Install any skill in seconds. Free to start, no credit card required.
Get Started Free →Detect and prevent API enumeration attacks including BOLA and IDOR exploitation by monitoring sequential identifier access patterns and authorization failures.
.claude/skills/detecting-api-enumeration-attacks/SKILL.md| Test case | Without → With | Effect | Δ tokens | Δ turns |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| case-11 | ✗→✓ | ▲ Improved | — | — |
| case-10 | ✗→✓ | ▲ Improved | — | — |
| case-03 | ✗→✓ | ▲ Improved | — | — |
| case-06 | ✗→✓ | ▲ Improved | — | — |
| case-09 | ✗→✓ | ▲ Improved | — | — |
API enumeration attacks occur when attackers systematically probe API endpoints with sequential or predictable identifiers to discover and access unauthorized resources. Broken Object Level Authorization (BOLA), ranked as API1:2023 in the OWASP API Security Top 10, is the most critical API vulnerability. Attackers manipulate object identifiers (user IDs, order numbers, account references) in API requests to bypass authorization and access other users' data. Detection requires monitoring for patterns of rapid sequential access attempts, authorization failures, and abnormal API usage behavior.
Attackers iterate through numeric or predictable identifiers:
GET /api/v1/users/1001 -> 200 OK
GET /api/v1/users/1002 -> 200 OK
GET /api/v1/users/1003 -> 403 Forbidden
GET /api/v1/users/1004 -> 200 OK
GET /api/v1/users/1005 -> 200 OK
...Detection Indicators:
Even non-sequential identifiers can be enumerated if leaked through other endpoints:
# Attacker first harvests UUIDs from a list endpoint
GET /api/v1/posts?page=1 -> Returns post objects with author UUIDs
# Then uses those UUIDs to access restricted user data
GET /api/v1/users/a3f2c1e4-... -> Private user profile
GET /api/v1/users/b7d9e8f1-... -> Private user profile# Authenticated as user_id=100, attempting to access other users' orders
GET /api/v1/orders?user_id=101
GET /api/v1/orders?user_id=102
GET /api/v1/orders?user_id=103spl# Detect sequential ID enumeration on API endpoints index=api_logs sourcetype=api_access | rex field=uri_path "(?<endpoint>/api/v\d+/\w+/)(?<object_id>\d+)" | stats count as request_count, dc(object_id) as unique_ids, values(status_code) as status_codes, min(_time) as first_seen, max(_time) as last_seen by src_ip, endpoint, user_session | eval time_span = last_seen - first_seen | eval requests_per_second = request_count / max(time_span, 1) | where unique_ids > 20 AND requests_per_second > 2 | eval severity = case( unique_ids > 100, "critical", unique_ids > 50, "high", unique_ids > 20, "medium", 1==1, "low" ) | sort - unique_ids | table src_ip, endpoint, unique_ids, request_count, requests_per_second, status_codes, severity # Detect BOLA via authorization failure patterns index=api_logs sourcetype=api_access status_code IN (401, 403) | bin _time span=5m | stats count as failure_count, dc(uri_path) as unique_paths, values(uri_path) as attempted_paths by _time, src_ip, user_id | where failure_count > 10 | eval attack_type = if(unique_paths > 5, "enumeration", "brute_force")
json{ "rule": { "name": "API Object Enumeration Detection", "description": "Detects rapid sequential access to API objects with mixed authorization results", "type": "threshold", "index": ["api-access-*"], "query": { "bool": { "must": [ { "regexp": { "url.path": "/api/v[0-9]+/[a-z]+/[0-9]+" } } ], "should": [ { "term": { "http.response.status_code": 200 } }, { "term": { "http.response.status_code": 403 } }, { "term": { "http.response.status_code": 401 } } ] } }, "threshold": { "field": ["source.ip"], "value": 50, "cardinality": [ { "field": "url.path", "value": 20 } ] }, "schedule": { "interval": "5m" }, "severity": "high", "risk_score": 73, "tags": ["OWASP-API1", "BOLA", "Enumeration"] } }
