Install any skill in seconds. Free to start, no credit card required.
Get Started Free →Implements threat modeling using the MITRE ATT&CK framework to map adversary TTPs against organizational assets, assess detection coverage gaps, and prioritize defensive investments. Use when SOC teams need to align detection engineering with threat landscape, conduct threat assessments for new environments, or justify security tool procurement.
.claude/skills/implementing-threat-modeling-with-mitre-attack/SKILL.md| Model | Eval pass | Runs |
|---|---|---|
| gemini-3.6-flash | 100% | 33 |
| Test case | Without → With | Effect | Δ tokens | Δ turns |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| case-18 | ✗→✓ | ▲ Improved | — | — |
| case-19 | ✗→✓ | ▲ Improved | — | — |
| case-02 | ✗→✓ | ▲ Improved | — | — |
| case-16 | ✗→✓ | ▲ Improved | — | — |
| case-11 | ✗→✓ | ▲ Improved | — | — |
Use this skill when:
Do not use as a one-time exercise — threat models must be continuously updated as adversary TTPs evolve and organizational attack surface changes.
Research adversary groups targeting your sector using MITRE ATT&CK Groups:
pythonimport requests import json # Download ATT&CK STIX data response = requests.get( "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mitre/cti/master/enterprise-attack/enterprise-attack.json" ) attack_data = response.json() # Extract groups and their techniques groups = {} for obj in attack_data["objects"]: if obj["type"] == "intrusion-set": group_name = obj["name"] aliases = obj.get("aliases", []) description = obj.get("description", "") groups[group_name] = { "aliases": aliases, "description": description[:200], "techniques": [] } # Map techniques to groups via relationships relationships = [obj for obj in attack_data["objects"] if obj["type"] == "relationship"] techniques = {obj["id"]: obj for obj in attack_data["objects"] if obj["type"] == "attack-pattern"} for rel in relationships: if rel["relationship_type"] == "uses": source = rel["source_ref"] target = rel["target_ref"] for group_name, group_data in groups.items(): if source == group_data.get("id") and target in techniques: tech = techniques[target] ext_refs = tech.get("external_references", []) for ref in ext_refs: if ref.get("source_name") == "mitre-attack": group_data["techniques"].append(ref["external_id"]) # Example: Financial sector threat actors financial_actors = ["FIN7", "FIN8", "Carbanak", "APT38", "Lazarus Group"] for actor in financial_actors: if actor in groups: print(f"{actor}: {len(groups[actor]['techniques'])} techniques") print(f" Top techniques: {groups[actor]['techniques'][:10]}")
Create ATT&CK Navigator layers for priority threat actors:
pythonimport json def create_attack_layer(actor_name, techniques, color="#ff6666"): """Generate ATT&CK Navigator JSON layer for a threat actor""" layer = { "name": f"{actor_name} TTP Profile", "versions": { "attack": "15", "navigator": "5.0", "layer": "4.5" }, "domain": "enterprise-attack", "description": f"Techniques associated with {actor_name}", "techniques": [ { "techniqueID": tech_id, "tactic": "", "color": color, "comment": f"Used by {actor_name}", "enabled": True, "score": 1 } for tech_id in techniques ], "gradient": { "colors": ["#ffffff", color], "minValue": 0, "maxValue": 1 } } return layer # Create layers for top threat actors fin7_techniques = ["T1566.001", "T1059.001", "T1053.005", "T1547.001", "T1078", "T1021.001", "T1003", "T1071.001", "T1041"] layer = create_attack_layer("FIN7", fin7_techniques, "#ff6666") with open("fin7_layer.json", "w") as f: json.dump(layer, f, indent=2)
Export current detection rules mapped to ATT&CK:
spl--- Extract ATT&CK technique mappings from Splunk ES correlation searches | rest /services/saved/searches splunk_server=local | where match(title, "^(COR|ESCU|RBA):") | eval techniques = if(isnotnull(action.correlationsearch.annotations), spath(action.correlationsearch.annotations, "mitre_attack"), "unmapped") | stats count by techniques | mvexpand techniques | stats count by techniques | rename techniques AS technique_id, count AS rule_count
Create detection coverage layer:
pythondef create_coverage_layer(detection_rules): """Generate coverage layer from detection rule inventory""" technique_counts = {} for rule in detection_rules: for tech in rule.get("techniques", []): technique_counts[tech] = technique_counts.get(tech, 0) + 1 layer = { "name": "SOC Detection Coverage", "versions": {"attack": "15", "navigator": "5.0", "layer": "4.5"}, "domain": "enterprise-attack", "techniques": [ { "techniqueID": tech_id, "color": "#31a354" if count >= 2 else "#a1d99b" if count == 1 else "", "score": count, "comment": f"{count} detection rule(s)" } for tech_id, count in technique_counts.items() ], "gradient": { "colors": ["#ffffff", "#a1d99b", "#31a354"], "minValue": 0, "maxValue": 3 } } return layer
Overlay threat actor TTPs against detection coverage:
pythondef gap_analysis(threat_techniques, covered_techniques): """Identify detection gaps for specific threat actor""" gaps = set(threat_techniques) - set(covered_techniques) covered = set(threat_techniques) & set(covered_techniques) print(f"Threat Actor Techniques: {len(threat_techniques)}") print(f"Detected: {len(covered)} ({len(covered)/len(threat_techniques)*100:.0f}%)") print(f"Gaps: {len(gaps)} ({len(gaps)/len(threat_techniques)*100:.0f}%)") # Prioritize gaps by kill chain phase priority_order = { "TA0001": 1, "TA0002": 2, "TA0003": 3, "TA0004": 4, "TA0005": 5, "TA0006": 6, "TA0007": 7, "TA0008": 8, "TA0009": 9, "TA0010": 10, "TA0011": 11, "TA0040": 12 } gap_details = [] for tech_id in gaps: gap_details.append({ "technique": tech_id, "priority": "HIGH" if tech_id.split(".")[0] in ["T1003", "T1021", "T1059"] else "MEDIUM", "recommendation": f"Build detection for {tech_id}" }) return { "total_actor_techniques": len(threat_techniques), "covered": len(covered), "gaps": len(gaps), "coverage_pct": round(len(covered)/len(threat_techniques)*100, 1), "gap_details": sorted(gap_details, key=lambda x: x["priority"]) } # Run analysis result = gap_analysis(fin7_techniques, current_coverage)
