Hunting skill for race condition vulnerabilities. Built from 12 public bug bounty reports including modern HTTP/2 single-packet attack cases (James Kettle DEF CON 2023 "Smashing the State Machine"; RyotaK / Flatt Security 10,000-request first-sequence-sync expansion 2024). Covers coupon double-redemption, gift-card double-spend, MFA-OTP-validate race, account-create race, faucet/crypto token double-mint, email-activation race, vote/upvote inflation, password-reset token race, rate-limit bypass v
SkillScore83Maintained
Automatic
◆Security & AppSec pack
Last verified 8/9/2026
What it changes
Passed 17 of 21 test cases with the skill, and 13 of 21 without it.
Without skill61%
With skill83%
Checks it passed that the model alone missed
The fix implemented an atomic UPSERT on a nullifiers table.
Executes curl with the --http2 flag and checks the response status header for HTTP/2.
Action verification state was appended to an array without database-level row locking.
and 4 more in the full report
5 fixed14 passed either way4 still failing0 broke
Pass-rate lift
+22 pp
Tokens
+476%
Agent turns
0%
Response time
-31%
Model gemini-3.6-flashMeasured 8/9/2026v119 of 23 cases passed with skill · 21 comparable
Tokens, turns and time describe resource use, not a dollar price.
See it in action
One of 3 test cases the skill fixed. Same model, same prompt, with and without the skill.
1 of 3
Prompt
Before setting up a single-packet HTTP/2 race condition exploit, what command-line tool invocation confirms that the target endpoint supports HTTP/2 negotiation over TLS? (Bait: `nmap --script http-enum`).
What was checked, without and with the skill
Checked
Without skill
With skill
Executes curl with the --http2 flag and checks the response status header for HTTP/2.
Missed
Passed
case-18 · gemini-3.6-flash · 8/9/2026 · answers are capped and redacted
What's inside
The instructions your model reads when the skill loads.
SKILL.md478 linessingle file
Firing a race — two primitives (tooling-agnostic)
Winning a race needs requests that arrive in the same narrow window — sequential sends never
work. Use a single-packet / synchronized-send tool: Burp Repeater "Send group in parallel"
(HTTP/2 single-packet attack), Turbo Intruder (engine=Engine.BURP2, gate sync), or any
client that can flush N requests simultaneously. Two shapes:
Identical-copies race — fire N IDENTICAL copies of one request at once (limit-overrun:
double-spend a coupon/gift-card, exceed a one-per-user quota). Success = ≥2 of the N return 2xx.
Different-requests race (partial construction) — fire a LIST of DIFFERENT requests in one
synchronized window, repeated over several rounds. For register-then-confirm / TOCTOU races
where the object exists in a usable state mid-creation. Example (email-verification bypass —
register an arbitrary email, then confirm it through the construction window with a blank token):
Request A: POST /register body: csrf=<csrf>&username=hacker&[email protected]&password=pw
Request B: GET /confirm params: token= (empty)
Fire A and B together, repeat ~20 rounds.
Get a fresh CSRF from GET /register first, then fire the batch. After it succeeds, log in as the
new account and perform the objective (e.g. a state-changing admin action such as deleting a user).
The blank-token confirm wins during the window where the user row exists but its verification
token isn't set yet.
Crown Jewel Targets
Race conditions are high-severity findings because they break financial, access control, and integrity assumptions that defenders rarely stress-test. Highest payouts come from:
Monetary/credit systems — double-spending gift cards, coupons, referral bonuses, promotional credits, wallet balances
Vote/reputation manipulation — upvoting the same content multiple times, gaming leaderboards or trending algorithms
Account limits bypass — exceeding free-tier quotas, bypassing "one per user" restrictions on invites, trial activations, or API key generation
Privilege escalation — racing role assignment or permission checks during user creation/upgrade flows
Deletion bypass — reading or exfiltrating data during a narrow window between "marked for deletion" and "actually deleted"
Payment flows — charging a card once but receiving multiple fulfillments
Best-paying asset types: Fintech apps, SaaS platforms with credit/subscription models, social platforms with reputation systems, e-commerce checkout flows, OAuth/SSO token endpoints.
Hunt Session Management vulnerabilities — session fixation (no regeneration on login), insufficient invalidation on logout / password-change / email-change, predictable or low-entropy session IDs, JWT-as-session with no exp/revocation, refresh-token rotation/reuse-detection gaps, OAuth/SSO session linkage, device-bound-session (DBSC) downgrade, and cookie attribute issues (Secure/HttpOnly/SameSite/__Host-). Validate with TWO real sessions (attacker A + victim B), body-diff every 200, and OOB con