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Get Started Free →Autonomously remove your info from data-broker sites.
.claude/skills/nousresearch-unbroker/SKILL.md| Test case | Without → With | Effect | Δ tokens | Δ turns |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| case-04 | ✗→✓ | ▲ Improved | 382% | 0% |
| case-07 | ✗→✓ | ▲ Improved | 425% | 0% |
| case-08 | ✗→✓ | ▲ Improved | 360% | 0% |
| case-10 | ✗→✓ | ▲ Improved | 256% | 0% |
| case-12 | ✗→✓ | ▲ Improved | 209% | 0% |
Find where a person's personal information (name, addresses, phone, email, relatives) is exposed on data brokers and people-search sites, then remove it - automatically where possible, with guided human steps only where a site demands a CAPTCHA, government ID, phone call, or fax. Manages multiple people independently. It does not defeat anti-bot systems, does not act on anyone without recorded consent, and does not remove public records (voter/property/court) or accounts the person controls.
The Python CLI (scripts/pdd.py) owns the deterministic state - config, dossiers + consent, the broker database, tier planning, the ledger, drafts, reports, email sending (SMTP), verification-link polling (IMAP), and the autonomous action queue (next). You (the agent) do the scanning and form-driving with native tools: web_extract and browser_navigate for searching and web forms, and cronjob for recurring re-scans.
This skill is designed to run hands-off. After intake (+ recorded consent) there are exactly TWO legitimate human touchpoints: (1) the intake conversation itself, and (2) ONE consolidated human-task digest at the end of the run ($PDD tasks). Between those:
$PDD setup --auto detects capabilities andpicks the most autonomous valid config itself.
autonomy=full (the default): the consentrecorded at intake is standing authorization for T0-T2 opt-outs. (autonomy=assisted restores per-submission confirmation for cautious operators - honor confirm_first flags in next output.)
--reason "...") and keep going; it all surfaces once in the final digest.
$PDD next <subject> - it returns the exact ordered actionsto take right now (scan, poll verification, re-check, opt out parents-first, requeue blocked), plus the human digest. Execute every action, record outcomes, re-run next, repeat until done_for_now. Then present the digest, report, and schedule the cron.
The hard limits that autonomy never overrides: no acting without recorded consent, no disclosure beyond disclosure_fields, no CAPTCHA/anti-bot bypass, and confirmed_removed only after a verifying re-scan.
python (stdlib only; no extra packages needed for the core engine).setup --auto turns on everyone it detects, reading credentials from the shell env and from $HERMES_HOME/.env so keys Hermes already loads for its own tools are picked up without re-exporting - each one converts a class of human tasks into agent actions):
BROWSERBASE_API_KEY. setup --auto selects itwhenever the key is present, and it is the intended baseline: a real residential-IP cloud browser clears soft/managed CAPTCHAs (Cloudflare Turnstile, hCaptcha/reCAPTCHA checkbox) as normal operation, so those brokers stay automated (T1) instead of becoming human tasks. This is not CAPTCHA "solving" - no solver service, no fingerprint spoofing; only interactive/behavioral ("hard") challenges the browser genuinely cannot pass fall back to a human task. Without the key, the plain agent browser is used and soft-CAPTCHA brokers drop to T2 (human).
setup --email-mode browser. The agent sends opt-out/CCPAemails and opens verification links through the operator's logged-in webmail using browser_* tools. Nothing is stored. This requires Hermes to be pointed at the operator's own logged-in browser, NOT a cloud browser: a headless cloud browser (Browserbase) holds no webmail session and is itself Cloudflare/DataDome-gated on webmail and on session-bound broker gates (e.g. PeopleConnect guided-mode). Drive the operator's real Chrome over CDP - launch chrome --remote-debugging-port=9222 --user-data-dir="$HOME/.hermes/chrome-debug" (a dedicated debug profile signed into the webmail once, not the Default profile) and connect the browser tools to 127.0.0.1:9222. $PDD cdp launches this for you (finds Chrome/Chromium/Brave/Edge, starts it detached on the dedicated profile, prints the CDP endpoint; --check to test, --print for the command). See references/methods.md -> "Browser backends: scan vs execute". Falls back to drafts for an email if the inbox isn't reachable.
