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Get Started Free →Deploy Zeek network security monitor to capture, parse, and analyze network traffic metadata for threat detection, anomaly identification, and forensic investigation.
.claude/skills/performing-network-traffic-analysis-with-zeek/SKILL.md| Test case | Without → With | Effect | Δ tokens | Δ turns |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| case-09 | ✗→✓ | ▲ Improved | — | — |
| case-02 | ✗→✓ | ▲ Improved | — | — |
| case-03 | ✗→✓ | ▲ Improved | — | — |
| case-10 | ✗→✓ | ▲ Improved | — | — |
| case-06 | ✓→✗ | ▼ Worse | — | — |
Zeek (formerly Bro) is an open-source network analysis framework that operates as a passive network security monitor. Unlike traditional signature-based IDS tools, Zeek generates high-fidelity structured logs from observed network traffic, capturing detailed metadata for protocols including HTTP, DNS, TLS, SSH, SMTP, FTP, and dozens more. Zeek's extensible scripting language enables custom detection logic, behavioral analysis, and automated response. This skill covers deploying Zeek, understanding its log architecture, writing custom detection scripts, and integrating outputs with SIEM platforms.
Zeek operates in two main modes:
The processing pipeline consists of:
Zeek generates protocol-specific log files:
| Log File | Description | |----------|-------------| | conn.log | TCP/UDP/ICMP connection summaries with duration, bytes, state | | dns.log | DNS queries and responses with query type, answers, TTL | | http.log | HTTP requests/responses with URIs, user agents, MIME types | | ssl.log | TLS handshake details including certificate chain, JA3/JA3S | | files.log | File transfers with MIME types, hashes (MD5, SHA1, SHA256) | | notice.log | Alerts generated by Zeek detection scripts | | weird.log | Protocol anomalies and unexpected behaviors | | x509.log | Certificate details from TLS connections | | smtp.log | Email metadata including sender, recipient, subject | | ssh.log | SSH connection details and authentication results | | pe.log | Portable Executable file metadata | | dpd.log | Dynamic Protocol Detection failures |
bash# Install Zeek on Ubuntu sudo apt-get install -y zeek # Or install from Zeek repository echo 'deb http://download.opensuse.org/repositories/security:/zeek/xUbuntu_22.04/ /' | \ sudo tee /etc/apt/sources.list.d/zeek.list sudo apt-get update && sudo apt-get install -y zeek-lts # Verify installation zeek --version
Configure the node layout in /opt/zeek/etc/node.cfg:
ini[manager] type=manager host=localhost [proxy-1] type=proxy host=localhost [worker-1] type=worker host=localhost interface=eth0 lb_method=pf_ring lb_procs=4 [worker-2] type=worker host=localhost interface=eth1 lb_method=pf_ring lb_procs=4
Configure network definitions in /opt/zeek/etc/networks.cfg:
# Internal network ranges
10.0.0.0/8 Private RFC1918
172.16.0.0/12 Private RFC1918
192.168.0.0/16 Private RFC1918Edit /opt/zeek/share/zeek/site/local.zeek:
zeek# Load standard detection scripts @load base/protocols/conn @load base/protocols/dns @load base/protocols/http @load base/protocols/ssl @load base/protocols/ssh @load base/protocols/smtp @load base/protocols/ftp # Load file analysis @load base/files/hash-all-files @load base/files/extract-all-files # Load detection frameworks @load base/frameworks/notice @load base/frameworks/intel @load base/frameworks/files @load base/frameworks/software # Load additional protocol analyzers @load policy/protocols/ssl/validate-certs @load policy/protocols/ssl/log-hostcerts-only @load policy/protocols/ssh/detect-bruteforcing @load policy/protocols/dns/detect-external-names @load policy/protocols/http/detect-sqli # Enable JA3 fingerprinting @load policy/protocols/ssl/ja3 # Enable JSON output for SIEM ingestion @load policy/tuning/json-logs redef LogAscii::use_json = T; # Configure file extraction directory redef FileExtract::prefix = "/opt/zeek/extracted/"; # Set notice email redef Notice::mail_dest = "soc@example.com";
Create detection scripts for common threats:
Detect DNS Tunneling (/opt/zeek/share/zeek/site/detect-dns-tunnel.zeek):
zeek@load base/protocols/dns module DNSTunnel; export { redef enum Notice::Type += { DNS_Tunnel_Suspected }; # Threshold for suspicious DNS query length const query_len_threshold = 50 &redef; # Track query counts per host per domain global dns_query_counts: table[addr, string] of count &default=0 &create_expire=5min; # High query volume threshold const query_volume_threshold = 100 &redef; } event dns_request(c: connection, msg: dns_msg, query: string, qtype: count, qclass: count) { if ( |query| > query_len_threshold ) { local parts = split_string(query, /\./); if ( |parts| > 3 ) { local base_domain = cat(parts[|parts|-2], ".", parts[|parts|-1]); dns_query_counts[c$id$orig_h, base_domain] += 1; if ( dns_query_counts[c$id$orig_h, base_domain] > query_volume_threshold ) { NOTICE([$note=DNS_Tunnel_Suspected, $msg=fmt("Possible DNS tunneling: %s queries to %s with long query names", c$id$orig_h, base_domain), $conn=c, $identifier=cat(c$id$orig_h, base_domain), $suppress_for=30min]); } } } }
Detect Beaconing Behavior (/opt/zeek/share/zeek/site/detect-beaconing.zeek):
