_marks(content) # Layer 2: Resolve string concatenation deobfuscated = resolve_string_concat(deobfuscated) # Layer 3: Decode Base64 b64_decoded = decode_base64_command(deobfuscated) if b64_decoded: print("[+] Base64 decoded content:") print(b64_decoded[:2000]) deobfuscated = b64_decoded print(f"\n[+] Deobfuscated script length: {len(deobfuscated)} chars") output_file = sys.argv[1] + ".deobfuscated.ps1" with open(output_file, 'w') as f: f.write(deobfuscated) print(f"[+] Saved to {output_file}")
pythonimport subprocess import tempfile import os def iex_replacement_deobfuscate(script_content, max_layers=10): """Iteratively replace IEX with Write-Output to unwrap layers.""" # IEX replacement patterns replacements = [ (r'\bInvoke-Expression\b', 'Write-Output'), (r'\bIEX\b', 'Write-Output'), (r'\|\s*IEX\b', '| Write-Output'), ] current = script_content layers = [] for layer_num in range(max_layers): # Apply IEX replacements modified = current for pattern, replacement in replacements: modified = re.sub(pattern, replacement, modified, flags=re.IGNORECASE) if modified == current and layer_num > 0: print(f" [+] No more IEX layers found at layer {layer_num}") break # Write to temp file and execute in constrained PowerShell with tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile(mode='w', suffix='.ps1', delete=False) as tmp: tmp.write(modified) tmp_path = tmp.name try: result = subprocess.run( ['powershell', '-NoProfile', '-ExecutionPolicy', 'Bypass', '-File', tmp_path], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=30 ) output = result.stdout.strip() if output and output != current: print(f" [+] Layer {layer_num + 1}: Unwrapped " f"{len(output)} chars") layers.append({ "layer": layer_num + 1, "technique": "IEX replacement", "content_length": len(output), }) current = output else: break except subprocess.TimeoutExpired: print(f" [!] Layer {layer_num + 1}: Execution timeout") break finally: os.unlink(tmp_path) return current, layers
pythondef extract_iocs_from_script(deobfuscated_content): """Extract indicators of compromise from deobfuscated PowerShell.""" iocs = { "urls": [], "ips": [], "domains": [], "file_paths": [], "registry_keys": [], "commands": [], "base64_blobs": [], } # URLs url_pattern = re.compile( r'https?://[^\s\'"<>)\]]+', re.IGNORECASE ) iocs["urls"] = list(set(url_pattern.findall(deobfuscated_content))) # IP addresses ip_pattern = re.compile( r'\b(?:\d{1,3}\.){3}\d{1,3}\b' ) iocs["ips"] = list(set(ip_pattern.findall(deobfuscated_content))) # File paths path_pattern = re.compile( r'[A-Za-z]:\\[^\s\'"<>|]+|' r'\\\\[^\s\'"<>|]+|' r'%(?:APPDATA|TEMP|USERPROFILE|PROGRAMFILES)%[^\s\'"<>|]*', re.IGNORECASE ) iocs["file_paths"] = list(set(path_pattern.findall(deobfuscated_content))) # Registry keys reg_pattern = re.compile( r'(?:HKLM|HKCU|HKCR|HKU|HKCC)(?:\\[^\s\'"<>|]+)+', re.IGNORECASE ) iocs["registry_keys"] = list(set(reg_pattern.findall(deobfuscated_content))) # Suspicious commands suspicious_cmds = [ 'New-Object Net.WebClient', 'DownloadString', 'DownloadFile', 'DownloadData', 'Start-Process', 'Invoke-WebRequest', 'New-Object IO.MemoryStream', 'Reflection.Assembly', 'Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath', 'Set-MpPreference -DisableRealtimeMonitoring', 'New-ScheduledTask', 'Register-ScheduledTask', ] for cmd in suspicious_cmds: if cmd.lower() in deobfuscated_content.lower(): iocs["commands"].append(cmd) return iocs
| Case | Status | Duration (ms) | Turns | Tokens | Tool calls | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Without | With | Δ | Without | With | Δ | Without | With | Δ | Without | With | Δ | ||
case-10 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-18 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-15 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-14 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-09 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-07 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-21 | fail→pass | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-08 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-19 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-16 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-02 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-17 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-01 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-12 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-23 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-03 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-22 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-04 | fail→pass | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-13 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-05 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-06 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-11 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-20 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
DecimalAI ran this skill against gemini-3.6-flash twice over the same eval suite — once with the skill loaded and once without — and compared the two runs case by case. 23 cases were attempted, and 22 counted toward the lift figure. The other 1 produced results that are not comparable between the two arms, so they are excluded from the headline rather than averaged into it. The headline lift of +9 percentage points is the difference between those two pass rates over the 22 comparable cases.
The per-case answers from this run were removed by the retention sweep, so the case table below shows the verdicts without the text either arm produced. The counts above were recorded at the time and are unaffected. Answers are now kept for 180 days.
Other measured skills in the registry, with their headline benchmark lift.