EMAIL_ADDRESS + EMAIL_PASSWORD (+ EMAIL_SMTP_HOST /EMAIL_IMAP_HOST for non-mainstream providers; gmail/outlook/yahoo/icloud/fastmail inferred). The CLI sends via send-email and reads verify links via poll-verification. The agentmail skill (per-broker aliases) also counts.
google-workspace skill.scrapling skill for stealth/Cloudflare-protected pages.Run everything through the terminal tool. From this skill's directory:
bashPDD="python scripts/pdd.py"
The engine stores data under $PDD_DATA_DIR (default $HERMES_HOME/unbroker), written 0600. Run via terminal, not execute_code (that sandbox scrubs env and redacts output, which breaks reading the dossier).
| Command | Purpose | |---|---| | $PDD setup --auto | Autonomous setup: detect capabilities, pick the most autonomous valid config (no questions) | | $PDD doctor | Readiness check: config, broker count, and which upgrades are on/available | | $PDD cdp [--check] [--print] [--port N] | Launch/detect the operator's Chrome over CDP for Phase-2 browser + webmail (dedicated debug profile; the reliable way to send webmail and clear session-bound gates) | | $PDD intake --full-name "..." [--alias ...] [--email ... --phone ...] [--city --state] [--prior-location "City,ST"] --consent | Create a consenting subject; captures aliases + multiple emails/phones + prior locations; prints subject_id | | $PDD next <subject> | The autonomous loop driver: ordered agent actions right now + human digest + next_wake_at | | $PDD brokers [--priority crucial] | List the people-search broker database (curated + live) | | $PDD refresh-brokers | Pull the latest BADBOOL people-search list and the CA Data Broker Registry (next requeues this automatically when the cache is stale) | | $PDD registry [--search NAME] | State registry coverage (CA ~545 ingested; VT/OR/TX portals surfaced); the DROP/email lane, not scanned | | $PDD drop <subject> [--filed] | The one-shot legal lever: one CA DROP request deletes from ALL registered brokers; --filed records it | | $PDD plan <subject> [--priority crucial] | Per-broker tier + method + search_vectors + the exact fields to disclose | | $PDD plan <subject> --batch | Reduce view: overlays ledger state, groups brokers by next action (unscanned/found/indirect/blocked/in_progress/done), collapses ownership clusters, orders found cluster-parents-first + emits a tailored parent_playbook, prints next_actions | | $PDD fanout <subject> [--priority crucial] [--size 5] | Batch brokers into parallel delegate_task subagents (auto for large runs; batches of 5 - 8+ time out) | | $PDD record <subject> <broker> <state> [--found true] [--evidence JSON] [--disclosed F --channel C] [--reason "..."] | Update the ledger (validated state machine); auto-stamps next_recheck_at | | $PDD show <subject> <broker> | Read back a case's recorded state + evidence + disclosure log (so the parent re-verifies a subagent's found without re-deriving the listing URL) | | $PDD send-email <subject> <broker> --listing <url> [--kind ccpa_indirect ...] | Render + record the request (recipient locked to the broker's own address). browser mode returns a compose payload to send via webmail (no password); programmatic mode SMTP-sends | | $PDD verify-link <subject> <broker> --text '<body>' | browser mode: extract a broker's verification link from webmail text you read (anti-phishing scored) | | $PDD poll-verification <subject> [--broker <id>] | programmatic mode: poll IMAP for verification links (anti-phishing scored); auto-advances submitted → verification_pending | | $PDD render-email <subject> <broker> --listing <url> | Draft only (fallback when no email mode is configured) | | $PDD due <subject> | Cases whose recheck window arrived (the cron re-scan queue) | | $PDD tasks <subject> | ONE consolidated human-task digest (present at END of run) | | $PDD status <subject> | Markdown status report | | $PDD report <subject> --sheets | Rows for the Google Sheets tracker |
For anything past a couple of brokers, run this as map → reduce → act, not broker-by-broker:
