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Get Started Free →SPF, DKIM, and DMARC form the three pillars of email authentication. Together they prevent domain spoofing, validate message integrity, and define policies for handling unauthenticated mail. Proper im
.claude/skills/implementing-dmarc-dkim-spf-email-security/SKILL.md| Test case | Without → With | Effect | Δ tokens | Δ turns |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| case-07 | ✗→✓ | ▲ Improved | — | — |
| case-09 | ✓→✓ | = Same ✓ | — | — |
| case-19 | ✗→✗ | = Same ✗ | — | — |
| case-17 | ✗→✗ | = Same ✗ | — | — |
| case-21 | ✗→✗ | = Same ✗ | — | — |
SPF, DKIM, and DMARC form the three pillars of email authentication. Together they prevent domain spoofing, validate message integrity, and define policies for handling unauthenticated mail. Proper implementation drastically reduces phishing attacks that impersonate your organization's domain.
Publishes a DNS TXT record listing authorized IP addresses and mail servers that can send email on behalf of your domain. Receiving servers check the envelope sender's IP against this list.
Adds a cryptographic signature to outgoing emails using a private key. The corresponding public key is published in DNS. Receivers verify the signature to ensure the message was not altered in transit.
Builds on SPF and DKIM by specifying a policy (none/quarantine/reject) for messages that fail authentication, and provides a reporting mechanism to monitor spoofing attempts.
bash# Check existing SPF record dig TXT example.com | grep spf # Check existing DKIM selector dig TXT selector1._domainkey.example.com # Check existing DMARC record dig TXT _dmarc.example.com
# DNS TXT record for example.com
v=spf1 ip4:203.0.113.0/24 include:_spf.google.com include:spf.protection.outlook.com -allKey SPF mechanisms:
ip4: / ip6: - Authorize specific IP rangesinclude: - Include another domain's SPF recorda - Authorize domain's A record IPsmx - Authorize domain's MX record IPs-all - Hard fail all others (recommended)~all - Soft fail (monitoring phase)bash# Generate DKIM key pair (2048-bit RSA) openssl genrsa -out dkim_private.pem 2048 openssl rsa -in dkim_private.pem -pubout -out dkim_public.pem # Format public key for DNS (remove headers, join lines) grep -v "PUBLIC KEY" dkim_public.pem | tr -d '\n'
DNS TXT record at selector1._domainkey.example.com:
v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhki...# DNS TXT record at _dmarc.example.com
# Phase 1 (Monitor):
v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc-aggregate@example.com; ruf=mailto:dmarc-forensic@example.com; pct=100
# Phase 2 (Quarantine):
v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; rua=mailto:dmarc-aggregate@example.com; pct=25
# Phase 3 (Reject):
v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:dmarc-aggregate@example.com; pct=100Use the scripts/process.py to parse DMARC aggregate XML reports and identify authentication failures, unauthorized senders, and spoofing attempts.
| Case | Status | Duration (ms) | Turns | Tokens | Tool calls | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Without | With | Δ | Without | With | Δ | Without | With | Δ | Without | With | Δ | ||
case-19 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-09 | pass→pass | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-17 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-21 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-01 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-07 | fail→pass | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-02 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-03 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-10 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-22 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-13 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-14 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-11 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-16 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-18 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-06 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-08 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-20 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-04 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-05 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-12 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-15 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
DecimalAI ran this skill against gemini-3.6-flash twice over the same eval suite — once with the skill loaded and once without — and compared the two runs case by case. 22 cases were attempted. The headline lift of 0 percentage points is the difference between those two pass rates over the 22 comparable cases. 1 case got worse with the skill loaded, and it is included in that figure.
The per-case answers from this run were removed by the retention sweep, so the case table below shows the verdicts without the text either arm produced. The counts above were recorded at the time and are unaffected. Answers are now kept for 180 days.
Other measured skills in the registry, with their headline benchmark lift.