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Get Started Free →Performs interactive dynamic malware analysis using the ANY.RUN cloud sandbox to observe real-time execution behavior, interact with malware prompts, and capture process trees, network traffic, and system changes. Activates for requests involving interactive sandbox analysis, cloud-based malware detonation, real-time behavioral observation, or ANY.RUN usage.
.claude/skills/performing-dynamic-analysis-with-any-run/SKILL.md| Test case | Without → With | Effect | Δ tokens | Δ turns |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| case-01 | ✗→✓ | ▲ Improved | — | — |
| case-09 | ✗→✓ | ▲ Improved | — | — |
| case-08 | ✗→✓ | ▲ Improved | — | — |
| case-02 | ✗→✓ | ▲ Improved | — | — |
| case-12 | ✗→✓ | ▲ Improved | — | — |
Do not use for highly sensitive samples that cannot be uploaded to cloud services; use an on-premises sandbox like Cuckoo instead.
Set up the ANY.RUN task with appropriate parameters:
ANY.RUN Task Configuration:
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OS Selection: Windows 10 x64 (recommended default)
Windows 7 x64 (for legacy malware)
Windows 11 x64 (for modern samples)
Execution Time: 60 seconds (default) / 120-300 for slow-acting malware
Network: Connected (captures real C2 traffic)
Residential Proxy (bypasses geo-blocking)
Privacy: Public (free tier) / Private (paid - not indexed)
MITM Proxy: Enable for HTTPS traffic decryption
Fake Net: Enable to simulate internet services if sample checks connectivityAPI-based submission (paid tier):
bash# Submit file via ANY.RUN API curl -X POST "https://api.any.run/v1/analysis" \ -H "Authorization: API-Key $ANYRUN_API_KEY" \ -F "file=@suspect.exe" \ -F "env_os=windows" \ -F "env_version=10" \ -F "env_bitness=64" \ -F "opt_timeout=120" \ -F "opt_network_connect=true" \ -F "opt_privacy_type=bylink" # Check task status curl "https://api.any.run/v1/analysis/$TASK_ID" \ -H "Authorization: API-Key $ANYRUN_API_KEY" | jq '.data.status'
Use the interactive session to trigger malware behavior:
Interactive Actions During Analysis:
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1. Document Macros: Click "Enable Content" / "Enable Editing" when prompted
2. Installer Screens: Click through installation dialogs
3. UAC Prompts: Click "Yes" to allow elevation (observe privilege escalation)
4. Credential Harvests: Enter fake credentials to observe phishing behavior
5. Browser Redirects: Navigate to URLs if malware opens browser windows
6. File Dialogs: Select target files if malware presents file picker
7. Timeout Extension: Extend analysis time if malware has delayed executionReview the complete process execution chain:
Process Tree Analysis Points:
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Parent-Child Relationships:
- WINWORD.EXE -> cmd.exe -> powershell.exe (macro execution chain)
- explorer.exe -> suspect.exe -> svchost.exe (process injection)
Process Events to Note:
- Process creation with suspicious command-line arguments
- PowerShell with encoded commands (-enc / -encodedcommand)
- cmd.exe executing script files (.bat, .vbs, .js)
- Legitimate processes spawned from unusual parents
- Process termination (self-deletion behavior)Examine DNS, HTTP/HTTPS, and TCP/UDP connections:
ANY.RUN Network Panel Analysis:
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DNS Requests:
- Domain resolutions with threat intelligence tags
- Fast-flux or DGA domain patterns
- DNS over HTTPS (DoH) detection
HTTP/HTTPS Traffic (with MITM enabled):
- Full request/response bodies for HTTP
- Decrypted HTTPS traffic showing C2 commands
- Downloaded payloads and their content types
- POST data containing exfiltrated information
Connection Map:
- Geographic visualization of C2 server locations
- Connection timeline showing beacon patterns
- Suricata alerts triggered on network trafficExtract indicators and map to known threats:
ANY.RUN IOC Categories:
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Files: Dropped files with hashes, YARA matches, VirusTotal results
Network: IPs, domains, URLs contacted during execution
Registry: Keys created/modified for persistence
Processes: Suspicious process names and command lines
Mutex: Named mutexes created (used for single-instance checking)
Signatures: Suricata rules triggered, behavioral signatures matched
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping:
- ANY.RUN automatically maps observed behaviors to ATT&CK techniques
- Review the ATT&CK matrix tab for technique coverage
- Export ATT&CK Navigator layer for reportingDownload comprehensive reports and artifacts:
bash# Download report via API curl "https://api.any.run/v1/analysis/$TASK_ID/report" \ -H "Authorization: API-Key $ANYRUN_API_KEY" \ -o report.json # Download PCAP curl "https://api.any.run/v1/analysis/$TASK_ID/pcap" \ -H "Authorization: API-Key $ANYRUN_API_KEY" \ -o capture.pcap # Download dropped files curl "https://api.any.run/v1/analysis/$TASK_ID/files" \ -H "Authorization: API-Key $ANYRUN_API_KEY" \ -o dropped_files.zip # Available exports from ANY.RUN web interface: # - HTML Report (shareable standalone page) # - PCAP file (network traffic capture) # - Process dump (memory dumps of processes) # - Dropped files (all files created during execution) # - MITRE ATT&CK Navigator JSON # - IOC export (STIX/JSON/CSV format)