verdict for each (found / not_found / indirect_exposure / blocked). Scanning has no side effects, so it is safe to parallelize and retry. Getting the full exposure map before acting is what unlocks cluster dedup and prioritization below. Default: the parent drives web_extract probes directly - most people-search sites render name/phone/address results as static HTML that web_extract reads in seconds. Escalate to browser_* only for the few JS-only sites, and to delegate_task subagents only for genuinely reasoning-heavy work (large-scale namesake/relative disambiguation). Do NOT hand a browser-toolset subagent a big list of brokers to crawl - in the field this timed out repeatedly (600s, ~5-6 brokers each, no summary) because browser navigation is heavy; the ledger writes that survived came at 10x the cost of parent web_extract. A blocked (DataDome/Cloudflare/antibot) site is not a subagent job either: record blocked and requeue it for a stealth/cloud browser (Browserbase) pass. Subagent reports are self-reports - the parent re-fetches key URLs to confirm a found before trusting it (this cuts both ways: it caught a real listing the parent had wrongly assumed was a false positive).
$PDD plan <subject> --batch. Collapses the crawl into a phase-oriented plan: groups bynext action, collapses ownership clusters (a parent removal that clears children is ONE action, not N - e.g. one Intelius/PeopleConnect suppression covers Truthfinder/Instant Checkmate/US Search/…), and prints next_actions. phase is discover while anything is unscanned, else delete.
plan --batch orders the found group cluster-parents-first (most children first) and emits a parent_playbook with tailored, ordered steps per parent - follow that order and those steps (full recipes in references/methods.md → "Ownership clusters - DO PARENTS FIRST"). Do the cluster parents (skipping the covered children), re-scan each parent's children after it confirms (they usually drop out), then the standalone listings; send the indirect_exposure cases as CCPA/GDPR delete-my-PII emails (send-email --kind ccpa_indirect), and defer blocked to the stealth-browser pass. Opt-outs hit CAPTCHAs, email-verification loops, and session binding - work them one at a time, carefully (this is the opposite of fan-out), but do NOT stop to ask permission per submission in autonomy=full; in assisted, confirm each one. Usually prefer deletion over suppression where a broker offers both (Spokeo/BeenVerified) - but follow the record's deletion.prefer: PeopleConnect is the exception (prefer: false), where deleting your user data removes your suppressions and does not stop public-records re-listing, so you suppress-and-maintain instead.
accessible removal channel, even when a listing was not first confirmed - it discloses only the subject's own identifiers to the broker's own official channel, so it does not violate least-disclosure. Two corollaries: (1) a guided flow that matches email+DOB+name and says "no results" is a stronger not_found than any scrape - the opt-out flow doubles as the search; (2) when a form is automation-hostile (hard CAPTCHA, Cloudflare/DataDome, slide-to-verify slider), default to the broker's cited rights-request email (name+state+contact-email only) rather than recording blocked. CAPTCHA policy: never defeat behavioral/token/slider challenges; OK to read a static distorted-text or plain-arithmetic CAPTCHA on the subject's own opt-out, but stop if the site rejects the whole submission after a correct answer (it is fingerprinting the automation). Third-party/indirect records are the exception - still confirm those before acting. Per-site game plans + the meta-search no-op skip-list are in references/site-playbooks.md; the full policy is in references/methods.md.
suppression and the subject re-lists across the whole affiliate cluster. If a "Your deletion request for PeopleConnect.us is Complete" email ever appears, the suppression is gone -> re-run suppression and re-verify the Control step reads "suppressed". Never leave this cluster on a completed deletion (see references/brokers/intelius.json).
Subagent reports are self-reports: the parent re-verifies key claims (listing URLs, match basis) before recording found and before any deletion.