Build a detection engineering roadmap:
yamlthreat_model_remediation_plan: assessed_date: 2024-03-15 primary_threats: - FIN7 (Financial sector) - APT38 (DPRK financial) - Lazarus Group (Destructive) current_coverage: 64% target_coverage: 80% priority_1_gaps: # 30-day target - technique: T1021.002 name: SMB/Windows Admin Shares data_source: Windows Security Event 5140 effort: Low detection_approach: Monitor admin share access from non-admin workstations - technique: T1003.006 name: DCSync data_source: Windows Security Event 4662 effort: Medium detection_approach: Detect DS-Replication-Get-Changes from non-DC sources priority_2_gaps: # 60-day target - technique: T1055 name: Process Injection data_source: Sysmon EventCode 8, 10 effort: High detection_approach: Monitor cross-process memory access patterns - technique: T1071.001 name: Web Protocols (C2) data_source: Proxy/Firewall logs effort: Medium detection_approach: Detect beaconing patterns in HTTP/S traffic priority_3_gaps: # 90-day target - technique: T1070.004 name: File Deletion data_source: Sysmon EventCode 23 effort: Low detection_approach: Monitor mass file deletion in sensitive directories
Test coverage using MITRE Caldera or Atomic Red Team:
bash# Using Atomic Red Team to validate coverage for FIN7 techniques # T1566.001 — Spearphishing Attachment Invoke-AtomicTest T1566.001 # T1059.001 — PowerShell Invoke-AtomicTest T1059.001 -TestNumbers 1,2,3 # T1053.005 — Scheduled Task Invoke-AtomicTest T1053.005 # T1547.001 — Registry Run Keys Invoke-AtomicTest T1547.001 # T1003 — Credential Dumping Invoke-AtomicTest T1003 -TestNumbers 1,2 # Verify detections # Check SIEM for corresponding alerts within 15 minutes
Document emulation results to validate threat model accuracy.
| Term | Definition | |------|-----------| | MITRE ATT&CK | Knowledge base of adversary tactics, techniques, and procedures based on real-world observations | | TTP | Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures — the behavioral patterns of adversary groups | | ATT&CK Navigator | Web tool for visualizing ATT&CK matrices as layered heatmaps showing coverage or threat profiles | | Gap Analysis | Process of comparing threat actor TTPs against detection coverage to identify blind spots | | Threat-Informed Defense | Security strategy prioritizing defenses based on actual adversary behaviors rather than theoretical risks | | Adversary Emulation | Controlled simulation of threat actor TTPs to validate detection and response capabilities |
THREAT MODEL ASSESSMENT — Financial Services Division
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
Date: 2024-03-15
Threat Actors: FIN7, APT38, Lazarus Group
Techniques Total: 87 unique techniques across all actors
DETECTION COVERAGE:
Covered: 56/87 (64%)
Gaps: 31/87 (36%)
Tactic Coverage Breakdown:
Initial Access: 78% ████████░░
Execution: 82% █████████░
Persistence: 71% ████████░░
Priv Escalation: 65% ███████░░░
Defense Evasion: 52% ██████░░░░ <-- Priority gap
Credential Access: 58% ██████░░░░ <-- Priority gap
Discovery: 45% █████░░░░░
Lateral Movement: 61% ███████░░░
Collection: 50% ██████░░░░
Exfiltration: 55% ██████░░░░
C2: 67% ███████░░░
TOP PRIORITY GAPS (30-day remediation):
1. T1055 Process Injection — used by all 3 actors, 0 detections
2. T1003.006 DCSync — used by FIN7 and Lazarus, 0 detections
3. T1070.004 File Deletion — evidence destruction, 0 detections
INVESTMENT RECOMMENDATION:
Closing top 10 gaps requires: 2 detection engineer FTEs, 60 days
Expected coverage improvement: 64% -> 76%| Case | Status | Duration (ms) | Turns | Tokens | Tool calls | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Without | With | Δ | Without | With | Δ | Without | With | Δ | Without | With | Δ | ||
case-20 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-01 | pass→pass | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-18 | fail→pass | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-19 | fail→pass | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-22 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-21 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-02 | fail→pass | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-03 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-04 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-12 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-16 | fail→pass | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-14 | pass→pass | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-11 | fail→pass | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-13 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-17 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-05 | fail→pass | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-09 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-10 | fail→pass | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-06 | pass→pass | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-07 | fail→pass | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-08 | fail→pass | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-15 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
DecimalAI ran this skill against gemini-3.6-flash twice over the same eval suite — once with the skill loaded and once without — and compared the two runs case by case. 22 cases were attempted. The headline lift of +41 percentage points is the difference between those two pass rates over the 22 comparable cases.
The per-case answers from this run were removed by the retention sweep, so the case table below shows the verdicts without the text either arm produced. The counts above were recorded at the time and are unaffected. Answers are now kept for 180 days.
Other measured skills in the registry, with their headline benchmark lift.