Restricted Tool Triage

Use this skill whenever you (the agent) are executing inside a gh-aw workflow whose frontmatter declares a narrow tools: allowlist (e.g. a short bash: [...] list, a scoped MCP toolsets, or no read/shell at all) and you hit — or are at risk of hitting — a "permission denied" / tool-denial response from the harness.

Why this matters

gh-aw enforces a hard, non-renewable denial budget per session (commonly 3 denied tool calls). Once the threshold is reached, the harness emits guard.tool_denials_exceeded and aborts the entire session immediately — no further turns, no partial credit, no chance to recover. Treat every tool denial as spending down a scarce budget, not as a way to probe what's allowed.

Triggers

• A tool call returns "permission denied by workflow tool permissions" or similar.
• You are about to try a shell/read/write command and are unsure if it's in the declared tools: allowlist.
• The workflow frontmatter shows a short/explicit bash: list, restrictive MCP toolsets, or omits edit/bash entirely.

Procedure

1. Read the allowlist first, before acting. Before issuing any shell/file/MCP command, check the workflow's declared tools: block (frontmatter bash: [...], edit:, MCP toolsets:, etc.) if visible in context, or infer it from the first denial message, which echoes the exact denied command. Do not assume general-purpose shell access is available just because the environment looks like a normal shell.

1. On the first denial, stop and pivot — do not retry variants. A denial is not a request to try a slightly different phrasing of the same disallowed command (e.g. don't go from git status to git status --short to git diff --stat as three separate attempts). Instead:

• Identify the capability you actually need (e.g. "see which files changed").
• Map it to a tool/command explicitly present in the allowlist (e.g. use git diff --name-only if git diff:* is allowed but git status is not; use the already-available MCP toolset instead of raw read/shell for file or repo introspection).
• If no allowed tool can achieve the capability, stop attempting workarounds for that capability and route around it (skip the sub-task, or note the limitation in your output) rather than spending more of the denial budget.

1. Budget awareness. Assume a low, fixed denial ceiling (verify from harness messages such as "N/M" if shown, e.g. "tool denial 2/3"). Once you're at 1 remaining denial, do not attempt anything speculative — only proceed with actions you are confident are allowed.

1. Don't misreport scope-as-bug. A restricted toolset is very often an intentional, security-motivated author choice (least-privilege workflow design), not a misconfiguration. Before calling missing_tool / missing_data / equivalent "report a gap" safe-output:

• Confirm the missing capability is genuinely required to complete the task and has no in-allowlist substitute.
• Do NOT claim "verify token scopes / repository permissions / credentials" when the actual evidence is a tools: allowlist denial — that phrasing wrongly suggests an infra/auth bug and can prompt maintainers to loosen permissions unnecessarily, which is a security regression.
• If you do report a gap, name the specific missing tool/capability and cite the exact denied command(s), not a generic "permissions" narrative.

1. Prefer completing partial work over aborting. If some parts of the task can be completed using only allowed tools, finish and report those, and clearly note what could not be done due to the restricted toolset — rather than continuing to probe disallowed tools until the session is forcibly terminated.

Verification checklist

• ] Did you check the declared tools: allowlist (or infer it from the first denial) before issuing further commands?
• ] After any denial, did you switch to a different capability strategy rather than retry a denied command class?
• ] Did you stay well under the denial threshold (ideally 0 denials, never risk the last one on a speculative call)?
• ] If you reported a missing tool/capability, did you cite the specific denied command(s) instead of a generic "check credentials/permissions" claim?

Stop conditions

• If you reach 2 denials, stop attempting anything not certain to be in the allowlist — finish with only allowed tools and report the limitation.
• If the required capability has no allowed substitute, do not keep probing; complete what you can and clearly state the constraint in your final output rather than exhausting the denial budget.