$PDD setup --auto - it detects capabilities and configuresthe most autonomous valid combination itself (programmatic email when EMAIL_* creds exist, Browserbase when its key exists, age encryption when the binary exists, autonomy=full). Then $PDD doctor and show the operator the readiness output for information, not as a question - proceed immediately. Mention what would unlock more automation (e.g. email creds) but do not wait.
$PDD intake ... with --consent (and--consent-method). Without consent the engine refuses to plan or act. Collect everything in one pass - names/aliases, current + prior cities, emails, phones - so you never have to come back with questions. For California subjects, also read references/legal/drop.md: next will surface a drop_submit one-shot that deletes from every registered broker (~545) at once, which is the single highest-leverage action. File it, then drop <subject> --filed. For non-CA subjects the registry is covered by targeted CCPA/GDPR emails (registry --search, then send-email); the people-search sites are worked directly in either case.
while true: q = $PDD next <subject> if q.actions is empty: break execute EVERY action in order; record each outcome via $PDD record
next emits, in order: refresh_brokers (stale cache), fanout_scan/scan_inline (Phase 1 crawl - see step 4), poll_verification (in-flight email confirmations), verify_removal (due re-checks), optout_web_form/optout_email_send (Phase 2, parents-first with playbook steps), indirect_email_send, and stealth_rescan. Human-only work never appears as an action - it accumulates in q.human_digest. In autonomy=full, execute actions without pausing; honor confirm_first in assisted mode.
next says so). For fanout_scan: run $PDD fanout <subject> and spawn onedelegate_task subagent per batch, in parallel, passing that batch's ready-made brief - do not scan all brokers yourself sequentially. For scan_inline: scan the few brokers yourself. Either way, each broker gets every search_vectors entry via the references/methods.md ladder (web_extract → site: probe → browser_navigate → scrapling), a 404 is INCONCLUSIVE (not not_found), blocked is recorded when antibot is set and no stealth browser is available, and subject vs namesake/relative is confirmed before recording: $PDD record <subject> <broker> <found|not_found|indirect_exposure|blocked> --found <bool> --evidence '{"listing_urls":[...]}'. The parent re-verifies key found claims from subagents before trusting them.
next says so). Actions come pre-ordered parents-first with steps from eachbroker record's own optout.playbook (field-verified; cluster parents like PeopleConnect, Whitepages, BeenVerified, Spokeo have exact, live-checked recipes). Deletion usually beats suppression: when an action carries prefer_deletion, complete the record's DELETION lane, not just the hide-my-listing flow. When it carries prefer_suppression instead (PeopleConnect - deleting removes your suppressions and does not stop re-listing), do the suppression flow and keep it maintained; use their Delete button only for a deliberate data-purge. Per method:
optout_url with browser_navigate/browser_type/browser_click, submitonly disclosure_fields, screenshot the confirmation, then the action's after record command. Playbooks may end with a right-to-delete send-email follow-up - do it (full erasure, not just listing suppression).
--listing <url> records + discloses in one step (recipient locked to addresses the broker record declares; next picks the kind from residency - never claim CCPA/GDPR for someone who can't). In **browser** mode it returns a recipient-locked compose payload: compose a new message to compose.to with compose.subject/compose.body exactly in the operator's webmail via browser_` and send (no password); in programmatic mode it SMTP-sends. next also routes human-gated forms (phone-callback/gov-ID) through a broker's deletion email when one exists - the rescue lane (verified Whitepages pattern). Draft-only falls back to render-email + a digest entry.
as normal); only a hard interactive/behavioral challenge it can't pass is recorded blocked (requeued for the stealth/operator-browser pass). Never a solver service.
never an agent action; next already routed these to the digest. Record them: $PDD record <subject> <broker> human_task_queued --reason "...".