python#!/usr/bin/env python3 """API Enumeration Attack Detector Analyzes API access logs to detect enumeration patterns including BOLA, IDOR, and sequential ID probing. """ import re import sys import json from collections import defaultdict from datetime import datetime, timedelta from dataclasses import dataclass, field from typing import List, Dict, Optional @dataclass class AccessRecord: timestamp: datetime source_ip: str user_id: Optional[str] method: str path: str status_code: int object_id: Optional[str] = None @dataclass class EnumerationAlert: source_ip: str user_id: Optional[str] endpoint_pattern: str unique_object_ids: int total_requests: int time_window_seconds: float requests_per_second: float auth_failure_ratio: float severity: str attack_type: str sample_ids: List[str] = field(default_factory=list) class EnumerationDetector: # Regex patterns for extracting object IDs from API paths ID_PATTERNS = [ re.compile(r'/api/v\d+/(\w+)/(\d+)'), # Numeric IDs re.compile(r'/api/v\d+/(\w+)/([a-f0-9\-]{36})'), # UUIDs re.compile(r'/api/v\d+/(\w+)/([a-zA-Z0-9]{20,})'), # Long alphanumeric IDs ] def __init__(self, time_window_minutes: int = 5, min_unique_ids: int = 15, max_requests_per_second: float = 5.0): self.time_window = timedelta(minutes=time_window_minutes) self.min_unique_ids = min_unique_ids self.max_rps = max_requests_per_second self.access_log: List[AccessRecord] = [] def parse_log_line(self, line: str) -> Optional[AccessRecord]: """Parse a common log format line into an AccessRecord.""" log_pattern = re.compile( r'(?P<ip>[\d.]+)\s+\S+\s+(?P<user>\S+)\s+' r'\[(?P<time>[^\]]+)\]\s+' r'"(?P<method>\w+)\s+(?P<path>\S+)\s+\S+"\s+' r'(?P<status>\d+)' ) match = log_pattern.match(line) if not match: return None path = match.group('path') object_id = None for pattern in self.ID_PATTERNS: id_match = pattern.search(path) if id_match: object_id = id_match.group(2) break return AccessRecord( timestamp=datetime.strptime(match.group('time'), '%d/%b/%Y:%H:%M:%S %z'), source_ip=match.group('ip'), user_id=match.group('user') if match.group('user') != '-' else None, method=match.group('method'), path=path, status_code=int(match.group('status')), object_id=object_id ) def analyze(self, records: List[AccessRecord]) -> List[EnumerationAlert]: """Analyze access records for enumeration patterns.""" alerts = [] # Group by source IP and endpoint pattern grouped = defaultdict(list) for record in records: if record.object_id: # Normalize endpoint by removing the specific object ID endpoint = re.sub(r'/[a-f0-9\-]{36}', '/{id}', re.sub(r'/\d+', '/{id}', record.path)) key = (record.source_ip, record.user_id, endpoint) grouped[key].append(record) for (src_ip, user_id, endpoint), records_group in grouped.items(): if len(records_group) < self.min_unique_ids: continue # Sort by timestamp records_group.sort(key=lambda r: r.timestamp) # Analyze time windows window_start = 0 for window_start in range(len(records_group)): window_records = [] for r in records_group[window_start:]: if r.timestamp - records_group[window_start].timestamp <= self.time_window: window_records.append(r) unique_ids = set(r.object_id for r in window_records) if len(unique_ids) < self.min_unique_ids: continue time_span = (window_records[-1].timestamp - window_records[0].timestamp).total_seconds() rps = len(window_records) / max(time_span, 1) auth_failures = sum(1 for r in window_records if r.status_code in (401, 403)) failure_ratio = auth_failures / len(window_records) # Determine severity if len(unique_ids) > 100: severity = "critical" elif len(unique_ids) > 50 or failure_ratio > 0.5: severity = "high" elif len(unique_ids) > 20: severity = "medium" else: severity = "low" # Determine attack type ids_list = sorted([r.object_id for r in window_records if r.object_id and r.object_id.isdigit()]) is_sequential = self._check_sequential(ids_list) attack_type = "sequential_enumeration" if is_sequential else "random_enumeration" alert = EnumerationAlert( source_ip=src_ip, user_id=user_id, endpoint_pattern=endpoint, unique_object_ids=len(unique_ids), total_requests=len(window_records), time_window_seconds=time_span, requests_per_second=round(rps, 2), auth_failure_ratio=round(failure_ratio, 2), severity=severity, attack_type=attack_type, sample_ids=list(unique_ids)[:10] ) alerts.append(alert) break # One alert per group return alerts def _check_sequential(self, ids: List[str]) -> bool: """Check if numeric IDs follow a sequential pattern.""" if len(ids) < 5: return False try: numeric_ids = sorted(int(i) for