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Get Started Free →Detect container escape attempts in real-time using Falco runtime security rules that monitor syscalls, file access, and privilege escalation.
.claude/skills/detecting-container-escape-with-falco-rules/SKILL.md| Test case | Without → With | Effect | Δ tokens | Δ turns |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| case-08 | ✗→✓ | ▲ Improved | — | — |
| case-03 | ✗→✓ | ▲ Improved | — | — |
| case-19 | ✗→✓ | ▲ Improved | — | — |
| case-10 | ✗→✓ | ▲ Improved | — | — |
| case-06 | ✗→✓ | ▲ Improved | — | — |
Falco is a CNCF-graduated runtime security tool that monitors Linux syscalls to detect anomalous container behavior. It uses a rules engine to identify container escape techniques such as mounting host filesystems, accessing sensitive host paths, loading kernel modules, and exploiting privileged container capabilities.
bash# Add Falco Helm chart helm repo add falcosecurity https://falcosecurity.github.io/charts helm repo update # Install Falco with eBPF driver helm install falco falcosecurity/falco \ --namespace falco --create-namespace \ --set falcosidekick.enabled=true \ --set falcosidekick.webui.enabled=true \ --set driver.kind=ebpf \ --set collectors.containerd.enabled=true \ --set collectors.containerd.socket=/run/containerd/containerd.sock # Verify kubectl get pods -n falco kubectl logs -n falco -l app.kubernetes.io/name=falco --tail=20
bash# Add Falco GPG key and repo curl -fsSL https://falco.org/repo/falcosecurity-packages.asc | \ sudo gpg --dearmor -o /usr/share/keyrings/falco-archive-keyring.gpg echo "deb [signed-by=/usr/share/keyrings/falco-archive-keyring.gpg] https://download.falco.org/packages/deb stable main" | \ sudo tee /etc/apt/sources.list.d/falcosecurity.list sudo apt-get update sudo apt-get install -y falco # Start Falco sudo systemctl enable falco sudo systemctl start falco
yaml- rule: Container Mounting Host Filesystem desc: Detect a container attempting to mount the host filesystem condition: > spawned_process and container and proc.name = mount and (proc.args contains "/host" or proc.args contains "nsenter") output: > Container mounting host filesystem (user=%user.name container_id=%container.id container_name=%container.name image=%container.image.repository command=%proc.cmdline %evt.args) priority: CRITICAL tags: [container, escape, T1611]
yaml- rule: Nsenter Execution in Container desc: Detect nsenter being used to escape container namespaces condition: > spawned_process and container and proc.name = nsenter output: > nsenter executed in container - potential escape attempt (user=%user.name container_id=%container.id image=%container.image.repository command=%proc.cmdline parent=%proc.pname) priority: CRITICAL tags: [container, escape, namespace, T1611]
yaml- rule: Launch Privileged Container desc: Detect a privileged container being launched condition: > container_started and container and container.privileged=true output: > Privileged container started (user=%user.name container_id=%container.id container_name=%container.name image=%container.image.repository) priority: WARNING tags: [container, privileged, T1610]
yaml- rule: Write to Sysrq Trigger desc: Detect writes to /proc/sysrq-trigger which can crash or control the host condition: > open_write and container and fd.name = /proc/sysrq-trigger output: > Write to /proc/sysrq-trigger from container (user=%user.name container_id=%container.id image=%container.image.repository command=%proc.cmdline) priority: CRITICAL tags: [container, escape, host-manipulation]
yaml- rule: Container Loading Kernel Module desc: Detect a container attempting to load a kernel module condition: > spawned_process and container and (proc.name in (insmod, modprobe) or (proc.name = init_module)) output: > Kernel module loading from container (user=%user.name container_id=%container.id image=%container.image.repository command=%proc.cmdline) priority: CRITICAL tags: [container, escape, kernel, T1611]
yaml- rule: Write to Cgroup Release Agent desc: Detect writes to cgroup release_agent which is a known container escape vector condition: > open_write and container and fd.name endswith release_agent output: > Container writing to cgroup release_agent - escape attempt (user=%user.name container_id=%container.id image=%container.image.repository file=%fd.name command=%proc.cmdline) priority: CRITICAL tags: [container, escape, cgroup, CVE-2022-0492]
yaml- rule: Container Reading Host Shadow File desc: Detect a container reading /etc/shadow on the host via mounted volume condition: > open_read and container and (fd.name = /etc/shadow or fd.name startswith /host/etc/shadow) output: > Container reading host shadow file (user=%user.name container_id=%container.id image=%container.image.repository file=%fd.name command=%proc.cmdline) priority: CRITICAL tags: [container, credential-access, T1003]
