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Get Started Free →Analyze volatile memory dumps using Volatility 3 to extract running processes, network connections, loaded modules, and evidence of malicious activity.
.claude/skills/performing-memory-forensics-with-volatility3/SKILL.md| Test case | Without → With | Effect | Δ tokens | Δ turns |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| case-09 | ✗→✓ | ▲ Improved | — | — |
| case-01 | ✗→✓ | ▲ Improved | — | — |
| case-11 | ✗→✓ | ▲ Improved | — | — |
| case-12 | ✓→✓ | = Same ✓ | — | — |
| case-05 | ✗→✗ | = Same ✗ | — | — |
pip install volatility3)bash# Install Volatility 3 pip install volatility3 # Or install from source for latest features git clone https://github.com/volatilityfoundation/volatility3.git cd volatility3 pip install -e . # Download Windows symbol tables (ISF packs) # Place in volatility3/symbols/ directory wget https://downloads.volatilityfoundation.org/volatility3/symbols/windows.zip unzip windows.zip -d /opt/volatility3/volatility3/symbols/ # Download Linux and Mac symbol packs wget https://downloads.volatilityfoundation.org/volatility3/symbols/linux.zip wget https://downloads.volatilityfoundation.org/volatility3/symbols/mac.zip # Memory acquisition tools (for live systems): # Windows: winpmem, DumpIt, FTK Imager # Linux: LiME (Linux Memory Extractor) sudo insmod lime-$(uname -r).ko "path=/cases/memory/linux_mem.lime format=lime" # Verify the memory dump file /cases/case-2024-001/memory/memory.raw ls -lh /cases/case-2024-001/memory/memory.raw
bash# Run banners plugin to identify the OS vol -f /cases/case-2024-001/memory/memory.raw banners # For Windows, identify the OS version vol -f /cases/case-2024-001/memory/memory.raw windows.info # Output example: # Variable Value # Kernel Base 0xf8047e200000 # DTB 0x1ad000 # Symbols ntkrnlmp.pdb/GUID # Is64Bit True # IsPAE False # primary layer Intel32e # KdVersionBlock 0xf8047ee232c0 # Major/Minor 15.19041 # Machine Type 34404 # KeNumberProcessors 4 # SystemTime 2024-01-18 14:32:15 UTC # NtBuildLab 19041.1.amd64fre.vb_release.191206-1406 # NtProductType NtProductWinNt # NtSystemRoot C:\WINDOWS # PE MajorOperatingSystemVersion 10 # PE MinorOperatingSystemVersion 0 # For Linux memory dumps vol -f /cases/case-2024-001/memory/linux_mem.lime linux.info
bash# List all running processes vol -f /cases/case-2024-001/memory/memory.raw windows.pslist | tee /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/pslist.txt # Show process tree (parent-child relationships) vol -f /cases/case-2024-001/memory/memory.raw windows.pstree | tee /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/pstree.txt # Detect hidden processes using cross-view analysis vol -f /cases/case-2024-001/memory/memory.raw windows.psscan | tee /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/psscan.txt # Compare pslist vs psscan to find hidden processes diff <(vol -f memory.raw windows.pslist | awk '{print $1}' | sort) \ <(vol -f memory.raw windows.psscan | awk '{print $1}' | sort) # List DLLs loaded by a suspicious process (PID 4532) vol -f /cases/case-2024-001/memory/memory.raw windows.dlllist --pid 4532 # Check for process hollowing and injection vol -f /cases/case-2024-001/memory/memory.raw windows.malfind | tee /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/malfind.txt # Dump suspicious process memory for further analysis vol -f /cases/case-2024-001/memory/memory.raw windows.memmap --pid 4532 --dump \ -o /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/dumps/
bash# List active network connections vol -f /cases/case-2024-001/memory/memory.raw windows.netscan | tee /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/netscan.txt # Filter for established connections vol -f /cases/case-2024-001/memory/memory.raw windows.netscan | grep ESTABLISHED # Filter for listening ports vol -f /cases/case-2024-001/memory/memory.raw windows.netscan | grep LISTENING # Extract network connections with process mapping vol -f /cases/case-2024-001/memory/memory.raw windows.netstat | tee /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/netstat.txt # Dump registry hives from memory vol -f /cases/case-2024-001/memory/memory.raw windows.registry.hivelist # Extract specific registry keys vol -f /cases/case-2024-001/memory/memory.raw windows.registry.printkey \ --key "Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run" # Check services vol -f /cases/case-2024-001/memory/memory.raw windows.svcscan | tee /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/services.txt
bash# Dump cached credentials (hashdump) vol -f /cases/case-2024-001/memory/memory.raw windows.hashdump | tee /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/hashes.txt # Extract LSA secrets vol -f /cases/case-2024-001/memory/memory.raw windows.lsadump # Dump cached domain credentials vol -f /cases/case-2024-001/memory/memory.raw windows.cachedump # Search for plaintext strings in process memory vol -f /cases/case-2024-001/memory/memory.raw windows.strings --pid 4532 \ | grep -iE '(password|credential|token|api.key)' # Extract command history from cmd.exe/powershell vol -f /cases/case-2024-001/memory/memory.raw windows.cmdline | tee /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/cmdline.txt # Extract environment variables vol -f /cases/case-2024-001/memory/memory.raw windows.envars --pid 4532
bash# Scan memory with YARA rules vol -f /cases/case-2024-001/memory/memory.raw yarascan \ --yara-file /opt/yara-rules/malware_index.yar | tee /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/yara_hits.txt # Scan specific process memory vol -f /cases/case-2024-001/memory/memory.raw yarascan \ --yara-file /opt/yara-rules/apt_rules.yar --pid 4532 # Check loaded kernel modules for rootkits vol -f /cases/case-2024-001/memory/memory.raw windows.modules | tee /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/modules.txt # Detect unlinked/hidden modules vol -f /cases/case-2024-001/memory/memory.raw windows.modscan | tee /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/modscan.txt # Check for SSDT hooks (System Service Descriptor Table) vol -f /cases/case-2024-001/memory/memory.raw windows.ssdt | grep -v "ntoskrnl\|win32k" # Dump a suspicious executable from memory vol -f /cases/case-2024-001/memory/memory.raw windows.dumpfiles --pid 4532 \ -o /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/extracted/