i in ids) sequential_count = sum( 1 for i in range(1, len(numeric_ids)) if numeric_ids[i] - numeric_ids[i-1] <= 2 ) return sequential_count / len(numeric_ids) > 0.7 except ValueError: return False def main(): detector = EnumerationDetector( time_window_minutes=5, min_unique_ids=15 ) log_file = sys.argv[1] if len(sys.argv) > 1 else "/var/log/api/access.log" records = [] with open(log_file, 'r') as f: for line in f: record = detector.parse_log_line(line.strip()) if record: records.append(record) alerts = detector.analyze(records) if alerts: print(f"\n[!] {len(alerts)} enumeration attack(s) detected:\n") for alert in alerts: print(f" Source IP: {alert.source_ip}") print(f" User ID: {alert.user_id}") print(f" Endpoint: {alert.endpoint_pattern}") print(f" Unique IDs Accessed: {alert.unique_object_ids}") print(f" Requests/sec: {alert.requests_per_second}") print(f" Auth Failure Ratio: {alert.auth_failure_ratio}") print(f" Attack Type: {alert.attack_type}") print(f" Severity: {alert.severity.upper()}") print(f" Sample IDs: {alert.sample_ids}") print() else: print("[+] No enumeration attacks detected.") if __name__ == "__main__": main()
python# Always validate object ownership at the data layer def get_user_order(request, order_id): order = Order.objects.get(id=order_id) if order.user_id != request.user.id: raise PermissionDenied("Not authorized to access this order") return order
pythonimport uuid # Use UUIDs instead of sequential integers class Order(Model): id = UUIDField(default=uuid.uuid4, primary_key=True)
yaml# Kong rate limiting per API route plugins: - name: rate-limiting config: minute: 30 policy: redis limit_by: credential
| Case | Status | Duration (ms) | Turns | Tokens | Tool calls | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Without | With | Δ | Without | With | Δ | Without | With | Δ | Without | With | Δ | ||
case-22 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-11 | fail→pass | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-10 | fail→pass | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-13 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-08 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-15 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-03 | fail→pass | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-12 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-17 | pass→pass | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-01 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-20 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-06 | fail→pass | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-05 | pass→pass | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-09 | fail→pass | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-19 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-02 | fail→pass | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-21 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-18 | pass→pass | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-16 | fail→pass | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-04 | fail→pass | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-07 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-14 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
DecimalAI ran this skill against gemini-3.6-flash twice over the same eval suite — once with the skill loaded and once without — and compared the two runs case by case. 22 cases were attempted, and 21 counted toward the lift figure. The other 1 produced results that are not comparable between the two arms, so they are excluded from the headline rather than averaged into it. The headline lift of +36 percentage points is the difference between those two pass rates over the 21 comparable cases. 2 cases got worse with the skill loaded, and they are included in that figure.
The per-case answers from this run were removed by the retention sweep, so the case table below shows the verdicts without the text either arm produced. The counts above were recorded at the time and are unaffected. Answers are now kept for 180 days.
Other measured skills in the registry, with their headline benchmark lift.