yaml- rule: Container Accessing Docker Socket desc: Detect a container accessing the Docker socket which allows host control condition: > (open_read or open_write) and container and fd.name = /var/run/docker.sock output: > Container accessing Docker socket (user=%user.name container_id=%container.id image=%container.image.repository command=%proc.cmdline) priority: CRITICAL tags: [container, escape, docker-socket, T1610]
yaml# /etc/falco/rules.d/container-escape.yaml - list: escape_binaries items: [nsenter, chroot, unshare, mount, umount, pivot_root] - macro: container_escape_attempt condition: > spawned_process and container and proc.name in (escape_binaries) - rule: Container Escape Binary Execution desc: Detect execution of binaries commonly used for container escape condition: container_escape_attempt output: > Escape-related binary executed in container (user=%user.name container=%container.name image=%container.image.repository command=%proc.cmdline parent=%proc.pname pid=%proc.pid) priority: CRITICAL tags: [container, escape, mitre_T1611] - rule: Sensitive File Access from Container desc: Detect container access to sensitive host files condition: > (open_read or open_write) and container and (fd.name startswith /proc/1/ or fd.name = /etc/shadow or fd.name = /etc/kubernetes/admin.conf or fd.name startswith /var/lib/kubelet/) output: > Sensitive file accessed from container (container=%container.name image=%container.image.repository file=%fd.name command=%proc.cmdline user=%user.name) priority: CRITICAL tags: [container, sensitive-file, mitre_T1005]
yaml# /etc/falco/falco.yaml (key settings) rules_files: - /etc/falco/falco_rules.yaml - /etc/falco/rules.d/container-escape.yaml json_output: true json_include_output_property: true json_include_tags_property: true log_stderr: true log_syslog: true log_level: info priority: WARNING stdout_output: enabled: true syslog_output: enabled: true http_output: enabled: true url: http://falcosidekick:2801 insecure: true grpc: enabled: true bind_address: "unix:///run/falco/falco.sock" threadiness: 8 grpc_output: enabled: true
yaml# Falcosidekick values.yaml config: slack: webhookurl: "https://hooks.slack.com/services/XXXXX" minimumpriority: "warning" messageformat: | *{{.Priority}}* - {{.Rule}} Container: {{.OutputFields.container_name}} Image: {{.OutputFields.container_image_repository}} Command: {{.OutputFields.proc_cmdline}}
bash# Simulate container escape attempt (in a test container) kubectl run test-escape --image=alpine --restart=Never -- sh -c "cat /etc/shadow" # Simulate nsenter kubectl run test-nsenter --image=alpine --restart=Never --overrides='{"spec":{"hostPID":true}}' -- nsenter -t 1 -m -u -i -n -- cat /etc/hostname # Check Falco alerts kubectl logs -n falco -l app.kubernetes.io/name=falco --tail=50 | grep -i escape
| Case | Status | Duration (ms) | Turns | Tokens | Tool calls | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Without | With | Δ | Without | With | Δ | Without | With | Δ | Without | With | Δ | ||
case-07 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-08 | fail→pass | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-13 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-04 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-15 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-14 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-03 | fail→pass | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-01 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-19 | fail→pass | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-05 | pass→pass | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-21 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-10 | fail→pass | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-09 | pass→pass | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-06 | fail→pass | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-02 | fail→pass | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-12 | fail→pass | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-18 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-22 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-11 | fail→pass | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-16 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-17 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-20 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
DecimalAI ran this skill against gemini-3.6-flash twice over the same eval suite — once with the skill loaded and once without — and compared the two runs case by case. 22 cases were attempted. The headline lift of +36 percentage points is the difference between those two pass rates over the 22 comparable cases.
The per-case answers from this run were removed by the retention sweep, so the case table below shows the verdicts without the text either arm produced. The counts above were recorded at the time and are unaffected. Answers are now kept for 180 days.
Other measured skills in the registry, with their headline benchmark lift.