zeek@load base/protocols/conn module Beaconing; export { redef enum Notice::Type += { C2_Beacon_Detected }; # Track connection intervals global conn_intervals: table[addr, addr, port] of vector of time &create_expire=1hr; const min_connections = 20 &redef; const jitter_threshold = 0.15 &redef; } event connection_state_remove(c: connection) { if ( c$id$resp_p == 80/tcp || c$id$resp_p == 443/tcp ) { local key = [c$id$orig_h, c$id$resp_h, c$id$resp_p]; if ( key !in conn_intervals ) conn_intervals[key] = vector(); conn_intervals[key] += network_time(); if ( |conn_intervals[key]| >= min_connections ) { local intervals: vector of interval = vector(); local i = 1; while ( i < |conn_intervals[key]| ) { intervals += conn_intervals[key][i] - conn_intervals[key][i-1]; i += 1; } # Calculate mean and standard deviation local sum_val = 0.0; for ( idx in intervals ) sum_val += interval_to_double(intervals[idx]); local mean_val = sum_val / |intervals|; local variance = 0.0; for ( idx in intervals ) { local diff = interval_to_double(intervals[idx]) - mean_val; variance += diff * diff; } variance = variance / |intervals|; local stddev = sqrt(variance); if ( mean_val > 0 && (stddev / mean_val) < jitter_threshold ) { NOTICE([$note=C2_Beacon_Detected, $msg=fmt("Possible C2 beaconing: %s -> %s:%s (interval=%.1fs, jitter=%.2f)", c$id$orig_h, c$id$resp_h, c$id$resp_p, mean_val, stddev/mean_val), $conn=c, $identifier=cat(c$id$orig_h, c$id$resp_h), $suppress_for=1hr]); } } } }
Load threat intelligence feeds into Zeek:
zeek# In local.zeek @load frameworks/intel/seen @load frameworks/intel/do_notice redef Intel::read_files += { "/opt/zeek/intel/malicious-ips.intel", "/opt/zeek/intel/malicious-domains.intel", "/opt/zeek/intel/malicious-hashes.intel", };
Intel file format (/opt/zeek/intel/malicious-ips.intel):
#fields indicator indicator_type meta.source meta.desc meta.do_notice
198.51.100.50 Intel::ADDR abuse.ch Known C2 server T
203.0.113.100 Intel::ADDR threatfeed Ransomware infrastructure Tbash# Deploy Zeek cluster sudo /opt/zeek/bin/zeekctl deploy # Check cluster status sudo /opt/zeek/bin/zeekctl status # Process offline PCAP zeek -r capture.pcap local.zeek # View logs cat /opt/zeek/logs/current/conn.log | zeek-cut id.orig_h id.resp_h id.resp_p proto service duration orig_bytes resp_bytes # Search for specific connections cat /opt/zeek/logs/current/dns.log | zeek-cut query answers | grep -i "suspicious" # Rotate logs sudo /opt/zeek/bin/zeekctl cron
Filebeat configuration for ELK Stack:
yamlfilebeat.inputs: - type: log enabled: true paths: - /opt/zeek/logs/current/*.log json.keys_under_root: true json.add_error_key: true fields: source: zeek fields_under_root: true output.elasticsearch: hosts: ["https://elasticsearch:9200"] index: "zeek-%{+yyyy.MM.dd}" setup.template.name: "zeek" setup.template.pattern: "zeek-*"
bash# Find top talkers by bytes cat conn.log | zeek-cut id.orig_h orig_bytes | sort -t$'\t' -k2 -rn | head -20 # Find long-duration connections (potential C2) cat conn.log | zeek-cut id.orig_h id.resp_h id.resp_p duration | awk '$4 > 3600' | sort -t$'\t' -k4 -rn # Find connections with unusual ports cat conn.log | zeek-cut id.resp_p proto | sort | uniq -c | sort -rn | head -30
bash# Find self-signed certificates cat ssl.log | zeek-cut server_name validation_status | grep "self signed" # Extract JA3 fingerprints for known malware cat ssl.log | zeek-cut ja3 server_name | sort | uniq -c | sort -rn # Find expired certificates cat ssl.log | zeek-cut server_name not_valid_after | awk -F'\t' '$2 < systime()'
capture_loss.log for dropped packets| Case | Status | Duration (ms) | Turns | Tokens | Tool calls | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Without | With | Δ | Without | With | Δ | Without | With | Δ | Without | With | Δ | ||
case-23 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-19 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-09 | fail→pass | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-11 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-20 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-13 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-17 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-21 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-18 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-02 | fail→pass | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-03 | fail→pass | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-01 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-22 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-04 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-05 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-14 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-10 | fail→pass | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-08 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-16 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-07 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-06 | pass→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-12 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
case-15 | fail→fail | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
DecimalAI ran this skill against gemini-3.6-flash twice over the same eval suite — once with the skill loaded and once without — and compared the two runs case by case. 23 cases were attempted. The headline lift of +13 percentage points is the difference between those two pass rates over the 23 comparable cases. 1 case got worse with the skill loaded, and it is included in that figure.
The per-case answers from this run were removed by the retention sweep, so the case table below shows the verdicts without the text either arm produced. The counts above were recorded at the time and are unaffected. Answers are now kept for 180 days.
Other measured skills in the registry, with their headline benchmark lift.