bash# Generate comprehensive analysis summary echo "=== MEMORY FORENSICS REPORT ===" > /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/memory_report.txt echo "Image: memory.raw" >> /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/memory_report.txt echo "OS: Windows 10 Build 19041" >> /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/memory_report.txt echo "" >> /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/memory_report.txt echo "--- Suspicious Processes ---" >> /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/memory_report.txt cat /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/malfind.txt >> /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/memory_report.txt echo "--- Network Connections ---" >> /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/memory_report.txt cat /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/netscan.txt >> /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/memory_report.txt echo "--- YARA Matches ---" >> /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/memory_report.txt cat /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/yara_hits.txt >> /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/memory_report.txt # Calculate hash of the memory dump for integrity sha256sum /cases/case-2024-001/memory/memory.raw >> /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/memory_report.txt
| Concept | Description | |---------|-------------| | Volatile data | Information that exists only in RAM and is lost when power is removed | | Process hollowing | Technique where malware replaces legitimate process memory with malicious code | | DLL injection | Loading unauthorized DLLs into a running process address space | | EPROCESS | Windows kernel structure representing a process; basis for process listing | | Pool scanning | Searching memory for kernel object signatures to find hidden artifacts | | VAD (Virtual Address Descriptor) | Memory management structure tracking process virtual memory regions | | ISF (Intermediate Symbol Format) | Volatility 3 symbol table format for OS-specific structure definitions | | Malfind | Plugin detecting injected code by examining VAD permissions and content |
| Tool | Purpose | |------|---------| | Volatility 3 | Primary open-source memory forensics framework | | LiME | Linux Memory Extractor for acquiring Linux RAM dumps | | WinPmem | Windows physical memory acquisition driver | | DumpIt | Comae one-click Windows memory dump utility | | YARA | Pattern matching engine for malware signature scanning | | Rekall | Alternative memory forensics framework (Google) | | MemProcFS | Memory process file system for memory analysis | | strings | Extract printable strings from binary memory dumps |
Scenario 1: Active Malware Investigation Acquire memory with DumpIt, run pslist/pstree to identify suspicious processes, use malfind to detect injected code in svchost.exe, dump the injected memory segment, scan with YARA rules identifying Cobalt Strike beacon, extract C2 IP from netscan, correlate with network logs.
Scenario 2: Credential Theft After Breach Run hashdump and lsadump to extract cached credentials, identify mimikatz execution in cmdline output, check for lsass.exe memory dumps in filesystem artifacts, correlate with lateral movement evidence in network connections.
Scenario 3: Rootkit Detection Compare pslist (uses EPROCESS linked list) with psscan (pool scanning) to find unlinked processes, check modules vs modscan for hidden kernel drivers, examine SSDT for hooks redirecting system calls, dump suspicious modules for static analysis.
Scenario 4: Ransomware Incident Recovery Extract encryption keys from ransomware process memory before system shutdown, identify the ransomware variant using YARA, find the initial execution point through command line artifacts, map lateral movement via network connections.
Memory Forensics Analysis:
Image: memory.raw (16 GB)
OS Identified: Windows 10 x64 Build 19041
Capture Time: 2024-01-18 14:32:15 UTC
Process Analysis:
Total Processes: 87
Hidden Processes: 2 (PIDs: 4532, 6128)
Injected Processes: 3 (malfind detections)
Suspicious: svchost.exe (PID 4532) - injected code at 0x7FFE0000
Network Connections:
Total: 45
Established: 12
Suspicious: 3 (C2 connections to 185.xx.xx.xx:443)
Credentials Found:
NTLM Hashes: 4 accounts
Cached Creds: 2 domain accounts
YARA Matches:
CobaltStrike_Beacon: PID 4532 (3 hits)
Mimikatz_Memory: PID 6128 (1 hit)
Extracted Artifacts: 15 files dumped to /analysis/extracted/| Case | Status | Duration (ms) | Turns | Tokens | Tool calls | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Without | With | Δ | Without | With | Δ | Without | With | Δ | Without | With | Δ | ||
case-05 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-02 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-23 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-19 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-17 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-21 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-04 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-13 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-03 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-18 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-15 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-22 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-12 | pass→pass | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-09 | fail→pass | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-01 | fail→pass | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-06 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-20 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-16 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-07 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-08 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-10 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-11 | fail→pass | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-14 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
DecimalAI ran this skill against gemini-3.6-flash twice over the same eval suite — once with the skill loaded and once without — and compared the two runs case by case. 23 cases were attempted, and 22 counted toward the lift figure. The other 1 produced results that are not comparable between the two arms, so they are excluded from the headline rather than averaged into it. The headline lift of +13 percentage points is the difference between those two pass rates over the 22 comparable cases.
The per-case answers from this run were removed by the retention sweep, so the case table below shows the verdicts without the text either arm produced. The counts above were recorded at the time and are unaffected. Answers are now kept for 180 days.
Other measured skills in the registry, with their headline benchmark lift.