| Term | Definition | |------|------------| | Interactive Sandbox | Analysis environment allowing real-time analyst interaction with the executing sample, enabling triggering of user-dependent behaviors | | MITM Proxy | Man-in-the-middle TLS interception in ANY.RUN that decrypts HTTPS traffic for visibility into encrypted C2 communications | | Residential Proxy | ANY.RUN feature routing malware traffic through residential IP addresses to bypass geo-IP and datacenter-IP evasion checks | | Suricata Alerts | Network IDS signatures triggered during execution, providing immediate identification of known malicious traffic patterns | | Process Tree | Hierarchical visualization of parent-child process relationships showing the complete execution chain from initial sample to final payloads | | Behavioral Tags | ANY.RUN classification labels automatically applied based on observed behavior (e.g., "trojan", "stealer", "ransomware") |
Context: Phishing email contains a .docm file that requires clicking "Enable Content" to trigger the macro payload. Traditional non-interactive sandboxes fail to trigger the malicious behavior.
Approach:
Pitfalls:
ANY.RUN ANALYSIS REPORT
=========================
Task URL: https://app.any.run/tasks/<task_id>
Sample: invoice_q3.docm
SHA-256: e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb924...
Verdict: MALICIOUS (Score: 95/100)
Family: Emotet
Tags: [trojan, banker, spam, macro]
PROCESS TREE
WINWORD.EXE (PID: 2184)
└── cmd.exe (PID: 3456) "/c powershell -enc JABXAG..."
└── powershell.exe (PID: 4012)
└── rundll32.exe (PID: 4568) "C:\Users\...\payload.dll,Control_RunDLL"
NETWORK INDICATORS
DNS: update.emotet-c2[.]com -> 185.220.101.42
HTTPS: POST hxxps://185.220.101[.]42/wp-content/gate/ (C2 beacon)
HTTP: GET hxxp://compromised-site[.]com/invoice.dll (payload download)
SURICATA ALERTS
[1:2028401] ET MALWARE Emotet CnC Beacon
[1:2028402] ET MALWARE Win32/Emotet Activity
MITRE ATT&CK TECHNIQUES
T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment
T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File
T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
T1218.011 Rundll32 Execution
T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols
DROPPED FILES
payload.dll SHA-256: abc123... Detection: 48/72 (VirusTotal)
config.dat SHA-256: def456... (encrypted configuration)| Case | Status | Duration (ms) | Turns | Tokens | Tool calls | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Without | With | Δ | Without | With | Δ | Without | With | Δ | Without | With | Δ | ||
case-17 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-18 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-01 | fail→pass | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-03 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-05 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-20 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-21 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-09 | fail→pass | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-06 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-08 | fail→pass | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-02 | fail→pass | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-12 | fail→pass | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-10 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-22 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-07 | fail→pass | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-16 | fail→pass | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-14 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-19 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-04 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-11 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-13 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-15 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-23 | fail→pass | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
DecimalAI ran this skill against gemini-3.6-flash twice over the same eval suite — once with the skill loaded and once without — and compared the two runs case by case. 23 cases were attempted, and 22 counted toward the lift figure. The other 1 produced results that are not comparable between the two arms, so they are excluded from the headline rather than averaged into it. The headline lift of +35 percentage points is the difference between those two pass rates over the 22 comparable cases. 1 case got worse with the skill loaded, and it is included in that figure.
The per-case answers from this run were removed by the retention sweep, so the case table below shows the verdicts without the text either arm produced. The counts above were recorded at the time and are unaffected. Answers are now kept for 180 days.
Other measured skills in the registry, with their headline benchmark lift.