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Get Started Free →Adversaries may exfiltrate data to a webhook endpoint rather than over their primary command and control channel.
.claude/skills/cyberstrikeus-t1567-004-exfiltration-over-webhook/SKILL.md| Test case | Without → With | Effect | Δ tokens | Δ turns |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| case-05 | ✗→✓ | ▲ Improved | 1% | 0% |
| case-06 | ✗→✓ | ▲ Improved | 0% | 0% |
| case-13 | ✗→✓ | ▲ Improved | -24% | 0% |
| case-03 | ✓→✓ | = Same ✓ | 6% | 0% |
| case-22 | ✓→✓ | = Same ✓ | 35% | 0% |
> Sub-technique of: T1567
Adversaries may exfiltrate data to a webhook endpoint rather than over their primary command and control channel. Webhooks are simple mechanisms for allowing a server to push data over HTTP/S to a client without the need for the client to continuously poll the server. Many public and commercial services, such as Discord, Slack, and webhook.site, support the creation of webhook endpoints that can be used by other services, such as Github, Jira, or Trello. When changes happen in the linked services (such as pushing a repository update or modifying a ticket), these services will automatically post the data to the webhook endpoint for use by the consuming application.
Adversaries may link an adversary-owned environment to a victim-owned SaaS service to achieve repeated Automated Exfiltration of emails, chat messages, and other data. Alternatively, instead of linking the webhook endpoint to a service, an adversary can manually post staged data directly to the URL in order to exfiltrate it.
Access to webhook endpoints is often over HTTPS, which gives the adversary an additional level of protection. Exfiltration leveraging webhooks can also blend in with normal network traffic if the webhook endpoint points to a commonly used SaaS application or collaboration service.
Platforms: Windows, macOS, Linux, SaaS, Office Suite, ESXi
> Note: No Atomic Red Team tests available for this technique. See Atomic Red Team GitHub for updates.
Data loss prevention can be detect and block sensitive data being uploaded to web services via web browsers.
| Finding | Severity | Impact | | ---------------------------------------------- | -------- | ------------ | | Exfiltration Over Webhook technique applicable | Low | Exfiltration |
| CWE ID | Title | | ------- | --------------------------------- | | CWE-200 | Exposure of Sensitive Information |
| Case | Status | Duration (ms) | Turns | Tokens | Tool calls | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Without | With | Δ | Without | With | Δ | Without | With | Δ | Without | With | Δ | ||
case-01 | fail→fail | 36,429 | 30,410 | -17% | 1 | 1 | 0% | 4,271 | 5,290 | +24% | 0 | 0 | — |
case-02 | fail→fail | 29,843 | 30,235 | +1% | 1 | 1 | 0% | 3,505 | 5,323 | +52% | 0 | 0 | — |
case-03 | pass→pass | 25,419 | 15,825 | -38% | 1 | 1 | 0% | 2,703 | 2,870 | +6% | 0 | 0 | — |
case-22 | pass→pass | 25,217 | 23,540 | -7% | 1 | 1 | 0% | 2,914 | 3,925 | +35% | 0 | 0 | — |
case-04 | pass→pass | 21,434 | 7,703 | -64% | 1 | 1 | 0% | 3,060 | 1,518 | -50% | 0 | 0 | — |
case-05 | fail→pass | 57,912 | 8,602 | -85% | 1 | 1 | 0% | 2,579 | 2,596 | +1% | 0 | 0 | — |
case-06 | fail→pass | 15,744 | 9,256 | -41% | 1 | 1 | 0% | 1,625 | 1,630 | +0% | 0 | 0 | — |
case-07 | pass→pass | 9,342 | 6,900 | -26% | 1 | 1 | 0% | 646 | 1,383 | +114% | 0 | 0 | — |
case-08 | pass→pass | 17,348 | 7,778 | -55% | 1 | 1 | 0% | 2,078 | 1,461 | -30% | 0 | 0 | — |
case-09 | pass→pass | 2,140 | 6,894 | +222% | 1 | 1 | 0% | 399 | 1,381 | +246% | 0 | 0 | — |
case-10 | pass→pass | 8,971 | 4,801 | -46% | 1 | 1 | 0% | 1,458 | 1,702 | +17% | 0 | 0 | — |
case-11 | pass→pass | 14,274 | 9,508 | -33% | 1 | 1 | 0% | 1,142 | 1,627 | +42% | 0 | 0 | — |
case-12 | pass→pass | 22,749 | 16,227 | -29% | 1 | 1 | 0% | 2,648 | 2,763 | +4% | 0 | 0 | — |
case-13 | fail→pass | 9,786 | 6,452 | -34% | 1 | 1 | 0% | 1,668 | 1,276 | -24% | 0 | 0 | — |
case-14 | pass→pass | 10,696 | 2,679 | -75% | 1 | 1 | 0% | 796 | 1,422 | +79% | 0 | 0 | — |
case-15 | pass→pass | 21,502 | 14,167 | -34% | 1 | 1 | 0% | 2,625 | 2,622 | -0% | 0 | 0 | — |
case-16 | pass→pass | 16,823 | 2,137 | -87% | 1 | 1 | 0% | 1,796 | 1,483 | -17% | 0 | 0 | — |
case-17 | pass→pass | 15,714 | 10,164 | -35% | 1 | 1 | 0% | 2,359 | 1,870 | -21% | 0 | 0 | — |
case-18 | pass→pass | 24,672 | 22,486 | -9% | 1 | 1 | 0% | 3,307 | 3,941 | +19% | 0 | 0 | — |
case-19 | pass→pass | 19,170 | 7,754 | -60% | 1 | 1 | 0% | 2,676 | 1,550 | -42% | 0 | 0 | — |
case-20 | pass→pass | 20,501 | 33,401 | +63% | 1 | 1 | 0% | 3,778 | 6,287 | +66% | 0 | 0 | — |
case-21 | pass→pass | 19,185 | 17,087 | -11% | 1 | 1 | 0% | 2,809 | 4,162 | +48% | 0 | 0 | — |
DecimalAI ran this skill against gemini-3.6-flash twice over the same eval suite — once with the skill loaded and once without — and compared the two runs case by case. 22 cases were attempted. The headline lift of +14 percentage points is the difference between those two pass rates over the 22 comparable cases.
Without the skill loaded, the model failed this case. With it loaded, the same prompt on the same model passed. This is one improved case from the latest verified run; every case, including any that regressed, is in the table above.
Other measured skills in the registry, with their headline benchmark lift.