Use when designing or auditing AAMAS experiments - self-play and population-based training, opponent selection, equilibrium and regret metrics, game-theoretic simulations, ablations, seeds, hyperparameters, compute, and claim-to-evidence fit - with emphasis on experiments that probe the interaction rather than chase a single-agent leaderboard.
SkillScore86Maintained
Automatic
◆Research pack
Last verified 8/15/2026
What it changes
Passed 19 of 22 test cases with the skill, and 15 of 22 without it.
Without skill68%
With skill86%
Checks it passed that the model alone missed
The response includes the bracketed header [Claim -> evidence map].
The output includes the literal text bracket [Experiment readiness].
The output includes the literal text bracket [Reproducibility gaps].
and 4 more in the full report
6 fixed13 passed either way1 still failing2 broke
Pass-rate lift
+18 pp
Tokens
-14%
Agent turns
0%
Response time
-39%
Model gemini-3.6-flashMeasured 8/15/2026v119 of 22 cases passed with skill
Tokens, turns and time describe resource use, not a dollar price.
See it in action
One of 6 test cases the skill fixed. Same model, same prompt, with and without the skill.
1 of 6
Prompt
I am getting ready to submit my multiagent reinforcement learning paper on learned communication protocols. Could you review my experimental setup and provide a review? Please structure your feedback by giving an experiment readiness assessment, mapping my core claims to empirical evidence, identifying missing interaction evidence, pointing out reproducibility gaps, and recommending the single most decision-critical next run.
What was checked, without and with the skill
Checked
Without skill
With skill
The output includes the literal text bracket [Experiment readiness].
Missed
Passed
The output flags the absence of strategic deviation testing against uncooperative or held-out agents.
Missed
Passed
case-01 · gemini-3.6-flash · 8/15/2026 · answers are capped and redacted
What's inside
The instructions your model reads when the skill loads.
SKILL.md62 linessingle file
AAMAS Experiments
Use this before submission when the empirical or simulation story is not yet locked. At AAMAS
the experiment exists to test the interaction claim, not to top a benchmark.
Experiment audit
Map each empirical claim to a game, a self-play run, a population sweep, an ablation, or a
deviation test.
Choose opponents deliberately: self-play alone rarely suffices; include held-out opponents,
population sets, or classical strategies as the claim requires.
Separate simulations that validate a solution concept (where the equilibrium is known) from
real or applied studies that show practical multiagent behavior.
Report uncertainty for stochastic results over both seeds and opponents: standard errors,
confidence intervals, or paired tests.
Report the environment, number of agents, training regime, evaluation protocol, metrics,
hyperparameter ranges, chosen settings, seeds, hardware, software versions, and runtime.
Add ablations for the interaction mechanism (communication, reward sharing, the payment rule),
not just cosmetic variants.
Audit for the mismatch between the strategic claim and the setup: an equilibrium claim tested
against only one fixed opponent, or a cooperation claim that hides a reward-shaping constant.
What experiments are for at this venue
The strongest design shows the interaction under stress: agents that can deviate, opponents
the method did not train against, and populations that vary in size or composition.
One experiment that lets agents try to exploit the mechanism and fails to profit is worth more
than five extra environments where nothing strategic is tested.
Reviewers, often game theorists, check whether the metric matches the claim: convergence to a
named solution concept, exploitability, social welfare, or regret - not just episodic return.
Interaction-validation design table
Interaction claim
Matching experiment
Reject pattern avoided
Converges to equilibrium
Convergence/exploitability curve under simultaneous adaptation
"Equilibrium asserted, never measured"
Mechanism is truthful
Strategic-deviation test: an agent tries to misreport
"Truthfulness proved, never stress-tested"
Beats other agents
Round-robin vs held-out opponents and a population