next says so). In programmatic mode $PDD poll-verification <subject>finds arrived confirmation links via IMAP (anti-phishing scored, auto-advances state). In browser mode, open the broker's confirmation email in the operator's webmail and run $PDD verify-link <subject> <broker> --text '<body>' to score the link. Either way open the link in the same browser (several brokers bind the verification session to the browser that opens it), finish the flow, then record awaiting_processing. confirmed_removed ONLY after a verifying re-scan shows the listing gone - never off the submission flow's own confirmation page.
next returns no actions: present $PDD tasks <subject> (theconsolidated human digest) if non-empty, then $PDD status <subject>; if the Sheets tracker is on, append $PDD report <subject> --sheets rows via the google-workspace skill.
next returns next_wake_at (earliest due re-check). Create ONEcronjob that re-runs this skill's loop for the subject (a prompt like: "run the unbroker loop for <subject_id>: `$PDD next` and execute all actions"). Processing windows, verification polls, and reappearance sweeps all flow through the same queue, so the case keeps advancing with zero human attention.
disclosure_fields. The enginenever volunteers SSN/ID numbers; you must not either.
send-email is idempotent + rate-limited. It refuses to re-send a case already submittedor beyond (use --force only if a genuine re-send is needed), and SMTP sends are paced by email_min_interval_seconds (default 20s) with retry/backoff. Do not loop it to "make sure" - a successful SMTP handoff is not proof of delivery; the due-queue re-scan is the real confirmation.
lock timeout, another run is mid-write - let it finish, don't delete the .lock by hand.
gate. If a broker demands MORE than the planned disclosure_fields mid-flow, stop that case and queue it (human_task_queued --reason) rather than deciding alone to disclose extra PII.
setup --auto's job; human-only workgoes to the digest. The only mid-run question that's ever warranted is a missing-identity fact that blocks scanning (e.g. no city at all) - and that should have been collected at intake.
terminal, not execute_code for pdd.py (secret scrubbing + output redaction break it).0600 under HERMES_HOME). For at-rest encryption run$PDD setup --encryption age - it generates a local age key and encrypts dossiers + ledgers (the audit log holds field names only and stays plaintext). It guards casual/backup/commit exposure, not a full-HERMES_HOME read; set PDD_AGE_IDENTITY to a separate volume for real key separation. $PDD doctor shows whether encryption is actually engaged (not just whether age is installed).
confirmed_removed after verifying the record isactually gone; note paid-tier retention in the report.
managed/soft challenges as normal operation (those brokers stay T1). For a hard interactive one it genuinely can't pass, record blocked and let the stealth/operator-browser pass take it - never a third-party solver service or fingerprint spoofing.
$PDD record ... blocked and flag the broker file inreferences/brokers/ for re-verification instead of guessing.
confidence: auto records came fromparsing BADBOOL (read optout.notes/optout.links, confirm the real opt-out URL). confidence: documented records (several people-search sites) carry the correct published opt-out URL but have not been field-verified (they 403 datacenter IPs), so confirm the live flow via the operator's residential browser on first use, then set last_verified. Field-verified curated records (no confidence, e.g. the cluster parents) have checked mechanics and take precedence.
scripts/run_tests.sh tests/skills/test_unbroker_skill.py (hermetic; no network), or thedependency-free runner python tests/skills/test_unbroker_skill.py.
--email t@example.com --consent | python -c 'import sys,json;print(json.load(sys.stdin)"subject_id"])') && $PDD next "$SID" and confirm a readiness summary plus an ordered action queue.
