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Get Started Free →Reverse engineers malware binaries using NSA's Ghidra disassembler and decompiler to understand internal logic, cryptographic routines, C2 protocols, and evasion techniques at the assembly and pseudo-C level. Activates for requests involving malware reverse engineering, disassembly analysis, decompilation, binary analysis, or understanding malware internals.
.claude/skills/reverse-engineering-malware-with-ghidra/SKILL.md| Test case | Without → With | Effect | Δ tokens | Δ turns |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| case-23 | ✗→✓ | ▲ Improved | — | — |
| case-16 | ✗→✓ | ▲ Improved | — | — |
| case-20 | ✗→✓ | ▲ Improved | — | — |
| case-08 | ✓→✓ | = Same ✓ | — | — |
| case-02 | ✗→✗ | = Same ✗ | — | — |
Do not use for initial triage of unknown samples; perform static analysis with PEStudio and behavioral analysis with Cuckoo first.
Set up a Ghidra project and import the malware sample:
1. Launch Ghidra: ghidraRun (Linux) or ghidraRun.bat (Windows)
2. File -> New Project -> Non-Shared Project -> Select directory
3. File -> Import File -> Select malware binary
4. Ghidra auto-detects format (PE, ELF, Mach-O) and architecture
5. Accept default import options (or specify base address if known)
6. Double-click imported file to open in CodeBrowser
7. When prompted, run Auto Analysis with default analyzers enabledHeadless analysis for automation:
bash# Run Ghidra headless analysis with decompiler /opt/ghidra/support/analyzeHeadless /tmp/ghidra_project MalwareProject \ -import suspect.exe \ -postScript ExportDecompilation.py \ -scriptPath /opt/ghidra/scripts/ \ -deleteProject
Navigate the binary to locate critical code sections:
Navigation Strategy:
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
1. Start at entry point (OEP) - follow execution from _start/WinMain
2. Check Symbol Tree for imported functions (Window -> Symbol Tree)
3. Search for cross-references to suspicious APIs:
- VirtualAlloc/VirtualAllocEx (memory allocation for injection)
- CreateRemoteThread (remote thread injection)
- CryptEncrypt/CryptDecrypt (encryption operations)
- InternetOpen/HttpSendRequest (C2 communication)
- RegSetValueEx (persistence via registry)
4. Use Search -> For Strings to find embedded URLs, IPs, and paths
5. Check the Functions window sorted by size (large functions often contain core logic)Ghidra keyboard shortcuts for efficient navigation:
G - Go to address
Ctrl+E - Search for strings
X - Show cross-references to current location
Ctrl+Shift+F - Search memory for byte patterns
L - Rename label/function
; - Add comment
T - Retype variable
Ctrl+L - Retype return valueUse Ghidra's decompiler to understand function logic:
c// Example: Ghidra decompiler output for a decryption routine // Analyst renames variables and adds types for clarity void decrypt_config(BYTE *encrypted_data, int data_len, BYTE *key, int key_len) { // XOR decryption with rolling key for (int i = 0; i < data_len; i++) { encrypted_data[i] = encrypted_data[i] ^ key[i % key_len]; } return; } // Analyst actions in Ghidra: // 1. Right-click parameters -> Retype to correct types (BYTE*, int) // 2. Right-click variables -> Rename to meaningful names // 3. Add comments explaining the algorithm // 4. Set function signature to propagate types to callers
Follow the network communication code path:
Analysis Steps for C2 Protocol Reverse Engineering:
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
1. Find InternetOpenA/WinHttpOpen call -> trace to wrapper function
2. Follow data flow from encrypted config -> URL construction
3. Identify HTTP method (GET/POST), headers, and body format
4. Locate response parsing logic (JSON parsing, custom binary protocol)
5. Map the C2 command dispatcher (switch/case or jump table)
6. Document the command set (download, execute, exfiltrate, update, uninstall)Ghidra Script for extracting C2 configuration:
python# Ghidra Python script: extract_c2_config.py # Run via Script Manager in Ghidra from ghidra.program.model.data import StringDataType from ghidra.program.model.symbol import SourceType # Search for XOR decryption patterns listing = currentProgram.getListing() memory = currentProgram.getMemory() # Find references to InternetOpenA symbol_table = currentProgram.getSymbolTable() for symbol in symbol_table.getExternalSymbols(): if "InternetOpen" in symbol.getName(): refs = getReferencesTo(symbol.getAddress()) for ref in refs: print("C2 init at: {}".format(ref.getFromAddress()))
Identify and document cryptographic routines:
Common Malware Encryption Patterns:
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
XOR Cipher: Loop with XOR operation, often single-byte or rolling key
RC4: Two loops (KSA + PRGA), 256-byte S-box initialization
AES: Look for S-box constants (0x63, 0x7C, 0x77...) or calls to CryptEncrypt
Base64: Lookup table with A-Za-z0-9+/= characters
Custom: Combination of arithmetic operations (ADD, SUB, ROL, ROR with XOR)
Identification Tips:
- Search for constants: AES S-box, CRC32 table, MD5 init values
- Look for loop structures operating on byte arrays
- Check for Windows Crypto API usage (CryptAcquireContext -> CryptCreateHash -> CryptEncrypt)
- FindCrypt Ghidra plugin automatically identifies crypto constantsProduce actionable intelligence from reverse engineering:
bash# Generate YARA rule from unique code patterns found in Ghidra cat << 'EOF' > malware_family_x.yar rule MalwareFamilyX_Decryptor { meta: description = "Detects MalwareX decryption routine" author = "analyst" date = "2025-09-15" strings: // XOR decryption loop with hardcoded key $decrypt = { 8A 04 0E 32 04 0F 88 04 0E 41 3B CA 7C F3 } // C2 URL pattern after decryption $c2_pattern = "/gate.php?id=" ascii condition: uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and $decrypt and $c2_pattern } EOF
| Term | Definition | |------|------------| | Disassembly | Converting machine code bytes into human-readable assembly language instructions; Ghidra's Listing view shows disassembled code | | Decompilation | Lifting assembly code to pseudo-C representation for easier analysis; Ghidra's Decompile window provides this view | | Cross-Reference (XREF) | Reference showing where a function or data address is called from or used; essential for tracing code execution flow | | Control Flow Graph (CFG) | Visual representation of all possible execution paths through a function; reveals branching logic and loops | | Original Entry Point (OEP) | The actual start address of the malware code after unpacking; packers redirect execution through an unpacking stub first | | Function Signature | The return type, name, and parameter types of a function; applying correct signatures improves decompiler output quality | | Ghidra Script | Python or Java automation script executed within Ghidra to perform batch analysis, pattern searching, or data extraction |
Context: Behavioral analysis shows encrypted traffic to an external IP on a non-standard port. Network signatures cannot detect variants because the protocol is proprietary. Deep reverse engineering is needed to understand the protocol structure.
Approach:
Pitfalls:
REVERSE ENGINEERING ANALYSIS REPORT
=====================================
Sample: unpacked_payload.exe
SHA-256: abc123def456...
Architecture: x86 (32-bit PE)
Ghidra Project: MalwareX_Analysis
FUNCTION MAP
0x00401000 main() - Entry point, initializes config
0x00401200 decrypt_config() - XOR decryption with 16-byte key
0x00401400 init_c2() - WinHTTP initialization, URL construction
0x00401800 c2_beacon() - HTTP POST beacon with system info
0x00401C00 cmd_dispatcher() - Switch on 12 command codes
0x00402000 inject_process() - Process hollowing into svchost.exe
0x00402400 persist_registry() - HKCU Run key persistence
0x00402800 exfil_data() - File collection and encrypted upload
C2 PROTOCOL
Method: HTTPS POST to /gate.php
Encryption: RC4 with derived key (MD5 of bot_id + campaign_key)
Bot ID Format: MD5(hostname + username + volume_serial)
Beacon Interval: 60 seconds with 10% jitter
Command Set:
0x01 - Download and execute file
0x02 - Execute shell command
0x03 - Upload file to C2
0x04 - Update configuration
0x05 - Uninstall and remove traces
ENCRYPTION DETAILS
Algorithm: RC4
Key Derivation: MD5(bot_id + "campaign_2025_q3")
Hardcoded Seed: "campaign_2025_q3" at offset 0x00405A00
EXTRACTED IOCs
C2 URLs: hxxps://update.malicious[.]com/gate.php
hxxps://backup.evil[.]net/gate.php (failover)
Campaign ID: campaign_2025_q3
RC4 Key Material: [see encryption details above]| Case | Status | Duration (ms) | Turns | Tokens | Tool calls | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Without | With | Δ | Without | With | Δ | Without | With | Δ | Without | With | Δ | ||
case-23 | fail→pass | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-02 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-18 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-22 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-12 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-15 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-19 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-09 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-05 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-16 | fail→pass | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-01 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-13 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-03 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-04 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-06 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-07 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-08 | pass→pass | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-10 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-11 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-14 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-17 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-20 | fail→pass | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-21 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
DecimalAI ran this skill against gemini-3.6-flash twice over the same eval suite — once with the skill loaded and once without — and compared the two runs case by case. 23 cases were attempted. The headline lift of +13 percentage points is the difference between those two pass rates over the 23 comparable cases.
The per-case answers from this run were removed by the retention sweep, so the case table below shows the verdicts without the text either arm produced. The counts above were recorded at the time and are unaffected. Answers are now kept for 180 days.
Other measured skills in the registry, with their headline benchmark lift.