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Get Started Free →sonichi/task-workstream-sessions
Isolate already-assigned owner tasks into durable provider sessions keyed by inferred workstream. This runtime skill is adapter-invoked; ungrouped tasks keep the selected core's legacy session.
Passed 16 of 20 test cases with the skill, and 5 of 20 without it.
and 14 more in the full report
12 fixed6 passed either way4 still failing0 broke
Tokens, turns and time describe resource use, not a dollar price.
One of 12 test cases the skill fixed. Same model, same prompt, with and without the skill.
Where does the system read existing workstream task assignments when processing owner tasks?
| Checked | Without skill | With skill |
|---|---|---|
| Reads assignments from <workspace>/data/task-workstreams.json | Missed | Passed |
The instructions your model reads when the skill loads.
This runtime skill intercepts Team tasks before they can reach the unrestricted
live core only when the AG2 Space broker also attests the target agent's explicit
Agent Native collaborator: true setting. The remote gateway turns that signed
combination into one pre-body collaborator: true execution stamp. Missing,
malformed, duplicate, locally forged, or body-positioned stamps fail closed to
the established restricted path; a local owner-to-Team cap is not treated as
room consent. This makes the opt-in per room and per agent, with no host-wide
environment toggle. When opted in, the worker launches a fresh instance of the
owner's configured runtime with the normal configured workspace, tools,
integrations, network, and provider settings. A Team-specific prompt
identifies the sender as a trusted collaborator rather than the owner and
requires cautious, scoped work without disclosing credentials or unrelated owner
context. Before delivery, the handler scans the final response with Sutando's
maintained secret scanner, rejects bridge delivery-control markers, and withholds
any result containing a likely credential. Scanner/runtime failures publish a
safe terminal result and never fall through to the owner core.
This is deliberately a behavioral guardrail, not adversarial isolation. Team can perform ordinary development and operational work that needs the owner's installed toolchain and configured integrations. The owner accepts that trust tradeoff. The outbound scanner checks only the final response: it cannot observe or prevent a malicious or successfully prompt-injected task from reading a credential, sending it over the network, mutating the host, invoking a webhook, or causing another side effect before returning scanner-clean text. Guest remains on the pre-existing read-only Codex delegation path carried in the task's in-band instructions.
Future defense in depth can add AG2 Space security monitoring around this trusted tier: centralized action telemetry, prompt-injection and anomalous-tool signals, cross-agent incident correlation, owner alerts, and rapid credential or agent-session revocation. Those controls would improve detection and response; they are not implemented here and must not be treated as current guarantees.
For owner tasks, the skill reads existing assignments from
<workspace>/data/task-workstreams.json; it never classifies tasks or changes
the grouping sidecar. For each assigned owner task it resumes a headless Claude
or Codex provider session dedicated to that workstream and atomically publishes
the final result body. Session IDs live in
test cases passed, vs 5 / 20 without
More skills from the same source and nearby in the registry, with their headline benchmark lift.