| Case | Status | Duration (ms) | Turns | Tokens | Tool calls | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Without | With | Δ | Without | With | Δ | Without | With | Δ | Without | With | Δ | ||
case-01 | fail→fail | 11,575 | 5,432 | -53% | 1 | 1 | 0% | 2,067 | 6,859 | +232% | 0 | 0 | — |
case-02 | fail→fail | 9,203 | 4,829 | -48% | 1 | 1 | 0% | 1,665 | 6,778 | +307% | 0 | 0 | — |
case-03 | fail→fail | 12,022 | 5,777 | -52% | 1 | 1 | 0% | 2,073 | 6,801 | +228% | 0 | 0 | — |
case-04 | fail→pass | 9,488 | 7,313 | -23% | 1 | 1 | 0% | 1,607 | 7,741 | +382% | 0 | 0 | — |
case-05 | pass→pass | 4,929 | 6,199 | +26% | 1 | 1 | 0% | 908 | 7,673 | +745% | 0 | 0 | — |
case-06 | pass→pass | 12,259 | 11,740 | -4% | 1 | 1 | 0% | 1,432 | 7,659 | +435% | 0 | 0 | — |
case-07 | fail→pass | 7,606 | 3,194 | -58% | 1 | 1 | 0% | 1,340 | 7,041 | +425% | 0 | 0 | — |
case-08 | fail→pass | 8,992 | 4,767 | -47% | 1 | 1 | 0% | 1,608 | 7,390 | +360% | 0 | 0 | — |
case-09 | pass→pass | 11,304 | 4,532 | -60% | 1 | 1 | 0% | 2,038 | 7,327 | +260% | 0 | 0 | — |
case-10 | fail→pass | 13,279 | 6,547 | -51% | 1 | 1 | 0% | 2,166 | 7,717 | +256% | 0 | 0 | — |
case-11 | pass→pass | 9,451 | 4,434 | -53% | 1 | 1 | 0% | 1,569 | 7,149 | +356% | 0 | 0 | — |
case-12 | fail→pass | 14,570 | 5,743 | -61% | 1 | 1 | 0% | 2,446 | 7,552 | +209% | 0 | 0 | — |
case-13 | fail→pass | 10,013 | 4,116 | -59% | 1 | 1 | 0% | 1,682 | 7,241 | +330% | 0 | 0 | — |
case-14 | fail→pass | 11,095 | 2,646 | -76% | 1 | 1 | 0% | 1,981 | 6,999 | +253% | 0 | 0 | — |
case-15 | pass→pass | 14,540 | 4,860 | -67% | 1 | 1 | 0% | 2,333 | 7,261 | +211% | 0 | 0 | — |
case-16 | fail→fail | 12,797 | 3,232 | -75% | 1 | 1 | 0% | 2,068 | 7,057 | +241% | 0 | 0 | — |
case-17 | pass→pass | 9,512 | 3,951 | -58% | 1 | 1 | 0% | 1,768 | 7,136 | +304% | 0 | 0 | — |
case-18 | fail→pass | 7,251 | 3,144 | -57% | 1 | 1 | 0% | 1,305 | 7,066 | +441% | 0 | 0 | — |
case-19 | fail→pass | 9,324 | 3,784 | -59% | 1 | 1 | 0% | 1,627 | 7,091 | +336% | 0 | 0 | — |
case-20 | fail→pass | 9,119 | 3,535 | -61% | 1 | 1 | 0% | 1,546 | 7,109 | +360% | 0 | 0 | — |
case-21 | pass→pass | 9,009 | 2,482 | -72% | 1 | 1 | 0% | 1,511 | 6,930 | +359% | 0 | 0 | — |
case-22 | fail→pass | 12,239 | 7,310 | -40% | 1 | 1 | 0% | 1,917 | 7,917 | +313% | 0 | 0 | — |
DecimalAI ran this skill against gemini-3.6-flash twice over the same eval suite — once with the skill loaded and once without — and compared the two runs case by case. 22 cases were attempted, and 19 counted toward the lift figure. The other 3 produced results that are not comparable between the two arms, so they are excluded from the headline rather than averaged into it. The headline lift of +50 percentage points is the difference between those two pass rates over the 19 comparable cases.
Without the skill loaded, the model failed this case. With it loaded, the same prompt on the same model passed. This is one improved case from the latest verified run; every case, including any that regressed, is in the table above.
| Model | Method | Date | Lift |
|---|---|---|---|
| gemini-3.6-flash | verified | 8/8/2026 | +64% |
Other measured skills in the registry, with their headline benchmark lift.