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Get Started Free →cyberstrikeus/T1098.003_additional-cloud-roles
An adversary may add additional roles or permissions to an adversary-controlled cloud account to maintain persistent access to a tenant.
Passed 19 of 22 test cases with the skill, and 13 of 22 without it.
and 4 more in the full report
6 fixed13 passed either way3 still failing0 broke
Tokens, turns and time describe resource use, not a dollar price.
One of 6 test cases the skill fixed. Same model, same prompt, with and without the skill.
When scoping an audit for T1098.003 (Additional Cloud Roles), which four major cloud and enterprise platform categories must be evaluated?
| Checked | Without skill | With skill |
|---|---|---|
| Lists IaaS, Identity Provider, Office Suite, and SaaS as applicable platforms. | Missed | Passed |
The instructions your model reads when the skill loads.
Sub-technique of: T1098
An adversary may add additional roles or permissions to an adversary-controlled cloud account to maintain persistent access to a tenant. For example, adversaries may update IAM policies in cloud-based environments or add a new global administrator in Office 365 environments. With sufficient permissions, a compromised account can gain almost unlimited access to data and settings (including the ability to reset the passwords of other admins).
This account modification may immediately follow Create Account or other malicious account activity. Adversaries may also modify existing Valid Accounts that they have compromised. This could lead to privilege escalation, particularly if the roles added allow for lateral movement to additional accounts.
For example, in AWS environments, an adversary with appropriate permissions may be able to use the CreatePolicyVersion API to define a new version of an IAM policy or the AttachUserPolicy API to attach an IAM policy with additional or distinct permissions to a compromised user account.
In some cases, adversaries may add roles to adversary-controlled accounts outside the victim cloud tenant. This allows these external accounts to perform actions inside the victim tenant without requiring the adversary to Create Account or modify a victim-owned account.
Platforms: IaaS, Identity Provider, Office Suite, SaaS
Identify Attack Surface: Determine if the target environment is susceptible to Additional Cloud Roles by examining the target platforms (IaaS, Identity Provider, Office Suite).
Assess Existing Defenses: Review whether mitigations for T1098.003 are in place. If defenses are absent or misconfigured, this technique may be exploitable.
Execute Test: Use tools and methods described in the MITRE ATT&CK page and external references below.
test cases passed, vs 13 / 22 without
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